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Abstract
INDEXICAL EXPRESSIONS: SYNTAX AND CONTEXT
by
Barbara Bevington
Adviser: Professor Robert W. Fiengo
Indexicals are those expressions in natural language—such as I, you, here, and now— 
whose reference varies with occasion of use, picking out individuals in virtue of their 
contextual roles. Although analyses of the semantics of indexicals have been advanced—most 
notably by Kaplan—their syntax has heretofore been largely ignored. This dissertation puts 
forth a theory of the syntax of indexical expressions, within the framework of generative 
grammar, and proposes a new model of the formal context for natural language.
The central argument against prior accounts of indexicals is that such theories draw 
the distinction between the first and second person pronouns versus third person incorrectly. 
Evidence for syntactic "uniformity"—that first, second and third person expressions are 
individuated in the same way—is presented in chapter 2. It is concluded that Kaplan’s notion 
of "character" as a semantic function from context to individual is theoretically inadequate. 
Hypothesized instead is syntactic "orientation," a function that operates at the syntactic level 
of logical form, the output of which is not individuals but syntactic indices. The resulting 
proposed structure of the formal context is thus two-tiered; the syntactic input to the semantic 
component is uniform across first, second and third person expressions.
Analysis of the "switch" phenomenon in chapters 3 and 4 lends support to the 
syntactic orientation hypothesis. A natural account of switch is advanced within Fiengo and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
May’s dependency theory, through the assumption that dependencies may occur among 
syntactic orientations. The existence of two derivational levels at logical form—as proposed 
in the new model—is revealed to be crucial to the explanation of more complicated switch 
data. Additionally, evidence is presented that oriented sentences are the structure of choice in 
the making of expressive utterances such as "speech acts."
In chapter 5, syntactic orientation is shown to provide a natural way of describing the 
pronominal systems across languages. Furthermore, the new model is generalized to include 
non-pronominals, yielding a general theory of indexical expressions. Finally, "demonstrative" 
expressions are defined with respect to indexicals, with which they are argued to be in 
complementary distribution.
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IChapter 1: Indexical expressions
1.0 What are indexicals?
Human language is primarily a tool used for communication between people in 
particular settings, unfolding in time. Whatever knowledge of language is, it allows a speaker 
(or signer) to encode information in a structured string o f verbal noises (or physical 
movements). If all goes well, this structured string is correctly heard (or seen) by the 
intended recipient, whose knowledge of language in turn allows him to decode it. This 
knowledge includes the ability to appropriately incorporate facts from the speech context 
itself—information as to who is talking where and when—an inclusion that is vitally necessary 
due to the fact that a large part of human language is "indexical." Indexicality can be defined 
functionally as the device within language that operates from expressions of the language—that 
is, what is said—to contextual objects and individuals, in virtue of their participatory roles at 
the occasion o f use. It is through indexicality that a language not only occurs in, but also can 
be anchored to, the context delimited by the people who are using it to communicate.
The content of a "pure” indexical expression can only be known through the con tex t- 
such expressions include the first and second person pronouns /  and you, and place and time 
words such as here and now. A sentence that contains these four indexicals, such as (1), has 
the content that it has in virtue of being said by—say—Alice to Bob from her office at four 
o’clock. Said by—say—Chuck to Dianne from his kitchen at noon, it would have an almost 
entirely different content.
(1) I think you should come here now
Simply put, indexical expressions are shifters—that is, their content shifts from one thing to 
another, dependent on the context: if the context changes as indicated above, the content of I
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for an utterance o f (1) shifts from Alice to Chuck, the content o f you shifts from Bob to 
Dianne, and so on. Furthermore, indexicality is not limited to free expressions, but can also 
occur in bound morphemes—for example, as with the verbal tense system in English. 
Assuming the functional definition o f indexicality above, tenses are more often than not 
indexical: because the verb think in (1) is in the simple present tense, native speakers of 
English know that the "thinking" said to be occurring is contemporaneous with the context of 
utterance, and not in some time prior to it, which would be conveyed by substituting the past 
tensed thought. Note that not all uses of tense are indexical, such as the "timeless" use of the 
simple present in a sentence like two is an even prime, and in academic writing in general.
I have followed here in essence the modern usage of the term "indexical" established 
by Bar-Hillel (1954), drawing from C.S. Peirce’s classification of signs.1 In this important 
paper, Bar-Hillel took his colleagues to task for ignoring indexicality in their semantic 
models. Indexicality is essential to include in semantic theory, he argued, for two reasons: 
first, because indexical expressions comprise a large part of human language, and importantly, 
because it turns out that there are things that cannot be said non-indexically, without assuming 
other knowledge on the part of the addressee.
The first point is fairly intuitive. As far as I know, no one has attempted to actually 
count them and calculate, but estimates as to the percentage of utterances that contain 
indexicals go very high. Bar-Hillel himself guessed "more than 90%"; intuitively, the 
percentage of indexicals would be much higher in everyday conversation than it would be i n -  
say—a science textbook. I take it as uncontroversial and obvious that indexicality is 
pervasive. It is Bar-Hillel’s second point that was more important, for no matter how 
ubiquitous they may be, if all indexical sentences can be completely translated into non-
1 For discussion of Peirce’s classification system, see Burks (1949).
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3indexical sentences, it could be argued that a semantic model need account only for the latter.
However, the second point may seem counterintuitive. Isn’t it the case that anything 
that anyone would want to say can be said without indexicals? After all, a speaker can, and 
often does, refer to himself or to his listener in the third person, and any place or time picked 
out by a particular use of here or now  can be referred to by some unique non-shifting 
expression, such as New York City or Tuesday, January 27th, 1998, 2:30 pm. To make his 
argument, Bar-Hillel invented the entertaining example of Tom Brown, who having decided to 
speak without indexicals, and wanting breakfast in bed, could not manage to express to his 
wife what he could have expressed by the indexical sentence (2a). Assuming that Tom could 
somehow manage to use verbs tenselessly, a possibility such as (2b) will not do the job.
(2) a. I am hungry now
b. Tom Brown is hungry at eight o ’clock
Why is this so? Even if it is supposed that his wife must know his name, she would require— 
say—a clock and the ability to tell time to know what time is being referred to by the 
expression eight o 'clock—two requirements not necessary to knowing the reference of the 
expression now. In fact, for every non-indexical possibility that Tom might try to use, 
additional knowledge of some kind on the part of his wife is required, knowledge that she 
would not have to have to understand (2a). To understand (2a), all she needs to know is 
English. A similar case is given more recently by John Perry (1997), who finding himself 
standing next to W.V.O. Quine at a party, cannot say non-indexically what he could 
otherwise express to Quine by the indexical sentence I ’d like to shake your hand. Among 
other problems, he cannot refer to himself as John Perry because unlike Tom Brown and his 
wife. Perry assumes that Quine does not know his name.
Bar-Hillel’s and Perry’s examples both turn on the knowledge that may or may not be
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4assumed between speaker and addressee: there are non-indexical expressions which uniquely 
pick out the same contextual elements as the indexicals in these examples do, if only 
everybody had perfect, comprehensive knowledge of everything. However, no amount of 
knowledge will help in the making of a "speech act," which cannot be done non-indexically. 
When Austin (1962) first identified them, he observed that such utterances always contain a 
first person singular pronoun. It may be possible to perform a promising act without words, 
by establishing a convention that—say, to clap hands behind one’s back counts as a promise. 
But it does not seem possible to perform the speech act of promising by saying something in 
the third person: when I say Barbara promises I may have referred to myself and be 
reporting on a promise I have made, but clearly in so saying I have not promised. In order to 
do something with words—classically, to promise, to bet, to marry, to christen, to order—the 
indexical first or second person pronouns seem to be required. When Jack says I  love you to 
Susan, he can be declaring love—something he cannot do with an utterance of Jack loves 
Susan.
Is indexicality then essential to—a necessary property of—human language? Could 
there be a human language that did not have indexicality? Such questions remain mysteries.
Is indexicality universal? To answer positively would be to say that the function of anchoring 
expressions of the language to the context of use is universally realized—and for what it’s 
worth, I know o f no evidence to the contrary. This is not to say that there are words or 
morphemes in every language that have the identical "meanings" of—say—English I  and you , 
for even a cursory look across the pronominal systems of different languages shows that this 
is false. Such systems vary in the way they "cut up" the context and in the manner of lexical 
realization. Even within the history o f English there were once two forms for the second 
person where now there is one, once a three-way distinction singular, dual and plural where 
now dual forms do not exist. What would it mean to say that two languages had identical
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5indexical systems? It would be to say that their systems were functionally isomorphic: that 
each indexical anchor in language A has a functional correlate in B, and vice versa.2
In this dissertation I seek an explanatory account o f the grammar o f indexical 
expressions in English, working within the general framework of generative grammar. It is 
my view that a proper theory of indexicality presupposes a treatment of syntactic identity of 
the sort required by syntactic binding theory (Chomsky 1981). Some of the most revealing 
perspectives on indexicality involve the relative positions o f indexicals in structures and the 
interpretations they receive. Although I discuss other approaches where I feel it is 
appropriate, I generally assume binding theory and dependency theory as developed by Fiengo 
and May (1994) in Indices and Identity, as well as their rendering of the syntactic level of 
logical form. The core of my analysis centers on the syntax of first and second person 
pronouns, and in that light can be seen as further evidence for, as well as an extension of, the 
Fiengo and May account. But although the center of the thesis involves pronouns and their 
syntax, I do not plan to ignore other indexical expressions nor other components o f the
2 How many different indexical systems are there? Looking just at the pronouns of 71 
languages, ignoring case and gender features, Ingram (1978) counts 21 distinct "person 
systems" for pronouns—all of which, however, make at least a three-way person (first-second- 
third) distinction. Given that many languages are extinct and that many others do not yet 
exist, as well as the possible human languages that may never be manifest in the fullness of 
time, questions of universality are, of course, impossible to answer using brute force methods, 
but theorists do still make the claim. In an extensive summary of language typology research, 
Anderson and Keenan (1985) report that mechanisms that express person, spatial and temporal 
indexicality are "universally" manifest, although the distinctions that the systems they describe 
make vary greatly. For two extreme examples compared to English, consider Thai and 
Malagasy. Thai is claimed to have 25 first person forms, most of which "could be used, 
depending on context, as translations of the English first person singular pronoun." Spatially, 
where English has the two-way distinction here and there, Malagasy has seven forms ety, eto, 
eo, etsy, eny, eroa, ery, along the dimension closer-to-the-speaker to further-away-ffom-the- 
speaker. "Universal" claims can also lead to some odd conclusions: finding lexical 
instantiation of the "concepts" I, YOU, HERE, and NOW "universally" is evidence for 
Wierzbicka (1996) that these four indexicals are "semantic primitives" upon which other 
meanings are built. It is not clear which "I-concept" in Thai, and which "HERE-concept" in 
Malagasy she would claim are the "semantically primitive" ones corresponding to English I 
and here.
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6grammar. I intend to construct a general theory o f the knowledge and use o f indexical 
expressions.
1.01 Acquiring indexicals
In the Chomskyan framework I assume, a grammatical account o f a particular subpart 
of language should be consistent with what is known about how it is acquired (cf., Chomsky 
1975). Language acquisition research along these lines is still a fairly young field. The 
acquisition of indexicals as a class has been surveyed in a few early studies o f deixis; more 
recently, the indexical pronouns have been investigated both in isolation and also with respect 
to pronoun acquisition in general. Although the results are inconclusive and at times 
contradictory, these studies are nevertheless highly suggestive.
In one early study, Clark (1978) hypothesized that there is a continuity in acquisition 
from "deictic gestures" such as pointing, to "deictic words," a category in which she includes 
indexicals. Pointing gestures begin to be used by infants "communicatively" well before they 
acquire their first words, at around nine months to a year old. A demonstrative based on 
there or that, used along with a pointing gesture, is usually one of a child’s first ten words, 
and always one of the first fifty. While the first pronoun to appear is a first person pronoun 
like /  or me, the I/you contrast is often not worked out until well after the second birthday. 
Clark found the order o f acquisition of the indexical pairs that contrast deictically to be first 
l/you, followed by here/there, then this/that, while command o f verbs that contain a deictic 
contrast such as come/go and bring/take comes much later, often as late as eight years old. A 
similar acquisition order was found by Tanz (1980), who also noted that in each pair, the 
"proximal" member seems to be mastered first.
Although pronouns are abundant in the adult speech around them, language learners 
initially avoid using pronouns, relying on names alone to refer to themselves and others.
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7When pronominal forms arrive, they are not necessarily being used as an adult uses them. 
Many researchers of pronoun acquisition have observed that there is a stage between two and 
two and a half years at which children systematically confuse /  and you, intermittently using 
first person for their addressees and second for themselves—tor example, see Chamey 1980, 
Chiat 1981. This claim has been disputed by Girouard et al. (1997), who in a longitudinal 
study of children acquiring French or English, found no first and second person "reversals." 
Across both languages, they found that correct comprehension of all of the first, second and 
third person pronouns occurs simultaneously at around two years old, and subsequently, in 
production, first person appears in speech prior to second and third person forms. The failure 
o f Girouard et al. to observe reversals may be due to the artificial nature of their 
comprehension and production tasks; in contrast. Dale and Crain-Thoreson (1993) videotaped 
"precocious talkers" less than two years old in unstructured play, and found that 57% made at 
least one reversal error between first and second person forms.
Confusion between first and second person has also been shown by Petitto (1986) to 
occur in the acquisition o f the indexical pronouns in deaf children learning American Sign 
Language (ASL) as a first language. One might think that the early command o f pointing 
gestures exhibited by all normal babies would give these deaf children a leg up in learning the 
first and second person pronouns, since the words for "I" and "you” in ASL are the index 
finger pointing at the speaker and addressee, respectively, within the signing space. But 
analogously to hearing children learning spoken language, while the deaf children can 
effectively point as a gesture, they avoid the words that mean "I" or "you" in favor of names. 
Furthermore, when the indexical pronouns appear in their signing, they confuse first and 
second person, often pointing at themselves to mean "you" and away from themselves to 
mean "I." Mastery of the I/you contrast occurs as late as for the hearing children.
In looking across these studies, the conclusion seems to be that indexicals are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8surprisingly difficult to learn. There is agreement that the child’s first indexical "word" is 
usually a first person pronoun. It seems clear, however, that it cannot be claimed that the 
child has fully mastered the first person until the first person/second person contrast for the 
indexical pronouns is evident—which in many children may be from six months to a year 
after the first forms appear. Furthermore, it seems to be the case that it is not until the I/you 
contrast is made that other indexicals can be acquired; I/you is prior to here/there, which in 
turn is prior to this/that.
1.02 How to use indexicals: some not-so-simple ways
There are those who would respond to the question: what do we know when we 
know how to use indexicals? with the answer "pragmatic rules.” Their idea is that all there 
is to know about a particular indexical expression is a matter of its appropriate use. This is 
clearly a mistake.
The confusion comes from wrongly assuming that, because indexicals evaluate to 
individuals in context, their treatment must be exclusively in terms o f use. The result is 
descriptions like: /  is used by a speaker to refer to himself, you is used to refer to the hearer, 
third person forms are used to refer to someone else; here is used to indicate the location of 
the speaker, now  is used for the time o f the utterance. Such descriptions are said to be the 
pragmatic rules o f indexicality. Various hedges may be appended: the time span covered by 
now and the physical space delimited by here may vary. "Speaker” may be improved to 
"sender" or "source," and "hearer” to "intended recipient" or "addressee"—terms that include 
sign language and written language. Aside from refining such rules o f use to cover all the 
cases, on this view, that is all there is to it: these terms are indexicals because they are used 
in the way that they are. But the right way to think about it is the reverse: these terms are 
used as they are because they are indexicals.
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speakers in the way described above because they are the tools within language that can do 
that. Language is a big toolbox, and faced with a task, a speaker selects a tool to do the job. 
Knowledge of language involves not only knowing which tools are in the box and what each 
can do, but also knowing structuring rules that allow the combination of given tools to create 
complex tools to tackle novel tasks. So the question is, what is it about indexicals that makes 
it possible to use them indexically?
The first point is that indexicals are syntactically more complex than non-indexical 
expressions—a claim that I will argue for in specific detail throughout this dissertation. The 
added complexity o f indexicals explains why they are more difficult to learn, and also 
explains why certain things can be done with indexicals—such as making a speech act or 
telling your wife you’re hungry—that cannot be done non-indexically. It is their additional 
structure that make indexicals appropriate tools for anchoring the language to the context. To 
say /  am hungry is to say something syntactically more complex than Tom Brown is hungry.
This is not to say that there are no pragmatic rules about using indexical expressions. 
Plenty of rules govern the use of expressions in general, and as expressions indexicals are 
subject to them. The claim is that pragmatic rules are not defining o f  indexicals. For 
example, there is no rule that tells a speaker: "Use the first person to refer to yourself." For 
one thing, notice that unlike well-known pragmatic rules, this one is seemingly impossible to 
flout, and so does not have the property o f being defeasible. A speaker simply cannot up and 
decide to use the first person to refer to someone else. Kaplan (1978) gives the example of a 
deluded man, believing himself to be de Gaulle, saying I  am a general. Despite his beliefs, 
the deluded man has referred to himself and not de Gaulle with I.
On the other hand, there seem to be general pragmatic rules determining which 
expression, given a choice among expressions that pick out the same individual, a speaker will
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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opt for in a particular circumstance. Such rules apply to all expressions with equal force, 
whether they are indexical or not. One of these rules I will call the Precision principle, which 
is something like, "Select the most precise tool for the task," and can be argued to be a 
corollary of the maxim of quantity, one of Grice’s cooperative principles (see Grice 1989).
One chooses sentences under syntactic descriptions, with respect to given tasks. If a speaker 
is following this rule, most typically the more precise tool for the task of referring to himself 
will be the syntactically complex indexical pronoun /. But there are other circumstances in 
which to follow the rule, the more precise tool for referring to oneself might not be first 
person, such as in a recorded or written message where there is reason to doubt the 
recipient’s knowledge of the appropriate context. In these cases, the additional syntactic 
complexity of the indexical subtracts from its precision because there is a question whether it 
can be reliably anchored to context.3
The familiar defeasibility of a pragmatic rule can also be illustrated here, for there are 
also circumstances where the speaker violates or deliberately flouts the Precision principle and 
in so doing raises conversational implicatures. For example, imagine the circumstance under 
which I might ask a conference participant (3a) instead o f (3b).
3 Note that a general cooperation principle like Precision has more explanatory power 
than a pragmatic rule that is particular to a single word or to an individual feature like "first 
person." From the Precision principle it follows that indexicals, being more complex 
expressions structurally, will more often have priority over non-indexicals. This 
phenomenon—only one o f the things that follows from Precision—is described by Fillmore 
(1997) for the specific case of time words under a notion o f indexical "preemption.” In his 
specific example, if it is Wednesday, the indexical tomorrow  "preempts" a third person day 
name like Thursday:; that is why, he says, a sentence like I  will arrive this Thursday cannot 
appropriately be uttered on Wednesday, rather one must say I  will arrive tomorrow. But 
contrary to what Fillmore seems to suggest, this "preemption" is not a particular property of 
time indexicals or even of indexicals generally, but rather follows from Precision—which, 
furthermore, can also explain the reverse case: why in a written message, the indexical 
tomorrow may be avoided in favor of I  will arrive Thursday, even though the message is both 
sent and received on Wednesday. Fillmore’s description gives reasons why tomorrow  is 
favored over Thursday in the former case, but does not explain why Thursday is favored over 
tomorrow in the latter case; both choices follow from the general Precision principle.
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(3) a. What do you think of Bevington’s theory?
b. What do you think of my theory?
While I haven’t said that I am not Bevington, by the violation o f choosing the less precise 
tool, I may have misled her into thinking so, or into thinking that there is another linguist 
named Bevington. Why would I want to mislead her? Perhaps I believe that she will not 
reveal her true opinion of a theory to its author. Perhaps I don’t want to admit that the 
theory is mine until I know that she believes it to have merit.
Notice that if my addressee at the conference finds out later that I am Bevington that 
she couldn’t say I had lied to her about who I was, which is also why flouting Precision can 
be effective even if she knows very well that I am Bevington, and even if  I know that she 
knows this. Still she will not be confused by the question (3a), but make some other 
assumption concerning my decision to not use the more precise tool: perhaps I want to 
suggest that I am interested in discussing the theory objectively, with no personal feelings 
involved; perhaps I want to distance myself from it, implying that I have since changed my 
views. These are familiar kinds o f implicatures that come from following, violating or 
flouting a pragmatic rule, outlined in the work of Grice.
Indeed it is common to find cases of speakers using the third person instead of first or 
second to refer to themselves or their hearers. For example, on the campaign trail, the 
challenger in the recent U.S. presidential election often used his full name to refer to himself, 
rather than the first person form /, as in (4).
(4) Bob Dole is an honest man
The implicatures of this particular flouting are not entirely obvious—indeed, during the 
campaign I heard commentators puzzling over Dole’s use of the third person—but any listener
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wiil have some kind of idea: perhaps he did not want to appear to be a braggart. I doubt that 
anyone assumed that he was talking about some other person named "Bob Dole." On the 
other hand, there seems to be no plausible reason Tom Brown might have to flout the cooper­
ative principle when he wants breakfast in bed and is talking to his wife, which is why Tom 
Brown is hungry said in this circumstance seems much odder than Dole's utterance o f (4).
1.03 Indexical transplants
In the cases above, non-indexical expressions can be used to refer to individuals in the 
context for which an indexical is available. Are there opposite cases, of indexicals being used 
to pick out individuals who are not in the context? Yes, but they are quite different from 
those above. While examples of indexicals evaluating to something other than the expected 
contextual individuals do exist, I would claim that they are nonetheless picking out the 
expected individuals in a different context. In such cases, the "picking out" proceeds 
normally, but it seems as if the indexical expression has been "transplanted” into another 
context where evaluation occurs. The most common case of this is direct quotation.
Although it occurs more often in written than spoken English, indexicals under the verb say, 
as in (5a), evaluate not to the context o f utterance but to the context of the "saying" that is 
being reported. In my dialect of spoken English I would rather use present tense go or 
colloquial like, as in (5b-c), which have many similarities to say, to the same effect: in (5a), 
(5b) and (5c), the content o f I  is Jack, not the speaker.4
4 The use of English like as a context shifting device was first brought to my attention by 
Lillo-Martin (1992), analogous to "point-of-view shift" in American Sign Language. Lillo- 
Martin identifies a particular movement of the body as the ASL shifting device. Once this 
body movement has occurred, the sign for "I"—which recall is the index finger pointing at the 
signer—refers to the individual who has been shifted to. More than one shift can occur in a 
single "utterance," exemplified below (preserving Lillo-Martin’s notation). In (i), the two "I" 
signs refer to Bill and Al respectively, neither of whom is the signer; note that the same
(continued...)
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(5) a. Jack said, "I’m tired"
b. Jack goes, I’m tired
c. Jack was like, I’m tired
It might be thought that such examples show that the indexicality o f /  does in fact involve 
only a pragmatic rule, and that the examples in (5) show a flouting of that rule. But on the 
contrary, cases o f direct quotation are perfectly sound, and intuitively do not seem to violate 
anything. Rather, these cases seem to be evidence that indexicality can survive a forced 
"transplanting" to a context different from the context o f utterance. In the case o f direct 
quotation, the context of evaluation is explicitly indicated by the verbs of saying.
The ability to transplant indexicals to evaluation in alternate contexts—which 
themselves seem to continue to follow their internal indexicality—is not limited to direct 
quotation, but seems to be something speakers can readily do in other kinds o f cases. For 
example, in the context for (6a), there has been a shift to another "speaker," and in (6b) to a 
future time.
(6) a. Ventriloquist's dummy: I am made of wood 
b. Answering machine: I am not here right now
Without transplantation, (6a) and (6b) would have to both be false: beings that can talk are 
generally not made of wood, and how could it be possible that I  am not here right now  is 
true, whenever that sentence is used? Indeed that sentences like these must both be false has
4(...continued)
observation holds for the two occurrences of I  in the English gloss.
(i) aBILL (SHIFT) jINFORMb bAL; (SHIFT) ,INFORMa 
Bill;, (I;) informed A1-; and (Ij) informed (him;)
Bill’s like, I told Al, and AI’s like, I told him
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been claimed. But clearly it could be argued that both (6a) and (6b) might be true, as 
follows. In (6a), the first person pronoun /  does not refer to the actual speaker, the 
ventriloquist, but to the apparent speaker, the dummy, who may well be made of wood.
When the ventriloquist "throws" his voice to create the illusion that the dummy is speaking, 
the indexical expression is "thrown" into a different context o f evaluation that is thus created, 
in much the same way as the explicit Jack said in (5a) "throws" the following indexical into 
Jack’s mouth. In (6b), while I  refers to the actual speaker who recorded the message and not 
the machine playing the message, now refers to the time of message playback, and here means 
the location in which it would be possible to answer the telephone at the moment of the call, 
which may be neither the place the message was recorded nor the location of the message 
playback; taken altogether, it is certainly possible that that person is not at that place at that 
time. In this case, the telephone answering technology "throws” the message not into another 
speaker but into a future time and possibly different place—whenever it may be that someone 
might call.
Native speakers of English watching the ventriloquist’s act or hearing the answering 
machine easily interpret the indexicals in (6). Similarly, when Olivier, on stage as Hamlet, 
says I, when the automated teller machine says How may I  help you?, the native speaker is 
not confused as to who "I” is. But like direct quotation, these examples are clearly not 
examples of flouting rules but rather using the normal function of the indexical expressions to 
achieve the particular ends of the speakers in each situation. If the ventriloquist or Olivier did 
not use indexicals, would the disbelief of the audience be suspended? Could a non-indexical 
sentence on the answering machine or ATM give the sense of immediacy or personal response 
as effectively as the indexical message? But although speakers can readily understand 
transplanted indexicals in cases like those given, this ability is not without limits. Recall 
Kaplan’s example of the man who believes himself to be de Gaulle. Even in conversation
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between him and—say—a physician fully aware o f his mental state, a transplanting to the 
context of his delusions cannot occur: when he says /, he refers to himself and not de Gaulle. 
That is, despite his delusions, he cannot change the fact that he and not de Gaulle is speaking. 
But the ventriloquist can. As another example, consider the interpretation of (7), which 
asserts that the situation in the consequent would arise in the circumstances where Jack is the 
speaker of the sentence. But who would be angry? Not Jack, which would be the case if the 
indexical I were interpreted in these same circumstances. Unlike in (5), I  evaluates to the 
actual speaker of (7). Here, the attempt to overtly set up a context transplant has failed.
(7) If Jack were speaking this sentence, I would be angry
On the other hand, in the counterfactual (8), the indexical I  in the consequent seems to have 
undergone a transplanting away from the actual context of utterance in virtue of the content of 
the hypothetical.
(8) If I were Jack, I’d marry Susan
How and when transplantation to alternate contexts can occur demands explanation in 
a proper theory of indexicals, and I will return to the discussion of such cases throughout this 
chapter and the next.5 In the case where the indexical /  is "thrown" from one to another
5 It is interesting to speculate that the notion of transplantation may account for an even 
wider range of phenomena: for example, the generic or "impersonal" uses of the first or 
second person pronouns that occurs in many languages. In an analysis of, among others,
"moral or truism" examples like (i), Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990) hypothesize that the speaker 
can... "abstract the 2nd person pronoun away from...the immediate speech act domain to the 
sphere of a universally applicable life drama script.... A sense of informal camaraderie is 
often present with the use o f impersonal you  precisely because the speaker assigns a major 
’actor’ role to the addressee." (p. 752)
(i) You kill yourself to raise your kids properly, and guess what happens
(continued...)
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mouth—literally or figuratively, when now  is "thrown" from one to another time, when here 
is "thrown" from one to another place—for these transplants, as well as the cases discussed in 
the previous section, an exclusively pragmatic account o f indexicality is inadequate. Of 
course if a sentence that contains indexicals is separated from its context—such as the slip of 
paper in a bottle that reads only I am here—its referential content is obscure: who is "I" and 
where is "here”? But a treatment of indexicals that describes only their pragmatics is no 
account at all. So we’re back to the question: what is it that we know when we use and 
understand indexicals?
1.1 Kaplan’s theory of indexicals6
The scope of "Demonstratives," Kaplan’s (1977) comprehensive theory of indexicals, 
is accurately described by its subtitle: "an essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and 
epistemology of demonstratives and other indexicals." I will be concerned primarily with 
Kaplan’s treatment of the first two of these, semantics and logic. Note that his interests do 
not include the syntax of indexicals, which is mentioned neither in this subtitle nor anywhere 
within his theory. This omission is one I attempt to remedy in this dissertation.
Kaplan observes that any utterance of (9a) is "deeply, and in some sense...universally, 
true,” while an utterance of a non-indexical counterpart such as (9b) is empirical, and 
develops a formal semantic analysis for indexicals and demonstrative expressions that accounts
^f... continued)
Because the context of "a universally applicable life drama script" is not as clear to me as the 
circumstances of a ventriloquist’s act, I will leave the transplantation account of such generic 
uses as a suggestion, and not attempt to develop it further.
6 What I call "Kaplan’s theory" is actually spread over three papers—in the discussion 
here I rely primarily on "Demonstratives" (1977), noting in the text points specifically taken 
from "Dthat" (1978) or "Afterthoughts" (1989).
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for, among other things, this observation.7
(9) a. I am here now
b. David Kaplan is in Portland on 26 March 1977
Central to Kaplan’s analysis is his notion of "character." Briefly explained, the 
character of the indexicals such as I  and here is functionally different from that o f the 
expressions David Kaplan and Portland. From how the character function is formally defined 
it will follow that the indexicals /  and here will evaluate to the agent and location o f a 
context, from which it follows that the former will always be in the latter, but there is no 
comparable function for expressions like David Kaplan and Portland from which this will 
always follow in any context. This notion of character will be discussed in more detail 
below.
But first a note concerning terminology. Kaplan calls his analysis a theory of 
"indexicals," using "indexical" as a general term to include two "subtypes": "pure 
indexicals" and "true demonstratives." The former are expressions I have called simply 
indexicals; the latter are certain uses o f expressions, such as he or that man, perhaps 
accompanied by some kind of pointing at a man. This usage of terms has elsewhere been 
reversed by Kaplan and others, where the term "demonstrative" is used as the general term 
including both "subtypes." While Kaplan’s decision to group demonstratives along with 
indexicals under one theory has been widely accepted and adopted, for reasons that will 
become clear I do not accept this unification, and so will use "indexical” and "demonstrative”
7 In fact, it is not very difficult to find circumstances in which I am here now  is false.
For example, if the sentence is uttered slowly while moving quickly, the individual picked out 
by I  will no longer be in the location referred to by here at the moment indicated with now. 
Another example, due to Richard Kayne, involves a ventriloquist who has "thrown his voice" 
so that the location referred to by here in /  am here now is in fact not his current location.
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for the "subtypes," intending neither term as a general category including the other.
On the view I will advance here, Kaplan’s claim that there is a definable semantic 
property that demonstratives share with indexicals cannot be upheld. I will argue that his 
notion of demonstrative character is fundamentally different from indexical character, and that 
not only do the two properties not belong in the same class, but their explanation lies in 
different components o f the grammar. I will claim that neither of these properties is, in fact, 
a semantic property: on my view, demonstrative character is pragmatic, and indexical 
character is syntactic. Even though what Kaplan identifies as demonstrative character has 
shifted in his writing over time, on any identification it is better explained in a theory of use 
than in semantics. Furthermore, returning to the analysis o f indexicals in chapter 2, I will 
argue that the proper explanation o f  what Kaplan identifies as the character o f indexicals lies 
in syntax and not, as he has it, in semantics. But before deconstructing the notion of 
character into other notions along these lines, Kaplan’s claims need to be understood in a little 
more detail.
1.11 Direct reference, character and content
Why does Kaplan group demonstratives along with indexicals under the same formal 
treatment? First, he observes that, like names, they are both "directly referential," 
expressions whose content simply is the individual—that is, there is no mediation such as a 
Fregean "sense" between the expression and the individual. But unlike names, demonstratives 
and indexicals both are "unstable," in that the content o f a demonstrative expression such as 
that one or he, like the content o f I  or here, varies from occasion to occasion. Names can be 
thought of as directly referential expressions that are "stable." Important to Kaplan is that his 
notion of direct reference underlies the philosophical concept of rigid designation, but this 
issue is not critical here.
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Kaplan begins by separating the "meaning" of an indexical into two components. One 
part o f an indexical’s "meaning" is the linguistic rule or procedure, known by every 
competent speaker, that determines its content—for example, the rule for I  can be paraphrased 
roughly as being ’’the speaker of the utterance’’—or, as Kaplan prefers "agent of the context.” 
Such phrases are not intended to be synonymous to or substitutable for occurrences o f  /, but 
rather a characterization of what the linguistic rule for the indexical does. According to 
Kaplan, while something like this rule is, intuitively, what a speaker who knows the 
"meaning" of /  knows, such a rule is not part of the "meaning” of a sentence containing the 
indexical. For example, the ’7-rule" is not any part of the propositional content of I  am 
hungry, which rather contains the individual that was picked out by the rule. These two 
different kinds of identifiable "meaning" Kaplan calls, respectively, "character” and 
"content." The content is "what is said,” and the character is "that which determines 
content." While the character is not part o f the content, it determines the content, and so may 
be given formal definition as a junction "from context to content." Although their reference 
is mediated by a linguistic rule, indexicals are directly referential in the sense that the content 
of, for example, /  simply is the individual who happens to be the "agent of the context."
Separating character and content as two components of indexical ’’meaning” as Kaplan 
does results in a two-stage semantic theory. The first stage, which is called ’’pre-semantic" in 
Kaplan 1989, is where the function of character operates "from context to content." The 
second stage is where more familiar semantic analysis occurs, such as the calculation o f 
quantifiers and modal operators like possibility and necessity, as well as questions of truth or 
falsity. Kaplan is careful to distinguish between "context" and "circumstance of utterance"; 
the latter being what is used in the second stage of the semantical system for such evaluation. 
That contents of indexicals should be determined prior to the second stage is supported by 
Kaplan’s example given as (10) below. The content of "actually," "here" and "now" is
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actuality at the place and time of the utterance, and this is so even though the indexicals are in 
the scope of "possible," "in Pakistan," and "in five years.”
(10) It is possible that in Pakistan, in five years, only those who are actually here now will
be envied
Kaplan’s two-stage model will also account for the fact that while an utterance of I  am here 
now will always be true, it will not be necessary. Although the characters of the expressions 
in (9a) are different from those in (9b), the content o f (9a) is the same as the content of (9b), 
and it is the content that is evaluated in the scope of a necessity operator at the second stage.
So far, I have discussed only how Kaplan’s theory works for indexicals—how does it 
fare with other expression types? For indexicals, character is identified with their associated 
linguistic rule, but once Kaplan defines character functionally as whatever it is that operates 
"from context to content," every expression will have something that serves this function, 
though it may not look like a rule or procedure. For each expression type, he can ask what 
serves this function "from context to content," and the answer will be the expression’s 
character, by definition. Some expressions, like names, have the same content in every 
context; each name thus has a "stable” character that would be represented formally in his 
system as a constant function.
What about Kaplan’s claims for demonstrative expressions? Like an indexical, a 
demonstrative is "unstable,” its content changing from context to context. What serves the 
function to the content for a demonstrative? The candidates for character are none of them 
entirely satisfactory, and on this matter Kaplan himself has changed his views. In Kaplan 
1977, it simply is the demonstration—the extra-linguistic pointing or physical gesture, 
whatever it may be that accompanies the expression. As with indexicals, while the character 
(physical pointing) determines the content, it is not part of the content: demonstratives are
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directly referential in that their content simply is the individual thus picked out. The analogy 
with indexicals is furthered by Kaplan’s claim that the demonstrative’s referent is determined 
by the demonstration as absolutely and rigidly as an indexical’s is by rule: if a speaker says 
that while pointing at object X, even though he meant to point at Y, the content o f the 
demonstrative is X. In Kaplan 1978, this is illustrated by the case of the speaker who, 
without looking, points to the place on the wall where Rudolf Carnap's picture has previously 
hung and says something like that is a great philosopher, unaware that a picture of Spiro 
Agnew now hangs there. Because the gesture demonstrates a picture not of Carnap but of 
Agnew, Kaplan argues that the demonstrative expression refers to Agnew. No matter what 
the speaker meant, what he has just said is that Agnew is a great philosopher. He concludes 
that the function that operates "from context to content” for a demonstrative is the pointing 
gesture itself.
That there are problems with identifying physical pointing as demonstrative character 
Kaplan himself was aware of in the earlier papers. There’s the "mischievous fellow who 
switched pictures" who would, after all, know that the speaker did not intend to refer to 
Agnew, and probably would not take him to be doing so. There’s the fact that pointing or 
other physical gestures can be vague, imprecise, or simply indeterminate of which object is 
picked out. By "Afterthoughts" (1989), Kaplan abandons physical demonstration, and instead 
favors the idea that the character of a demonstrative is the speaker’s intention. On this later 
idea, it is through the hearer’s recognition o f the speaker’s intention to demonstrate object X 
that X is the content of the demonstrative. Clearly this view is incompatible with the 
intuitions for Carnap-Agnew, which Kaplan retroactively decides is an exceptional case.
Whichever is decided upon—either a physical pointing or the speaker’s intention to 
point—the character o f a demonstrative is external to language, as compared to the character 
of an indexical, which is internal to language. In the next two sections I will argue that the
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differences between the two are fundamental; only the latter should be treated in grammatical 
theory.
1.12 On pointing
In this section 1 digress from Kaplan's theory in order to discuss some simple 
observations about pointing, and the role that pointing has in language and the use of 
demonstrative expressions. I will argue that it is not a physical pointing at an object, nor a 
speaker’s intention to point at an object, that determines its referent. I will put forth the 
argument that pointing is not a tool that can refer; linguistic expressions are such tools. A 
particular expression refers to an object, although its lexical content may underdetermine what 
that is. In certain circumstances—including those in which pointing gestures are employed in 
a particular way—such underspecified expressions are felicitous. As a result, those 
pointings—or indeed the recognition o f the speaker’s intentions to point, however such 
recognition is achieved—are helpful pragmatic clues to a hearer in figuring out what has been 
said. My claim is not that pointing, or the intention to point, is unimportant, but that the 
proper explanation of demonstration lies in the theory of language use, and not, as Kaplan has 
it, under the notion of semantic character.
Pointing at an object draws attention to it. There is nothing else, on this view, that 
pointing does. "Drawing attention" to something is not the same as "referring” to it. While 
the prototype point is the index finger extended from an otherwise closed fist, let’s include in 
the category any gesture that can be similarly interpreted: one can point with a shift o f one’s 
eyes, with a toss of the head, or a vague wave of the hand, and so on. Whatever the gesture, 
the function of pointing is to cause a particular object in the environment to stand out from 
the others. In this it may succeed or fail. It can be effective without language, although a 
certain level o f intelligence is required; any visitor to the zoo knows that chimpanzees and
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some other primates use pointing communicatively, both in turning their attention to 
something that has been pointed at, and in pointing to draw someone's attention to something 
(usually food—see Leavens et al. 1996), but my cats can neither point nor do they understand 
pointing. A prelinguistic baby points at her juice bottle, clearly hoping that the caregiver will 
hand it over, but in so doing she has not referred to the bottle.
By itself, a physical pointing is not, and cannot be used as, a referring expression; it 
cannot, for example, take the place of a word as part of a sentence. That the examples in 
(11) are both ungrammatical shows that a demonstration alone, represented here by the iconic 
picture i®*, cannot by itself fill the subject position of a sentence or the object position of a 
verb.
(11) a. * US’ is beautiful 
b. * Jack likes US’
Physical pointing, however, often does accompany expressions that occur in these kind of 
positions—grammatically speaking, noun phrase positions. A point can accompany an 
expression whose referent is fully determinable linguistically: as when saying /, I point to 
myself, or when calling on a student, the teacher says their name while pointing at them. It is 
not these superfluous pointings, but the w/aferspecified noun phrase expressions often 
accompanied by a point, that are called "demonstrative," paradigmatic cases being the third 
person pronouns he, she, and that, and noun phrases of the form [that N], Two examples are 
given in (12), where the parenthesized icon (US’) indicates that a physical demonstration (of 
whatever kind) has occurred along with the preceding expression. In such uses, pointing has 
the same function—drawing attention to some object in the environment—as when it occurs 
without language.
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(12) a. She (US’) is beautiful 
b. Jack likes that (US’)
However, such expressions do not require a pointing gesture on the part of the speaker. If an 
object already is standing out in the environment in some obvious way, no pointing is 
necessary: o f the egg that has just exploded in the carton, a speaker can say look at that!, 
where that is a "demonstrative" expression that can only mean the egg that has drawn 
attention to itself, as it were, by exploding, and not any of the eleven well-behaved eggs. 
Similarly, when the bakeshop lady picks up a cookie to put in my bag and I say I don’t want 
that one I do not bother to point, because her picking-up action has done the "demonstrating" 
already. Indeed the object need not be standing out in any physical way, but may simply be 
top-of-mind for the conversational participants; when my girlfriend telephones to say he called 
me! who else could it be but the new boyfriend whom she cannot stop thinking and talking 
about. The reasons that a particular object might be standing out in a circumstance are so 
various that the task o f describing what does the "demonstrating" for the demonstrative 
becomes hopeless.
Are noun phrases and locative adverbials such as there the only linguistic expressions 
with which physical pointing is felicitous? Clearly not—below are two that come to mind.
(13) a. Look! (US’) 
b. Wow! (BSP)
It might be argued, though, that these examples are actually shortened or elided forms of 
sentences that do contain a demonstrative phrase—in full these might be analyzed as Look [at 
that/over thereJ! and [That is] wow! But a "hidden NP" analysis is unlikely for the case of a 
speaker pointing at a dark cloud and saying (14).
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(14) It’s going to rain ( jjg )
Clearly there is no noun phrase in (14) that refers to the cloud. It is not a candidate, since
(14) does not say that the cloud is going to rain—and there is no other NP candidate in the 
sentence that the pointing gesture could be accompanying. Indeed, the cloud is intuitively not 
any part of the content o f (14). But pointing at it clearly may be felicitous and meaningful to 
the participants in this conversation: by drawing attention to the cloud, the speaker is in all 
likelihood offering the cloud’s appearance as relevant to the weather prediction being made.
The speaker has drawn attention to the cloud, but did not refer to the cloud.
These examples show that demonstrative expressions can be used felicitously without 
pointing, and that pointing can occur meaningfully without demonstrative expressions. On 
this view the name "demonstrative" for these expressions is unfortunate, and may itself have 
led to the mistaken idea that the "demonstration" must be part of a demonstrative’s 
"meaning." But if the claim that demonstration is no part of their "meaning" can be upheld, 
how do such expressions manage to refer? After all, the expressions that are used as 
"demonstratives" are those whose lexical content seriously underdetermines their reference.
That is, they can "mean" almost anything in some large range. In what circumstances would 
a speaker nonetheless choose to use such a defective expression as the most precise tool to 
refer to a particular object? When could such use be felicitous? The answer, I believe, lies 
once again with Grice’s maxim of quantity. It is often forgotten that in addition to "be as 
informative as required," the maxim continues, "don’t be more informative than required."
Say enough, but do not say too much. A speaker following this maxim will choose 
expressions that convey enough information to determine the referent, but no more. One 
example where the use of such an underspecified expression would be felicitous is the case 
where there is something standing out in the environment that very obviously must be the
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referent. Such cases have already been discussed. Compare two possible utterances in the 
circumstance where the egg has just exploded, neither o f  which is accompanied by a 
demonstration, shown in (15). To refer to the egg, (15a) uses the lexically underspecified 
that, while (15b) uses a fully specified descriptive phrase. Now it seems to me that to say 
(15a) is to be as informative as required, while to choose (15b) instead would be to be more 
informative than required, and thus pragmatically odd by the maxim of quantity.
(15) a. Look at that!
b. Look at the egg that just exploded!
Or suppose our car has broken down in a snowstorm and a large dark spot appears in the 
distance. That’s a truck! I yell. Of course I do not point, for the referent for that could be 
nothing other than the one object in the otherwise blank visual field. By the maxim of 
quantity, I have been as informative as I need to be; to say The large dark spot (that has 
appeared in the distance in the white nothingness) is a truck would be far too informative.
So underspecified expressions such as that or he felicitously refer just in case they are 
enough to secure reference—and to say more would be too much—according to the maxim o f 
quantity. But now we can generalize the point of pointing. Because pointing has the effect o f 
drawing attention to an object, it can be used by speakers to alter the circumstances in such a 
way that these lexically underspecified tools are enough to handle the task of referring to the 
desired object. That is, pointing creates conditions similar to the natural situations o f the egg 
exploding, or the truck in the snowstorm, where to say more would be too much. By 
pointing at the orange cat and saying he knocked over the wine glass, I have used the pronoun 
he to refer to the cat. I need choose an expression no more specified than he, for having 
created a circumstance in which attention is drawn to the orange cat with my pointing, to say 
more—by using his name, or a description that uniquely specifies him and not some other
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male in the household—would be to be more informative than is pragmatically required. A 
further welcome result o f  this account is that no special explanation is required for the so- 
called "deferred uses" o f  demonstratives, discussed by Nunberg (1993), as when a speaker 
points to a book and says h e ’s a great writer, referring to the author. Note that pointing at 
pictures of individuals, such as in the Carnap-Agnew example, is also such a "deferred use" 
o f demonstration, since the intended referent is the man, not the picture. The speaker has not 
referred to a book, or a picture, by pointing, but the gesture did bring to prominence the 
individual who is referred to with foe linguistic expression he—the author, in the case of the 
book, or the person portrayed in foe picture. On foe other hand, if while pointing at the 
orange cat I say I  must remember to buy some Frisfdes, I have not referred to him, because 
foe only tool that can refer is a linguistic expression, and no expression in the sentence I 
uttered did so.
A witness evaluates the suspects in a police line-up. Pointing at suspect #3, she says 
h e ’s the one who did it. Without the accompanying point, this would be an ambiguous 
utterance, for he, by itself, can refer to anyone in foe line-up, or any other male individual. 
From foe point of view o f a listener trying to figure out what has been said, a physical gesture 
thus can function as a disambiguator. But in linguistic analysis, that point of view is foe 
wrong way around. The witness’s utterance is felicitous because she is pointing; he succeeds 
in referring because she has created the circumstance in which he—although linguistically 
speaking could be referring to any of the several men in the room or indeed any male at 
all—in fact refers to #3. Because the pointing has drawn attention to suspect #3, to say more 
than he would be to say too much by the maxim of quantity, and thus he succeeds in referring 
to #3. To refer to someone else while pointing at #3, a great deal more would have to be 
said. But to refer to #2> while pointing at #3, he is enough, and not too much. This is not to 
say that foe pointing determines foe referent, or is part of the "meaning” of the expression.
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The same utterance, without a pointing, would have been felicitous in referring to #3, said 
following suspect #3’s collapse into a seizure.
Such pragmatic conventions may fail. In pointing, the witness might have a visual 
disorder whereby the apparent position of an object is to the right of its actual position, so she 
believed herself to be pointing at suspect #2. But this can be corrected: as it3 is handcuffed, 
she can protest that she intended to point at #2, and the police will release HZ. Similarly, she 
might say h e ’s the one who did it without pointing, believing #3 to be standing out already in 
an obvious way, but again fail, it not being at all obvious to her audience who will probably 
say who/which one do you mean? That demonstration can fail, and be corrected; that 
speakers can believe in error that "demonstration" has already occurred—these are reasons to 
place the explanation for it within in the theory o f use, and not, as Kaplan does, in semantics.
Some care needs to be taken: the claim is not that there are no "demonstratives," but 
rather that being accompanied by a demonstration is not defining o f  this class of expressions.
An expression that co-occurs with a demonstration is not necessarily being used 
"demonstratively," nor is it necessarily a "demonstrative." Intuitively, however, there are 
"demonstratives"—a subset of "underspecified" expressions that can co-occur with a 
demonstration, that are used in cases where the intended referent has prominence—whether 
this prominence is achieved through the act of a demonstration or not. When they are used in 
this way, they are being used "demonstratively," whether they co-occur with a demonstration 
or not. As a class, such expressions are distinct from another subset that can be used for 
"familiar" referents: [the N] and the neuter pronoun it in English fall into the latter group but 
not the former. To repeat the general claim being made here: linguistic expressions—that is 
to say, pieces of syntax containing words—are the only tools that can refer. The so-called 
"demonstratives" succeed in referring, despite their underspecificity, because they are used in 
circumstances where to say more would be to say more than is necessary to secure reference.
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When a particular object is prominent, or when attention has been drawn to an object through 
pointing, a subsequent or co-occurring linguistic expression need have very little lexical 
substance in order to succeed in referring. But without the linguistic expression, there can be 
no referring; until the child learning English accompanies her pointing with a word, she—like 
the chimp—is only pointing.
1.13 Internal versus external pointing
To account for indexicals and demonstratives under the same theory, as Kaplan does, 
is to claim that the character—linguistic rule or procedure—does the same thing for an 
indexical as the character—physical pointing or an intention—does for a demonstrative. In the 
previous section I argued that reference is not determined for a demonstrative through the 
demonstration, but rather that the demonstration creates a circumstance in which the use of a 
demonstrative is felicitous, and in many circumstances, a demonstration is not required to 
make such use felicitous. Given this understanding of a demonstration, let’s ask whether what 
Kaplan identifies as indexical character—the "linguistic rule or procedure” that picks out the 
appropriate contextual individual—can be thought o f as the correlate to the demonstration, as 
simply a pointing, or intention to point, that happens to be internal to language.
In comparing this "internal pointing" to the external kind, the first clear difference 
between them is that they are learned at quite different times in the language acquisition 
process, as discussed in section 1.01. Recall that external pointing is mastered by children 
before their first birthday, and that demonstrative expressions accompanied by pointing are 
among their first words, while they do not have command of their first expressions that 
contain internal pointing—the indexical pronouns—until well after two years old. This is true 
even for deaf children acquiring ASL, in which the "internal" pointing is in fact physically 
external. But the two kinds of pointing are nevertheless sharply distinguished for them:
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although the deaf children point at things quite early to draw attention to them, the pointing 
gestures that are words—the indexical pronouns—are mastered much later, contemporaneously 
with hearing children’s mastery o f I  and you.
A second difference is the availability o f charity: with external pointing there is a 
leeway that is not evident with the internal pointing. As seen in the witness example above, 
the identification of the culprit with external pointing can be in error and subsequently 
corrected. Even in Kaplan’s Camap-Agnew case, the speaker can explain about the pictures 
and correct the error. When the pointing gesture fails for whatever reason—by not exactly 
aligning with the target, by picking out more than one object, or no object—in all of these 
cases the hearer may understand anyway through charity. Indeed it is reflections such as 
these that led Kaplan to revise his idea that the character o f a demonstrative was the speaker’s 
intention. But there is no analogous charity with an indexical: if the witness says I  did it, 
she cannot subsequently recant her confession by claiming that an error was made in the 
indexical’s internal pointing, as she did when she had pointed at the wrong man. Recall also 
the case of the delusional man who believes himself to be de Gaulle. Though having full 
knowledge of his mental state, his hearer cannot through charity take him to be referring to de 
Gaulle when he says I. Furthermore, appeal to speaker intention does not change matters, as 
illustrated by Wettstein’s (1984) extension of the de Gaulle example. Suppose the delusional 
man is a history professor, and in the course of showing a film about de Gaulle to his 
students, he says ...and then I  marched triumphantly into Paris. Not only does he believe 
himself to be de Gaulle, but also he clearly has every intention of referring to de Gaulle with 
his use of I. Still there can be no charity: I  refers not to de Gaulle but to himself.
When external and internal pointing are consistent there is no issue, such as when a 
speaker points to himself while saying I. In general, if an expression refers unproblematically 
to some object, drawing attention to that object is superfluous. When there is a discrepancy
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between the different kinds of pointing, however, an internal pointing always overrides an 
external pointing or an intention. If the witness says I did it and points at suspect #2, she has 
confessed to the crime, not implicated the man. If the police wonder why she was pointing 
they may come up with an explanation—perhaps she is mad, perhaps the man is her 
confessor—but impossible as an explanation would be that she meant to identify him instead
of herself. An internal pointing that is inconsistent with an intention—the speaker said /  but
really meant someone else—is madness, as with the de Gaulle delusion; nevertheless the 
internal pointing "wins." On the other hand, in the cases where an external pointing is 
inconsistent with speaker intentions, as with the Camap-Agnew pictures, which overrides the 
other does not seem to have a clear answer, varying with what the knowledge of the 
participants is assumed to be.
Finally, intuitions concerning when same or different things have been said are not 
comparable with internal and external pointing. To see this, consider first the two utterances 
in (16), where the intuition is that in (16a) versus (16b), different things have been said. In
(17), however, although the contents of the utterances are respectively the same as in (16), the 
intuition is that Jack and Teddy have said the same thing.
(16) a. Jack is hungry 
b. Teddy is hungry
(17) a. Jack speaking: I am hungry
b. Teddy speaking: 1 am hungry
Note that this "same-saying" is not due merely to the fact that Jack and Teddy have used the 
same words—for if Susan says Jack is hungry, speaking of the cat, and the sports announcer 
says Jack is hungry, speaking of the first baseman, no one would argue that they had said the
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same thing, although they did use the same words. The intuition o f having said the same 
thing while the content—that is. the individuals referred to—are different occurs only with 
sentences containing indexicals. Kaplan accounts for this intuition by noting that (17a) and 
(17b) contain expressions that have identical character, although they have different contents.
It is because the contained expressions have identical character that when Jack says (17a) he 
has "said the same thing" as when Teddy says (17b).
Here once again the analogy between indexicals and demonstratives breaks down. In
(18), the character of the demonstrative he, the pointing gesture, is identical in both 
sentences, and yet the intuition in this case is that Susan and Alice have said different things.
(18) a. Susan, pointing at Jack: he (B3T) is hungry 
b. Alice, pointing at Teddy: he (US’) is hungry
Although they have used the same words, and both used the same external pointing gesture 
while doing so, Susan and Alice have not said the same thing in (18). They have pointed at 
different objects. If the intuition of "same-saying" is to be explained through appeal to 
character, then the external pointing gesture must not be character. In line with comments in 
"Dthat" (1978), Kaplan would probably argue that the pointings in (18) are different 
demonstrations and that therefore (18a) and (18b) have different characters, but if two 
demonstrations can never be of the same "character," then their difference from indexicals is 
emphasized: Jack and Teddy in (17), who have used the same internal pointing, have used 
identical "characters” and said the same thing, even though they too have "pointed" at 
different objects.
To the original question, what is it that we know when we know indexicals, Kaplan 
would say: we know the character of each indexical, the linguistic rule or procedure that 
determines its referent in a context. It is clear that whatever this is, it is part of our
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knowledge of language. But to the question, what is it that we know when we know the 
character of a demonstrative, Kaplan would have to say either that we know how pointing 
works, or that we know how to recognize a speaker’s intention. What I have argued here is 
that the first is knowledge of language use, while the latter can only be interpersonal 
psychology.
1.14 Metacharacter
Before moving on, let’s examine the notion of "metacharacter" put forth by Smith 
(1989), who attempts to extend Kaplan’s theory of indexicals to account for cases in which 
indexicals do not evaluate to what Kaplan’s formal "character" determines alone. I will argue 
that there is no need for metacharacter, and that Smith’s cases all fall out of a proper 
description of context and how context is determined; in fact, to the general process I called 
"transplantation" in the previous section.
To illustrate Smith’s proposal, let’s consider two of his temporal examples. In the 
first, the speaker is at the ballet, and becoming confused during a "flashback episode," asks 
(19a) of his companion, who correctly answers "No.” The reference of now in (19a) is not 
the time at which he utters the question, but the present "imaginary time" established by the 
play. In the second example, in the case where (19b) appears within a scholarly article, now  
refers not to the time of writing nor of reading, but to a "nontemporal time" that Smith 
roughly paraphrases as "at this place in my argument."
(19) a. Is this happening now?
b. Now I am going to prove the bundle theory of objects is false
Smith’s idea is that different metarules apply that determine how character is 
determined on the particular occasion of use. His metacharacter rule for the "theatrical
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The metacharacter for an occurrence of now  in the answering machine example I ’m not here 
right now, which I discussed in the previous section, is shown in (20c).
(20) a. "Now" refers to the imaginary time that is treated as the present time in the story.
[=  Smith's R3]
b. "Now" refers to the point in the argument at which it is tokened. [ = R ]^
c. "Now" refers to the time(s) later than the time of tokening that the context 
indicates the speaker/writer intends the communication to be heard or read. [= Ro]
The first problem with rules such as these is that they are simply listed on a case by 
case basis—no generalizations are captured. There would have to be a very large number of 
such rules, one for every circumstance for every indexical, and nothing in Smith’s theory 
limits how many there might be. Furthermore, in Smith’s system, nothing would prevent a 
"metarule" like (21), which would give the wrong result in the de Gaulle case. So Smith’s 
rules neither cover all the cases, nor can they predict the cases that do not occur.
(21) "I" refers to de Gaulle in the context of a delusional man speaking who believes
himself to be de Gaulle.
Secondly, although as descriptions for what is picked out in each circumstance 
Smith’s rules are accurate, they are inconsistent with his notion of metacharacter as those 
higher order rules that determine which first-order rule applies. There is nothing "meta" 
about the rules as written in (20); they determine the referent directly, without the mitigation 
of a lower-order rule, and so fail to capture the commonality that all three have in virtue of 
the character of now. What he describes in the text would more accurately be reflected in 
"metarules" of the form shown in (22) that I have constructed parallel to (20), in which the 
commonality has been removed. A "first-order" rule—the normal character o f  now— could
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then be applied across the cases.
(22) a. The temporal context when watching a ballet is the imaginary time in the story.
b. The temporal context for an argument is the sequence of steps within it.
c. The temporal context for a prerecorded message is the time of playback.
But stripped down in this way, it becomes clear that Smith’s notion of metacharacter is 
nothing more than a description o f the "transplanted" context in each circumstance.
Individual "metarules" are not necessary; all that is needed is a general notion of what is a 
proper context shift. Once this is generally established, the meaning of now (as well as other 
indexicals) will follow normally, whether on the answering machine, at the ballet, during a 
scholarly argument, or indeed in novel circumstances.
Smith also discusses a case that is interesting in light of the earlier discussion of how 
"demonstrative" should be defined. The case is an instance of the expression here to indicate 
a location other than the speaker’s, as when in my New York apartment, I point at Dusseldorf 
on a map, and say (23). Here refers not to New York, but to Dusseldorf.
(23) Susan lives here (US’)
Kaplan calls such examples the "demonstrative use" o f here, opposing it to the "pure indexical 
use" of here which picks out the location o f the speaker. But contra Kaplan, there is good 
reason to believe that here has no "demonstrative use,” as is shown by the fact that I cannot 
point to my neighbor’s window and say (24), to mean that Jack likes being in her apartment.
(24) * Jack likes it here (US’)
It is perhaps easy to see why Kaplan (and others) have mistaken here in (23) to be a 
"demonstrative," because like an occurrence of that (US’), here is both accompanied by a
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pointing gesture and evaluates to what is being pointed at. But as noted above, pointing 
gestures can occur without language, and when they occur with language they are not 
necessarily accompanying a "demonstrative" expression, as discussed with example (14).
And unlike that (US’), which can be used to indicate just about any object, the use of here (BSP) 
is severely restricted, in fact limited to indicating locations on maps.
The correct analysis o f (23) is that, like Smith’s earlier examples, it is a 
transplantation. By pointing at the map, a speaker "throws" the utterance into the symbolic 
space of the map. The indexical here is now evaluated with respect to that context, and not 
the physical space the speaker actually inhabits. To understand (23), the interlocutors must, 
of course, understand the conventional use of maps, which makes such a context shift 
possible. Perhaps because of such conventions, a shift to the map space seems to be one of 
the few transplantations that can be effected through pointing, as pointing at a photo of de 
Gaulle in Paris cannot change the referent of I  nor of here. Understood this way, it is clear 
why (24) fails. Pointing at different locations or objects, such as my neighbor’s window, 
does not establish a different contextual space, but rather draws attention to the locations or 
objects in the actual contextual space. This example shows yet another use of a pointing 
gesture, in this case to effect a transplantation, underlining the fact that we did well to reject 
the definition "accompanied by a demonstration" for a demonstrative.
1.2 Next steps
I have argued from a few perspectives that demonstratives are different in kind from 
indexicals, and therefore do not expect them to be accounted for under the same theory. For 
this reason, in the upcoming analysis of indexicals, I will be putting demonstratives aside, 
returning to discuss the proper relationship between indexicals and demonstratives within the 
theory in chapter 5.
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In the next chapter, I will be asking whether Kaplan’s theory is adequate to explain 
indexical expressions. Does what Kaplan calls the character o f indexicals properly belong in 
grammatical theory? Beginning with an analysis of the syntax of first and second person 
pronouns, and evaluating arguments for and against syntactic indexing, I will conclude that 
the indexicals require the same syntactic description as third person expressions. In light of 
this, I will argue that "character" is not a useful description, but that a property having a 
function similar to character is appropriate to hypothesize at a syntactic level of description 
for the indexical expressions. Because this property not only exists at a different level of 
description but is also more limited in scope than Kaplan’s notion of "character," I 
differentiate it with the name "orientation," and propose a new model for the description of 
indexical expressions in which orientation plays an important role.
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Chapter 2: A new model for indexicals
2.0 Why a new model?
In this chapter I argue that an account o f indexicals that centers on semantic 
"character" along the lines of Kaplan’s theory is inaccurate, and propose a new model for the 
description of indexical expressions. My argument rests on observations of the syntactic 
behavior of the indexical pronouns, which will be put forth in the first half of this chapter. 
The central thesis o f  my position is that in terms of syntactic individuation in natural 
language, indexical expressions are no different from their non-indexical counterparts. This 
position is in direct conflict with the received wisdom that posits a fundamental split between 
first and second person expressions on the one hand, and third person expressions on the 
other. Under a Kaplanian treatment, the individuation of indexical expressions is based on 
"character." Two indexical expressions will be considered to be occurrences of the same 
expression if they have the same character in a context, while if two expressions have 
different characters, they will be occurrences of different expressions. The individuation of 
non-indexical expressions, however, is not character-based. Since the formal syntactic 
mechanism through which third person expressions are individuated is, in the framework I 
assume, numeric indexing, I will call the extreme version of a Kaplanian approach to 
indexicals the "anti-indexing" position, understanding this to mean that from such a 
viewpoint, indexical expressions do not require whatever it is in the particular theory that 
functionally individuates expressions in the syntax.
A compromise form of the anti-indexing position, which I will call the "dualist" 
position, has been proposed by Larson and Segal (1995, section 6.5), who believe that the 
distinctions needed for third person expressions are insufficient to accommodate indexical 
expressions. Their proposal is "dualist" in that it assimilates semantic "character” into a
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system that is similar to one that assumes syntactic indexing. They invent a new kind of 
index, based on Kaplan’s character, to make the fuller distinctions that they think are 
necessary. On their account, while third person pronouns are individuated by numeric 
indices, indexicals are alphabetically indexed, each alphabetic index associated with a "fixed 
utterance role." Thus while third person pronouns may bear different numeric indices, all 
first person pronouns will have the same alphabetic index, since they all have the same 
character. The irony o f Larsen and Segal’s proposal is that the indices they invent for first 
and second person pronouns are not sufficient to make the distinctions that are empirically 
required for indexicals. I will show, to the contrary, that the syntactic distinctions 
independently motivated for third person expressions, if used for first and second person, are 
sufficient.
My claim is that in terms of syntactic individuation, expressions in all persons are 
individuated in the same way, and that there should be no disjunction in the theory in this 
regard between first and second person versus third. The correct account, I argue, is one that 
posits a uniformity across all persons: it is necessary to have numeric indices—or an 
equivalent syntactic mechanism—for first and second person expressions as well as third. I 
will defend this "uniformity thesis" throughout this chapter, providing evidence that in terms 
of individuation of expressions in the syntax, first and second person pronouns are no 
different from third. The problem faced by a Kaplanian anti-indexing position, as well as a 
dualist position such as Larson and Segal’s, is that their theory makes distinctions that are not 
needed, while not allowing them to make all the distinctions that are needed. For example, I 
will present evidence that two expressions having different Kaplanian "characters," or 
different alphabetic indices, may be, syntactically speaking, occurrences o f the same 
expression. Other evidence indicates that two expressions that are held to have the same 
"character," or the same alphabetic index—such as two first person pronouns—might not be
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occurrences of the same expression. The uniformity thesis, in saying that there is one kind of 
numeric indexing—or equivalent syntactic function—for all expressions, allows all the 
distinctions that are needed to be made.
In light of the evidence for the uniformity thesis, I will in the second half of this 
chapter propose a new model for the description of indexicals. In terms o f the individuation 
of expressions, noun phrases containing first and second person pronouns will be no different 
from those containing third person pronouns or names. However, indexicals will be 
differentiated from non-indexicals in the new model in terms of a hypothetical syntactic 
property that I call "orientation," a new function that will operate in the proposed model at 
the syntactic level of logical form.
2 .1 The syntactic indexing of indexical pronouns
In this section I undertake a linguistic analysis of indexicals, concentrating in 
particular on syntax, an area that has long been ignored with respect to these expressions.
What is the proper grammatical description of sentences that contain indexical expressions? 
Does the notion of character fit into this description? As there is a rich existing literature on 
the syntax of non-indexical pronominal expressions, my analysis begins with the indexical 
pronouns. No one disputes that the syntax of natural language is capable o f individuating
third person expressions. Syntactic theory has to have some mechanism through which it can
be determined whether two third person noun phrases are occurrences of the same expression 
or not. The question I will be concerned with is whether expressions containing indexical 
pronouns are individuated in the syntax in the same way as third person expressions. In the 
theoretical framework I assume, in which numeric indices fulfill this function, the question 
becomes: should indexical pronouns be syntactically indexed? But the conclusions I reach 
here would be valid assuming any functionally equivalent syntactic mechanism.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
2.11 What are numeric indices and what is their function?
First, let me be as precise as possible as to the role numeric indices play in the 
syntactic description of noun phrases, in general, in the theoretical framework I assume here.
It is often the case, in both the linguistic and philosophical literature, that numeric subscripts 
are appended to words or phrases without much discussion of what the numbers are supposed 
to mean or what, if any, theoretical claims are intended with their use. The theory developed 
by Fiengo and May (1994) is an exception to this. In their system, which presupposes
autonomy, a noun phrase index is claimed to be part o f the structural description o f a
sentence, and as such is not only constrained by purely syntactic rules but also interacts with 
(and can be referred to by) other syntactic operations. The familiar binding principles 
determine the distribution of these theoretical entities—the indices—on different kinds o f noun 
phrases—that is. those containing pronouns, reflexives and names. In addition, since they are 
part of the structure, the indices also are part of the input to the semantic component, where 
they feed interpretation. Thus numeric indices play a role in the syntax, contained in the 
structure of noun phrases, and also in the interpretive component.
Before considering first and second person pronouns, let’s review how the theory of 
indices works for third person pronominal expressions. Under binding theory, syntactic 
constraints specify the possible distribution o f indices in (la-d).
(1) a. Shet likes herself
b. Shej likes her2
c. Shet likes her1/2 mother
d. Shet walked in and then she1/2 sat down
By binding condition A, she and herself must have the same index in (la), else herself will 
not be bound, while by condition B, she and her must have different indices in (lb ), else her
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will not be free. In either (1c) or (Id), the two pronouns may be eoindexed or contraindexed, 
as far as binding theory is concerned, as each pronoun will be structurally free regardless: in 
(lc), her is not c-commanded by she; in (Id), the two pronouns are in different local 
domains.
What the index does is to indicate whether a particular expression is syntactically an 
occurrence of the same expression as, or a different expression from, another occurrence.
Note that sameness or difference o f  morphology does not necessarily correlate with sameness 
or difference of syntactic expression: two occurrences of Jack, like two occurrences of he, 
may be occurrences of different expressions or the same; while the expressions Jack and he 
might well be, as far as the syntax is concerned, occurrences of the same expression. To 
indicate the syntactic sameness or difference of expression in this theory numbers are 
conventionally used: thus Jack2 is an occurrence of the same expression as he2, and neither 
o f these is an occurrence of the same expression as Jack$ or he^. Numbers are convenient to 
use because there are a lot of them, and because their everyday familiarity makes it easy for 
theorists (and their readers) to see when two indices are the same or different, but the fact 
that numbers are used to individuate expressions and not some other marks such as V , ♦ ,
+  , or 4k has no theoretical consequence.
To this point in the explanation of (la-d), the only role played by the indices is to 
have marked the pronominal expressions in such a way that the syntactic rules can "see" 
whether they are occurrences of the same expression. Importantly, syntactic rules such as the 
binding conditions refer only to the sameness or difference o f the indices themselves, and not 
to, say, the individuals in the world that these expressions refer to. At the level o f  their 
application, the binding conditions are "blind" to what the expressions refer to, or indeed 
whether the expressions refer or not. Furthermore, sameness of referent does not necessarily 
correlate with sameness of syntactic expression: tor example, the two diffeient expressions
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John and Jack may well name the same individual. If condition B were not blind, if it were 
to say something like "a pronoun must (eventually?) refer to some individual in the world 
different from that which a noun phrase that c-commands it refers to." such a rule would not 
only flout autonomy, but it would also make the wrong predictions in a number of cases.
These include examples such as the "masked ball," "John’s coat,” and "amnesia" sentences. 
(For discussion, see chapter 1 in Fiengo and May 1994.)
What role do the indices play when structures such as (la-d) are interpreted? 
Abstracting away for the moment away from the interaction of dependency theory, in Fiengo 
and May’s system, the context in which they are evaluated is represented formally as a 
sequence, which operates as a function from indices to individuals: the value of a noun 
phrase with index / is the fth individual in the sequence. So in a sentence that contains two 
noun phrases with the same index, such as (la), the two expressions will necessarily evaluate 
to the same individual. However, in a sentence such as (lb), with two noun phrases 
containing different numeric indices, the valuation procedure may yield different individuals 
or the same individual, for the different indices. Put another way, while each position in the 
sequence contains only one individual, nothing prevents an individual from occupying more 
than one position in the sequence. The outcome of this model of the grammar is that, while 
syntactic coindexing entails semantic coreference, it is not the case that syntactic 
noncoindexing entails semantic noncoreference.
2.12 The anti-indexing and dualist positions
Given this understanding of the role of indices within the theory, it might be argued 
that while serving quite adequately for third person noun phrases, this kind of syntactic 
indexing is neither necessary nor desirable for first and second person expressions. This 
viewpoint I have called the "anti-indexing” position, and it has two clear supporting
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whether indexical expressions are occurrences of the same expression or not, without 
bothering with numeric indices. Second, to interpret the indexical pronouns in the same way 
that third person expressions are is counterintuitive, especially when there is a direct method 
available through "character" in Kaplan’s model. Because the argument I will advance is 
counter to the anti-indexing position, let’s set up in brief detail how such an argument against 
numeric indices might go. For the purposes o f simplicity, the discussion will be confined to 
singular expressions.
First consider the binding facts. For a limited range of data, such as shown in (2), 
the distribution of first and second person pronouns and reflexives is the same as that 
observed for third person: the pronouns must be free, the reflexives must be bound. (That 
the facts are actually not so clear in a larger range o f data is off the point now, but will be 
returned to later.)
(2) a. I hit myself
b. * I hit me
c. You hit yourself
d. * You hit you
Despite this parallelism with third person, the anti-indexing position could maintain that it is 
hardly necessary to hypothesize indices as part of the structure of these noun phrases to 
explain the distribution in (2 ). Since person features must be part of the structure in order to 
account for, among other things, subject-verb agreement, which everybody agrees is syntactic, 
for the purposes of binding theory, why couldn’t it be that syntactic sameness or difference is 
recognized on the basis of first and second person features alone for these expressions? It 
might be put forth as a further argument, by the anti-indexing theorist, that numeric indexing
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would allow the structures in (3) and only rule out those in (4).
(3) a. Ij hit meo
b. You3  hit you4
(4) a. * I, hit me,
b. * You3 hit you3
On the face of it, this might seem to be a good argument tor the anti-indexing position, but as
will be made clear below, it is not. This argument assumes that the contraindexing as in (3)
is never a legitimate representation, but 1 will show on the contrary that the theory requires 
the distinctions that numeric indexing is capable of making in (3) versus (4) to explain the 
distribution of indexical expressions in natural language.
The anti-indexing argument might continue by saying that if numeric indices are 
claimed to be part of the structure of these first and second person expressions, then these 
would be subject to the same evaluation procedure as third person expressions in 
interpretation, their values being calculated against a formal sequence, unless some special 
stipulation was made. If the interpretation proceeds through the formal sequence, there would 
have to be some checking procedure to make sure, for example with a first person expression, 
that the individual returned by the valuation function was indeed the speaker of the utterance 
containing that expression. Alternatively, the numeric indices could be stripped off prior to 
interpretation. Either way, this roundabout evaluation procedure is counterintuitive. If 
notions such as "speaker" and "hearer" must be appealed to anyway, why not hypothesize 
interpretation as proceeding directly to the speaker or the hearer o f the utterance, via a 
"character" rule or procedure such as in Kaplan’s model, without the mitigation of a formal 
context sequence?
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As laid out here, the anti-indexing position is clearly a strong one. Starting from such 
a perspective, however, creates a disjunction in the grammatical theory of noun phrases, 
treating first and second person pronominal expressions differently from third. The extreme 
response to this complaint would be to abandon the claim that numeric indices are part o f the 
structure o f any expressions—first, second or third—and posit a new unified theory that 
explains the distribution and interpretation o f all noun phrases without syntactic individuation 
of expressions. The benign response would be to take a "dualist" approach, such as Larson 
and Segal’s, who say that such a disjunction is the best explanation for the facts: first and 
second person are different from third. To argue for the uniformity thesis, as I will, is to say 
that in terms of syntactic indexing, first and second person are not different from third.
Let’s consider Larson and Segal’s proposal in more detail, for if it can be shown that 
their compromise, dualist position is untenable, it will follow that the less benign anti­
indexing position must be abandoned. Larson and Segal hypothesize that the formal 
expression of context, the interpretation sequence, is actually the union of two sequences, one 
numeric and the other alphabetic, the latter being a privileged portion of the sequence—the 
first r  positions for some r—that is rigidly fixed, against which the indexicals are interpreted. 
Thus, instead of assuming that the context is formally structured as a simple function, their 
new sequence a has the structure in (5) (=  their [55b], p. 217).
(5) a =  <a(a), <j(b)......... a(r), cr(7), a(2), ..., a(7), . . .>
For Larson and Segal, the first and second person pronouns—along with other indexicals—do 
not have numeric indices but instead have these special alphabetic indices, whereas third 
person pronouns continue to have the familiar numeric indices. The pronoun I  is stipulated to 
always have the index a, while you has the index b. In Larson and Segal’s evaluation 
function, "fixed utterance roles" are associated with a(a) through a(r); in an utterance u, a{a)
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=  "the utterer of u," o(b) — "the addressee of u," and so on. The values o f a(a) through 
a(f) might therefore be different from one utterance to the next, although the "role" associated 
with each alphabetic index remains constant—thus this special index may be seen as a 
representational correlate to Kaplan’s character. In general, the alphabetic positions of Larson 
and Segal’s sequence against which a particular utterance is interpreted may well evaluate to 
individuals that also occupy positions within the numeric portion of the sequence—which is of 
course in line with our previous understanding of context structure.
Larson and Segal’s proposal directly solves—as it was designed to—the interpretation 
problem discussed above that there would be if numeric indices were assigned to first and 
second person expressions. While they only sketch the analysis for /  and you , the other first 
person singular pronouns me, my, mine, and myself will presumably also be stipulated to have 
the index a, while all second person forms would have the index b. In such a procedural 
system, no checking back procedure would be needed to make sure that the individuals 
returned in evaluation have the appropriate "utterance roles,” since the indexicals are 
evaluated directly via such roles, in the way of Kaplan’s character.
That the index is of a different, non-numeric kind in Larson and Segal’s proposal is 
relevant, to them, for interpretation. But because their solution postulates something having 
the function of "character" as an index, and not as a purely semantic property, certain of the 
disjunctive problems between expressions of different persons are solved under their analysis, 
assuming that their indices can "percolate" from the lexical item to the containing phrase.
For example, although the alphabetic index is a special kind, there is no longer a problem in 
what is relevant to the syntactic binding conditions, for on Larson and Segal’s proposal all 
noun phrases, whatever their person features, do have indices that can be used by the syntax 
to determine whether two expressions are the same or different. Assuming their stipulative a 
and b indices, the distribution of first and second person pronouns and reflexives, repeated in
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(6 ), can thus straightforwardly be explained by direct appeal to the existing binding 
conditions. As with third person expressions, the rules can appeal to sameness or difference 
of index to determine boundness or treeness—and no appeal to sameness or difference of 
person features, morphology, or referents is necessary.
(6 ) a. Ia hit myselfa
b. * L hit me„a a
c. Youb hit yourselfb
d. * Youb hit youb
As discussed above, it is o f no theoretical importance that numbers are conventionally used 
for indices, and likewise it is of no importance that Larson and Segal hypothesize this 
particular set of indices as being alphabetic—they could instead have reserved the first n 
numbers, or positions #63 through #117, of the numeric sequence as being these special, 
rigid, "utterance role" indices. Note, however, that the distinctions indicated in (3) will not 
be possible under Larson and Segal’s account, since two first person forms (or two second 
person forms) will never have different indices, under the stipulation that assigns to them the 
particular alphabetic index a (or b). As mentioned in the discussion of (3), we will see that 
this entailment of the anti-indexing position is not a welcome result.
On the surface, it appears that Larson and Segal have come up with an attractive 
compromise between the extreme anti-indexing position and the uniformity thesis. However, 
once more complicated cases than those in (6 ) are considered, it becomes clear that their 
dualist position is untenable. Like the extreme anti-indexing position, they believe that first 
and second person pronouns are different from third person pronouns, in terms of syntactic 
individuation. Thus they posit two kinds of index to handle the distinction. But, having two 
kinds of index does not allow them to make all the distinctions necessary; and in other cases.
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leads them to distinguish what should not be distinct. The problem they face is that first and 
second person pronouns are not different from third person pronouns, indexically speaking. 
Saying that there is one kind of index—saying that first, second, and third person expressions 
are the same in this regard—allows one to make all and only the distinctions that are needed.
2,13 Cross-person identity: evidence for the uniformity thesis
The first argument against the anti-indexing position involves examples of what I call 
"cross-person identity" in ellipsis sites. These cases show, I believe, that a disjunction in 
syntactic indexing between first and second person expressions versus third cannot be 
maintained. This includes both the stronger claim that first and second person expressions do 
not have indices at all, while third person do, as well as Larson and Segal’s dualist proposal 
that the former have alphabetic indices and the latter have numeric.
I assume, following Fiengo and May, that verb phrase ellipsis is best described as a 
syntactic phenomenon, through reconstruction at the syntactic level of logical form (LF).
Let’s first consider an example that contains only third person expressions, such as (7). In 
(7b), the elliptical reply o f speaker 2 has the logical form as shown to the right, with the 
reconstructed verb phrase indicated in brackets . 1
(7) a. Speaker I: Jack3  loves her4
b. Speaker 2: Teddy5  does, too =  Teddy5  [loves h e rj, too
What licenses reconstruction at LF is verb phrase identity: the reconstructed verb phrase
1 For the purposes of simplicity of exposition in this section, I will be discussing only 
cases of so-called "strict" identity in ellipsis sites, and thus am excluding from the examples 
indications of index type—which in any event would all be independent, a-occurrences. So- 
called "sloppy" identity, and the interaction of dependent occurrences of indices with first and 
second person expressions will play a crucial role in the thesis o f this dissertation, however, 
beginning in chapter 3.
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[loves her4\ in (7b) is the same as the overt verb phrase [loves her4\ in (7a). Note that 
identity for the two verb phrases is defined such that it attends to the numeric indices on the 
included noun phrases—neither o f (8 a-b) would be possible logical forms for the elliptical 
reply in (7b), since neither of these verb phrases is identical to the verb phrase in (7a).
(8 ) a. Teddy5  [loves her6], too 
b. ^  Teddy5  [loves Susan7], too
Importantly, that there is no identity between the verb phrases in (7a) and (8 b) is due to the 
difference in numeric index of the noun phrases, and not the morphological difference in the 
lexical items contained therein. While sameness of noun phrase index is required, sameness 
of morphology is not necessary for overall syntactic identity of verb phrases, as is shown by 
the next two examples. In (9), the verb phrase in (9a) contains a pronoun, while the 
reconstructed verb phrase in (9b) contains a reflexive. Nonetheless, syntactic identity holds 
between the two verb phrases, as the numeric index on the contained noun phrases are the 
same. Fiengo and May term this process "vehicle change." Because of the coindexed subject 
noun phrase, there could not be a pronoun in (9b) without causing a condition B violation, so 
the "vehicle" that carries the index is changed to a reflexive . 2
(9) a. Speaker 1: Jack3  voted for her4
b. Speaker 2: She4  did, too = She4  [voted for herself^], too
Similarly, in (10) vehicle change occurs between a name and a pronoun— otherwise there 
would be a condition C violation in (10b).
-  For reasons that will be made clear in the next chapter, where index types will be 
discussed in detail, vehicle changes from independent occurrences of pronouns to reflexives 
are less marked in opaque contexts—such as complements o f verbs like vote for, as in the 
example shown.
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(10) a. Speaker 1: Jack3  voted for Susan4
b. Speaker 2: She4  wondered whether he3  did =  She4  wondered whether he3
[voted for her4]
These examples demonstrate that whether two third person noun phrases are occurrences of 
the same expression is determined by sameness o f index alone, and is not constrained by 
whether the lexical item that the noun phrase contains is a third person pronoun, reflexive or 
name, even though these differences must be discriminable in the syntax for binding theory to 
apply. But given that sameness o f morphology or anaphoric features is not a requirement, 
let’s now consider the question whether noun phrases that differ in another respect, having 
different person features, may be occurrences o f the same expression. Although person 
features clearly must be discriminable for syntactic agreement processes, such features may be 
as irrelevant as anaphoric features for the purposes of determining expression identity. While 
it is clear that they can refer to the same individual, can a first person expression such as me 
be an occurrence of the same expression as a second person expression you or to a third 
person expression hinft Consideration o f the exchange in ( 1 1 ) provides evidence that it can.
(11) a. Speaker 1 : Jack4  loves me
b. Speaker 2: Teddy5  does, too
Two possible full forms correspond to speaker 2 ’s elliptical reply in (lib ), depending on 
whether her remark is directed back to the original speaker, or to some other person. In the 
first case, if she is replying to speaker 1 , ( lib )  is the same as if she had said the full sentence 
Teddy loves you, too, where you refers back to speaker 1. But suppose speaker 2 does not 
reply to speaker 1, but instead turns to some third party, to whom she directs (1 lb). In this 
case, (1 lb) is the elided version of the full sentence Teddy loves him, too, where him refers to 
speaker 1 . This being so-called strict identity, the object noun phrase within the elided verb
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phrase evaluates to speaker 1 in both cases.
Now. if first and second person pronouns have numeric indices, as I would like to 
maintain, these facts can be easily accommodated under the syntactic account of ellipsis 
outlined above. As shown in (12), each of the two possible verb phrases reconstructed in the 
logical forms shown in ( 1 2 b) are identical to the verb phrase in ( 1 2 a) by sameness of numeric 
index. On this view, cross-person noun phrase identity might be analyzed as a kind of vehicle 
change. Bob Fiengo has given such changes the name "spin," the idea being that [me]{,
[yew], and [him] , are expressions of the same noun phrase, "spun" to different points of view.
(12) a. Speaker 1: Jack4  loves me,
b. Speaker 2: Teddys does, too (to speaker 1 —) Teddy5  [loves you,], too
(to speaker 3 =) Teddy5  [loves him,], too
On the other hand, if first and second person pronouns did not have numeric indices, 
as they would not were the anti-indexing position to prevail, then not only would this unified 
account of strict identity under ellipsis vanish, but it is not clear that cross-person identity 
under ellipsis could be explained except in a purely stipulative way. If, on the strong view, 
only third person expressions contain numeric indices while first and second person have 
none, there would seem to be no way to establish expression identity in the syntax among 
[him]l and the indexless noun phrases [me] and [you]. Even under Larson and Segal's dualist 
approach, establishing that these three expressions are occurrences of the same expression is 
problematic. Consider, for example, how their analysis would describe the LF structures for 
( 1 1 a) and the two possible responses in ( 1  lb), shown below.
(13) a. [yp loves m ej b. [w loves youb] c. [vp loves him,]
The first and second person noun phrases would have, by stipulation, the fixed alphabetic
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indices a and b, respectively. The problem is how then expression identity is to be defined 
across the three verb phrases in (13). Recall that on Larson and Segal’s analysis, each of 
(13a-c) is evaluated against a slightly different formal sequence in which some of the 
individuals in the a through r positions vary', since the utterance context has changed. In the 
sequence against which (13a) is evaluated, speaker 1 and speaker 2  are the values o f a(a) and 
a(b), respectively; while in the sequence for (13b), this is reversed: o(a) is speaker 2 and 
a{b) is speaker 1. In the sequence for (13c), on the other hand, speaker 1 is not the value for 
any of the alphabetic "utterance role” positions as he is neither speaking nor being addressed. 
So although all of the indices in (13) evaluate to speaker 1, each does so via a different route. 
Attempting to define expression identity across these very different syntactic entities seems 
nonsensical. That is, while there may be some ad hoc way for an alphabetically indexed noun 
phrase to be considered an occurrence of the same expression as—for the purposes of 
explaining cross-person identity—a numerically indexed noun phrase, this would, I think, 
defeat both the letter and the spirit of Larson and Segal’s proposal.
The cross-person identity problem in (12), however, is not definitive evidence for the 
uniformity thesis. The anti-indexing position has a way out, and that is to deny that verb 
phrase ellipsis is licensed through syntactic identity in the first place. Contra Fiengo and 
May, arguments that verb phrase ellipsis might be better described as a purely semantic 
phenomenon have been advanced in the literature. Whatever the formal theory of how 
semantic reconstruction works, it is clear that there is identity among the predicates in ( 1 2 ), 
since evaluation will return the same individual—speaker 1—in all three cases. I note here 
only that this is, on the face of it, a reasonable objection . 3  This semantic alternative cannot
3  Evaluation of certain of these competing semantic theories will be deferred until 
chapters 3 and 4, where it will properly include the phenomenon of "sloppy" identity, which 
has not yet been introduced here.
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be offered, however, with the next examples, for it is not only with verb phrase ellipsis that 
there is a cross-person identity problem. A similar difficulty arises in the analysis o f replies 
to questions, and unlike with verb phrase ellipsis, here it does not seem possible to argue that 
the phenomenon in question is semantic. Consider, tor example, the exchange in (14).
(14) a. Speaker I: What are you doing?
b. Speaker 2: Admiring myself
Speaker 2’s reply in (14b) contains the reflexive pronoun m yself but no apparent antecedent— 
what licenses it? Let’s first put aside the possibility that it is some kind of "unbound" 
reflexive like those in (15)—first noticed, I believe, by Ross (1970) in his performative 
analysis of declarative sentences.
(15) a. Admiring myself is fun
b. Linguists like myself are hard to find
The sentences in (15) can stand alone, but (14b) cannot. Furthermore, as an answer to the 
alternative questions (16a) and (17a), admiring myself is ungrammatical.
(16) a. Speaker 1: What am I doing?
b. Speaker 2: * Admiring myself
(17) a. Speaker 1: What is he doing?
b. Speaker 2: * Admiring myself
There seem to be two approaches to analyzing how short answers to questions are 
licensed. One way is to take such replies as exactly what they look like: phrases or 
fragments, period. Felicitous answers are those syntactic phrases or fragments that
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appropriately "fill the hole" that the question left open—where what counts as "appropriately" 
would have to be detailed. The second approach analyzes such replies as elliptical forms of 
syntactically complete sentences, which are reconstructed at LF under identity with an 
antecedent in much the same way as verb phrase reconstruction. Now here’s the point: 
whichever analysis is preferred, myself in (14b) will not be licensed unless its index is 
numeric. Let’s run through the two approaches to see why.
Under the "filling holes" approach to answering questions, speaker 2's reply in (14b) 
would replace, through some mechanism, the verb phrase w/z-hole filled in the question by the 
dummy phrase doing what. On this account the overt you in (14a) would be the only 
candidate for antecedent o f m yself in (14b). If first and second person expressions are 
indexed numerically, this would be straightforwardly licensed by binding theory, as myself 
could have the same numeric index as you. On the other hand, under Larson and Segal’s 
analysis, the alphabetic indices on the two expressions would have to be, by stipulation, the 
different a and b, making (14b) a binding violation, while by similar reasoning the 
ungrammatical (16b) would get through. Under the stronger anti-indexing position, the 
different person features on the pronouns would seem to preclude any possible explanation of 
the licensing of myself yet at the same time (16b) would be fine.
On the elliptical analysis of answering questions, the (14b) reply is analyzed as an 
elided form of the full sentence I  am admiring myself in which the reflexive is appropriately 
bound. Using numeric indices, the LF structures for (14) would be as follows.
(18) a. Speaker 1: What are you2  doing? =  you2  are doing what
b. Speaker 2: Admiring myself2  =  [I2  am] admiring myself2
What we’d want to say is that generally in elliptical answers, the pieces of the reply that are 
reconstructed at LF are syntactically identical to those corresponding pieces in the question.
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The only difference between this case and the licensing of verb phrase ellipsis is that here, the 
reconstructed "pieces” are not syntactic constituents. Constituency aside, the reconstructed 
piece I2 am in (18b) is syntactically identical to you2 are in (18a), thus unproblematically 
licensing the reflexive in the elliptical reply. However, if Larson and Segal’s alphabetic 
indices were used, as shown in (19), the problem of cross-person identity recurs: expression 
identity cannot be defined across the pronouns of different person, making the intuitive full 
form o f the reply underivable through reconstruction. Reconstruction with alphabetic indices 
could only have the intuitively incorrect interpretation shown below, in which the reflexive 
still has no antecedent.
(19) a. Speaker I: What are youb doing? = youb are doing what
b. Speaker 2: Admiring myselfa ^  [Ia am] admiring myselfa
=  [youb are] admiring myselfa
It should be clear that, unlike in the verb phrase ellipsis cases, a counter-argument 
hypothesizing a semantic account of reconstruction for elliptical replies to questions would be 
difficult to maintain. First o f all, the level at which binding theory applies—the level at which 
the distribution of pronouns and reflexives is explained—is at the structural level of syntax.
To be licensed, the reflexive myself must have a c-commanding antecedent, for example, but 
if the antecedent were to be reconstructed only semantically, the notion of c-command is 
without sense: without appeal to structural conditions such as c-command, admiring myself 
should be as appropriate an answer for the question what is your mother doing? as it is for 
what are you doing? Secondly, unlike in verb phrase ellipsis cases, where the missing verb 
phrase has been assumed by some to denote a semantic "property,” it is difficult to see how 
the pieces that are elided in the question answering case could be argued to correspond to any 
coherent semantic chunk. It therefore seems most likely that reconstruction occurs in the
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syntax, under some notion of syntactic identity.
In sum, whether the question answering examples are analyzed as hole-fillers or as 
elliptical, cross-person expression identity needs to he established in order to explain the 
distribution of noun phrases contained within them. The clearest way to do this is to 
hypothesize numeric indices as part of the structure of first and second person expressions and 
to maintain that the anti-indexing position is untenable.
2.14 Dreamscapes and counterfactuals
The anti-indexing position rests on the idea that numeric indices are theoretically 
superfluous for first and second person pronouns, needed neither for determination of 
syntactic identity nor for their evaluation. The former of these intuitions has been called into 
question: without such indexing, syntactic identity cannot be defined among noun phrases 
having different person features. Turning to the evaluation of first and second person 
expressions, we will see that numeric indices are not superfluous in this regard either. The 
problem involves occurrences of distinct expressions that have the same person features.
Such examples include not only cases where same-featured expressions evaluate to different 
individuals, but more critically cases where same-featured expressions evaluate to the same 
individual, but nonetheless can be shown to be occurrences of different expressions. The 
former kinds of examples occur every day, when the person being addressed in a 
circumstance, or the person speaking, suddenly changes. Such examples lead to syntactic 
violations if an anti-indexing position is assumed, although evaluation in these cases can occur 
unproblematically. I will discuss these kinds of cases first below. The second kind of 
examples—which appear in so-called "dreamscapes" and counterfactuals—are more critical to 
the claims being made here, as the explanation for their evaluation is highly problematic in 
existing theories.
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Larson and Segal proposed alphabetic indices to solve the evaluation problem tor 
indexical expressions, each alphabetic index being associated with a "fixed utterance role." 
Kaplan’s notion o f indexical character ignores syntactic structure and syntactic indexing, being 
defined instead as a formal procedural function within the semantics. Whichever of these 
evaluation procedures is assumed, if there are two or more occurrences o f a particular 
indexical expression in a sentence, all of them will corefer. But is this the correct result? On 
the face of it, it may seem so for first person singular pronouns, where the procedure will 
return the same individual—the speaker—no matter how many times it is employed. In (20), 
for example, it might seem correct that the occurrences of /, my, and me—whether through 
Larson and Segal’s alphabetic index a or the first person’s semantic "character"—will evaluate 
to the same individual.
(20) I think my resume will get me an interview
On the other hand, the result is unwelcome in the case where there are two or more 
second person pronouns, tor a speaker can in a single utterance address as many different 
people as he chooses to with iterated occurrences of you; for example, a natural interpretation 
of (2 1 ) is that three are being taken, and the fourth is being left behind.
(21) I’ll take you and you and you, but not you
In the alphabetic indexing system, all four occurrences o f you would have to be coindexed, as 
in (22a). Such a structure seems counterintuitive, however, especially when compared to 
what the numeric indexing counterpart would presumably be, shown in (2 2 b).
(22) a. I’ll take youb and youb and youb, but not youb 
b. I’ll take yoU[ and you2  and you3, but not you4
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A proponent of the dualist solution could argue, however, that the alphabetic coindexing in 
(2 2 a) is the correct structure, and that what this example shows is that even within an 
utterance, the "fixed utterance role” associated with an alphabetic index—or "character” 
function, for that matter—can evaluate to different individuals, as the context changes each 
time that a new individual is addressed. That a speaker can use the second person to address 
different individuals in turn is clearly a fact about natural language that needs to be accounted 
for in any model: there must be some formal mechanism o f context change, which Larson 
and Segal do not provide in their brief discussion. But clearly their theory must provide a 
formal mechanism of change, in order to derive different formal contexts across different 
speakers. (2 1 ) shows that it is not just across utterances that contexts change, and that while 
numeric coindexing entails coreference, even within an utterance, alphabetic coindexing does 
not.
In "Afterthoughts,” Kaplan (1989) recognizes the problem of examples like (21) that 
contain more than one second person pronoun, and proposes an alternative solution to the one 
offered here. Instead o f the context changing within the utterance, he hypothesizes rather that 
the context contains more than one addressee. "Although we must face life one day at a 
time," he says, "we are not condemned to perceive or direct our attention to one object at a 
time." (p. 587) But as Kaplan himself recognizes, evaluation to the new context he envisions 
would require a formal distinction among the different occurrences of you—for which he 
utilizes, without further discussion, numeric indices. I will continue to regard examples like
(21) as context change; Kaplan’s alternative suggestion is in fact incompatible with the model 
that will be proposed here, as will be made clear below.
On either analysis of (21), it is clear that contraindexing of two expressions having the 
same character or alphabetic index is theoretically necessary. Recall the cases in (3) and (4), 
repeated below, which were put forth as a possible problem for the uniformity thesis, but
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which are in fact needed structures, as mentioned there. The distinction between the well- 
formed (3) and the ill-formed (4) can only be made under the assumption of numeric indices.
(3) a. I[ hit me2
b. Y ou3 hit you4
(4) a. * It hit me[
b. * Y ou3 hit you3
In contrast to the ambiguous structures possible under the uniformity thesis, /  hit me and you 
hit you each have only one possible structure assuming alphabetic indices, which would both 
contain coindexing and thus a condition B violation. In light of (21), however, it appears that
at least (3b) should not be ruled a binding violation, as it would be under any theory that did
not distinguish the two occurrences of you syntactically.
In addition, (3a) should also be possible grammatically, although this may seem 
counter to intuition. While the possibility o f different "addressees" in a single utterance is 
common, it might seem impossible for the context to change in such a way that there would 
be a different "speaker"—but in fact, there are cases where this does literally occur and two 
first person forms need to be distinguished syntactically. More importantly, though, there 
are cases where two first person forms need to be distinguished syntactically even though the 
speaker has not changed and they evaluate to the same individual.
Let’s first get out of the way cases where the speaker literally changes partway 
through a sentence, in the circumstance where someone finishes another person’s sentence . 4
4  Over the years, different people have told me that this kind of thing just doesn’t happen. 
I find this claim mind boggling, having come from a family in which we commonly/often/ 
always finish each other’s sentences—and nobody, by the way, considers it to be the least bit 
rude. Apparently this is a matter of variation o f conversational styles.
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Imagine tor example, in (23), that the first-speaker is on his knees presenting a dozen red 
roses, but being shy and young can only manage to stammer (23a). The second speaker, 
taking pity on the poor fellow and wanting her roses already, helps him out by finishing his 
sentence for him in (23b).
(23) a. Speaker 1: I... I... I — 
b. Speaker 2: — love me?
It seems to me that the best way to regard (23a-b) is as a single sentence that just happens to 
have been uttered across two speakers. Like in (21), where the "addressee" in the context has 
changed mid-utterance, so too in (23), the "speaker" has changed. I would argue that the 
structure of the single sentence uttered across (23a-b) is as shown below. Without the ability
to syntactically differentiate the two first person pronouns, (23a-b) would be a binding
violation.
(24) I, love me2
Note that an anti-indexing proponent could not counter that this was a violation that simply 
"got through" somehow, as with many well known kinds of binding violations that occur 
among first and second person pronouns. For example, (25a-c) are taken from popular songs, 
and in these kinds of environments condition B violations typically occur.
(25) a. I believe in me
b. I’ve got to be me
c. I’m gonna buy me a Cadillac
But (23a-b) is different in kind from the cases in (25). If me were replaced by myself in the
(25) examples, the resulting sentences would all mean approximately the same thing as the
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originals—at least in terms o f who is doing something to/for whom. If myself were substituted 
into (23b), however, it would be nonsense . 5
More interesting cases where first person pronouns need to be syntactically 
distinguished occur dramatically in so-called "dreamscape" examples and in counterfactuals.
As mentioned above, in these kinds o f cases, the explanation for their evaluation is highly 
problematic in the existing models that are based on Kaplan’s character. Example (26) is a 
"dreamscape," included by Lakoff (1972) in a discussion of "counterpart” theory. For 
Lakoff, the problem presented by (26) was not an indexing problem per se, but rather raised 
difficulties for identification o f individuals across possible worlds.
(26) I dreamt that I was Brigitte Bardot and that I kissed me
Like (23a-b), the second clause I  kissed me does not seem intuitively to be a binding 
violation, even though, as Lakoff noted, it is ungrammatical in isolation. Unlike the situation 
in (23), though, it is not because the "speaker" has changed but rather that in the context of 
the dream, there are distinct individuals both of whom are the "speaker." But in fact there 
are not two people: the reason that a first person pronoun can be used for each, after all, is
5  Bob Fiengo has pointed out to me that (23) might be alternatively analyzed not as a 
single sentence but as two sentences, the idea being that (23a) and (23b) are each an elided 
form of a complete sentence, the missing pieces of each being reconstructed at logical form 
from the other. While I don’t really see a clear way of choosing between the two analyses, 
on his alternative, numeric indices would still be necessary, similar to the question answering 
cases in the previous section. That is, only with numeric indices can each of the 
reconstructed pieces—shown in brackets below—be determined to be identical to its overt 
counterpart.
(i) a. Speaker 1 : Ij... I[... I t — [love you2]
b. Speaker 2: [youi...yoUj...youj] — love me^ ?
If this alternative is accepted, then (23) is not actually a case of two first person pronouns 
evaluating to different individuals in the same sentence.
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that the dreamer is the individual being referred to in both cases. This does not necessarily
mean, however, that the two first person expressions are syntactic occurrences of the same
expression. Assuming these to be reports o f George’s dreams, both /  and me in the second 
clause of (26) refer to the "speaker," George. It is because George is dreaming that he is 
someone else, namely Brigitte, that in a report of his dreams I  and me can be different 
expressions. Thus it is ‘Brigitte’—who George is, in the dream—who kissed George in (26). 
Importantly, who is being kissed is different in (27), the intuition in this case being that 
‘Brigitte’ kissed ‘Brigitte,’ and in this example I  and myself in the second clause are 
occurrences of the same expression . 6
(27) I dreamt that I was Brigitte Bardot and that I kissed myself
Using numeric indices, these intuitions can be naturally captured assuming that the structures 
of the final clause are contraindexed and coindexed, respectively, as shown in (28).
(28) a. ... I[ kissed meo
b. ... I[ kissed myself
Larson and Segal’s alphabetic indexing would have the same a index on all the pronouns in
(28), and they would somehow have to devise a way for the same index—or "character" 
function—to effect the distinction between (28a) and (28b), and this while respecting binding 
theory. In any event, it is difficult to see how (26) and (27) could be differentiated in any 
system that did not have a functional correlate to numeric indexing. Under Kaplan’s 
assumptions, a speaker would not have the option of using two different first person
6  These intuitions as to who kissed whom are mine, and match those described by Lakoff. 
However, I am told that in addition to ‘Brigitte’ kissing George, the second clause of (26) 
may also have the meaning that George kissed ‘Brigitte.’ These alternate interpretations will 
be discussed in the next section.
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character, and the distinction made in (28) would thus not be possible.
The difficulty of accounting for such cases has not gone unnoticed. It is not only in 
the "dreamscapes" that a speaker may use occurrences of different first person expressions to 
refer to himself. For example, Reboul (1997) recognizes counterfactual examples like (29) as 
a problem for "procedural meaning" accounts of indexicals, for which she advocates a 
creative solution involving numeric indices.
(29) a. If I were you, I wouldn't trust me
b. If I were you, I wouldn’t trust myself
Note that (29a-b) pattern similarly to the dreamscape pair (26) and (27); the subject /  in both 
consequents is a different individual from the first I  in the sentence, although both are still in 
an important sense the "speaker,” and in the consequent of (29a), the two first person forms 
are occurrences of different expressions.
Reboul’s strategy is to assign a different index to all the indexical pronouns in the 
sentence regardless of their status as first or second person forms. To justify this approach, 
she appeals to the idea that indexicals are autonomously interpreted due to their "procedural 
meaning"—an idea she credits as beginning with Kaplan. The only grammatical requirement 
in her theory of how this works is that /  and m yself must be coindexed, due to the fact that 
myself is a reflexive. The indexing patterns that result from this reasoning are shown in (30).
(30) a. If I[ were you2, I3  wouldn’t trust me4
b. If Ij were you2, I3  wouldn’t trust myself3
Sorting out who ends up not trusting whom is a matter, on Reboul’s account, for 
pragmatics—and because noncoindexing does not entail noncoreference, some of the
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noncoindexed expressions may well end up referring to the same individual. For example, in 
(30a), the pragmatic interpretation of the subject position in the consequent will be "the 
individual whose point of view is being expressed," while [7] 3  and [/ne] 4  will evaluate to the 
different people due to an "implicature of noncoreference."
There are a few problems with Reboul’s approach. The first difficulty is the 
entailment that no two same-person pronouns will ever be coindexed unless one o f them is a 
reflexive. That is, two distinct first person non-reflexive pronouns can never be considered to 
be occurrences of the same expression. But surely there are cases where coindexing is 
arguably the correct structural choice, as in the cases in (31). Besides being intuitively right, 
coindexing in such sentences is necessary to derive the so-called "sloppy" reading if a second 
clause such as ...and Alice does, too follows these . 7
(31) a. I love my mother
b. I think Jack loves me
Reboul would contraindex the pronouns in (31 a) and (31b), and the fact that /  and my, or I 
and me, end up picking out the same individual would be a matter of their use and would not 
be entailed by grammar. Why there would be no "implicature of noncoreference" in these 
cases is not clear.
There is also a problem with Reboul’s account o f the particular cases at hand. In 
assigning different indices all around as a matter of course, something crucial is missed about 
examples such as (30a) that licenses them in the first place. In the counterfactual (as in the 
dreamscape), the first clause sets up a context in which there seems to be more than one
7  I will defer until chapter 3 the details of the analysis of "sloppy" versus "strict" readings 
in verb phrase ellipsis sites, which involves the notions o f dependent versus independent 
syntactic occurrences of indices.
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individual who can legitimately be referred to by a first person form. But then there really 
shouldn’t be an "implicature of noncoreference" because in some sense both o f these 
individuals are the same individual. Furthermore, if the set-up is not there, the consequent 
becomes illegitimate. For example, compare (30a) to (32a). Intuitively there is a binding 
violation in the consequent o f (32a) in sharp contrast to (30a). That is, in terms of binding, 
(32a) fares about as well as (32b).
(32) a. ? If the moon were made of green cheese, I wouldn’t trust me
b. ? I don’t trust me
On Reboul’s approach, I  and me would be contraindexed in both examples in (32), making 
their syntax identical to (30a). This seems to me to be the wrong result. I would propose 
instead that the correct structures for (30) and (32) are as follows . 8
(30’) a. If I[ were you2, I2  wouldn’t trust met
b. If Ij were you2, I2  wouldn’t trust myself,
(32’) a. ? If the moon were made of green cheese, I t wouldn’t trust met
b. ? Ij don’t trust me,
In (30’), the intuition as to who isn’t trusting whom in the consequents is captured, as is their 
relationship to who is picked out in the antecedents. In contrast, the indexical patterns in 
(32’) reveal the binding violation that they intuitively contain.
Evidently, some first person forms behave as if they are syntactically occurrences of 
the same expression, while others behave as if they are occurrences of different expressions.
a
As mentioned in note 6  for the dreamscape example, apparently the reverse readings are 
available in the second clauses of (55’) for some people. This issue will be addressed in the 
next section.
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Numeric indexing is the formal device that appropriately indicates these facts. I will end this 
section with a more complex counterfactual example, due to Lakoff (1972). Compare the 
structure that would be assigned by Reboul, in (33a), to the indexing pattern that I would 
claim, shown in (33b).
(33) a. If I, were you2  and you3  were me4, I’d5  hate you6  
b. If I, were you2  and you2  were me,, I’d2  hate you.
The one advantage to Reboul’s approach is that the structure assigned can be trivially derived 
for any sentence; all the work is done in the pragmatics. On my view, however, this ignores 
the very important work contributed by the syntax. I have to this point in the discussion 
presented each of my alternative structures as a fait accomplis, and it is not yet clear how the 
indexing patterns that I claim are derived. Are all indexing patterns syntactically possible, 
and a system of filters rules out the "bad" ones? Or if only one such pattern is possible, how 
is it syntactically derived? In the next section, I propose a model from which the numeric 
indexing patterns I have claimed for such examples are derivable.
The analysis of noun phrases containing indexical pronouns that has been discussed 
throughout this chapter has indicated that indexical expressions need to be individuated 
syntactically in the same way as third person noun phrases. The cross-person identity cases 
show that two indexical noun phrases that contain pronouns with different Kaplanian 
"character"—e.g., phrases containing first person versus second person pronouns—may be 
occurrences of the same expression, just as two third person noun phrases that are different—
e.g., one containing a name and the other a pronoun—may be occurrences of the same 
expression. Numeric indexing marks this: [ / ] 2  and \yoii\z  are occurrences of the same 
expression, as are [.Jack] 3  and [he\y The "dreamscape" and counterfactuals, on the other 
hand, have shown that two indexical noun phrases that contain pronouns with the same
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"character"—such as two first person pronouns—may be occurrences of different expressions: 
the sentence I{ kissed me2 contains occurrences of different expressions, just as he3 kissed 
him4 does. Any theory of indexical expressions that cannot make these distinctions—that is, 
any anti-indexing account that assumes "character” in the sense o f Kaplan, even a dualist 
position such as Larson and Segal’s—is explanatorily inadequate in this regard.
2.2 The new model
2.21 Syntactic orientation
The syntax o f natural language has the capability of individuating expressions, 
marking some as occurrences of the same expression and others as different. In this regard, I 
have argued that expressions containing indexical pronouns are no different from those 
containing third person pronouns or names. This syntactic mechanism, which in this theory is 
formally marked with numeric indexing, is required for indexical expressions at the syntactic 
level of logical form to explain the distribution of indexical pronouns and reflexives, as well 
as the availability in the grammar of dreamscape and counterfactual indexical sentences.
However, one detail of the anti-indexing position that has not been countered is the 
problem of redundancy in evaluation—that is, assuming current models, indexical expressions 
will be evaluated twice over unless the model is revised. If the context is represented 
formally as a function from indices to individuals, all numerically indexed expressions will 
receive an evaluation in that context. How can this be squared with the idea that each 
indexical has a character, represented formally as a function that evaluates directly to an 
individual in the context? It can be, I claim, in the new model that I propose.
Recall that Kaplan’s theory of indexicals incorporates a two-stage model, in the first 
of which operates the character function. Two stages are necessary, he argues, as the 
different indexical characters do not interact with, for example, necessity or possibility
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operators, which come to play in the second stage. In "Afterthoughts," he calls the character 
stage "pre-semantic." In this last point I am in agreement with Kaplan, but probably not in 
the way he would expect. My claim is that there indeed exists something very like Kaplan’s 
character, that is in fact a syntactic property of indexicals. I will call this property 
"orientation.” Orientation is proposed to be a function that operates at the syntactic level of 
logical form. But unlike semantic character, the output of which is individuals, the output of 
the function of syntactic orientation is an index. By "index," I mean numeric index.
My proposal, therefore, is that while all have numeric indices, natural language 
syntax does, in another way, differentiate expressions containing first and second person 
pronouns from third person expressions. Indexical expressions have the property of 
orientation, from which their numeric indices must be derived. The function of orientation 
operates entirely within the syntactic level o f logical form. Because on this proposal, numeric 
indices are derived through orientation, there is no longer a conflict between different 
evaluation procedures. Rather, "evaluation" for indexicals proceeds in a two-stage process. 
Unlike Kaplan’s model, however, in which the two stages are both considered to be 
"semantic," the new model places the first stage completely in the syntax, from orientation to 
index, and the second in the semantics, from index to individual. Kaplan’s "character" had to 
be semantic, in that he assumed it to be a function directly to individuals; once this notion is 
replaced by orientation, functioning to numeric index, the procedure is revealed as a syntactic 
operation. I continue to assume, however, that the function from index to individual operates 
in the semantics, not only for indexical expressions but also for expressions containing third 
person pronouns and names.
Notationally, I will indicate orientation formally with an arrow, based on the 
metaphoric understanding of orientation as a syntacticized, internal pointing. Supposing, to 
describe them informally, that first person expressions have an "inward" orientation and
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second person have an "outward" orientation, I will use left and right arrows, respectively. 
Every sentence containing an indexical thus has a structural description containing orientation, 
as shown in line 1 of (34) and (35), related derivationally to a numerically indexed structure, 
shown in line 2 .
(34) line 1: I<- am hungry
line 2 : I2  am hungry
(35) line 1: Are you-* hungry
line 2: Are you3  hungry
How the derivation proceeds from line 1 to line 2 will be examined in detail in the next 
section. Note that the non-indexical counterpart to (34), shown in (36), is less derivationally 
complex, there being no line containing syntactic orientation.
(36) Torn, is hungry
The new model containing syntactic orientation provides a natural way to evaluate many of 
our earlier observations concerning sentences containing indexicals. For example, it is the 
derivational complexity of (34), compared to (36), that makes it the more precise tool in the 
situation o f Tom Brown wanting breakfast in bed. The intuitions of "same-saying" or not also 
can be explained. When Jack says I  am hungry and Teddy says I am hungry, there is a level 
of description—the oriented line 1 —at which these sentences are indeed structurally identical, 
thus the intuition that they have said the same thing. However, Jack is hungry said of the cat 
and Jack is hungry said of the first baseman are structurally identical at no level of 
description. Neither is there structural identity when Susan, pointing at Jack, says he is 
hungry, and Alice, pointing at Teddy, says he is hungry. This pointing is an external,
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pragmatic act, in contrast to syntactic orientation. Thus although in these last two examples, 
the speakers used the same words, they have not used the same sentence at any level, and thus 
the intuition that these are not cases o f "same-saying."
Before moving on, let me answer a possible objection concerning whether syntactic 
orientation, thought of as an index, might not simply supplant numeric indexing. That is, if 
orientation exists at a syntactic level as is claimed in the new model, why does there need to 
be a derived level of numeric indices? Upon a little reflection, the answer is relatively 
simple. If there were no numeric level, the orientation proposal would collapse into a 
notational variant of Larson and Segal’s alphabetic indices, having the same explanatory 
problems that their proposal had, as discussed throughout section 2.1 above.
«
2.22 From orientation to index, from index to individual
To illustrate how the proposed model works, I will compare it to previous models 
schematically. (37) represents a "standard” numeric context—something like which was 
assumed in Fiengo and May 1994. In such a semantic model, the context is formalized as a 
sequence—an uncomplicated function cr; the indices that mark noun phrases in the syntax 
directly evaluate to individuals. The formal context is thus a semantic construct. In the 
following illustration of the structure such a formal context, <x(l) =  X, o(2) =  Y and <x(3) =
Z, and so on.
(37) 1 2 3 . . . n . . .
© © © ©
/X\ IY\ IZ\ /N\
A A A A
Larson and Segal’s more complicated union of alphabetic and numeric contexts is depicted in 
(38)—a pictorial version of (5). Recall that unlike the standard sequence, theirs is specifically
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designed to take indexicals into account. The individuals that the alphabetic indices evaluate 
to vary; a(a) =  the individual who is the speaker, o(b) =  the individual who is the hearer, 
while the numeric portion of the sequence operates the same as in (37). This picture makes 
clear why Larson and Segal’s proposal is very close in spirit to Kaplan's character, in that 
like character, the alphabetic indices function directly to individuals.
(38) a b . . . r 1 2 . . . n
© © © © ©
/S\ /H\ /X\ /Y\ /N\
A A A A A
In contrast, the model of the context that I have proposed can be represented as a two- 
tiered structure depicted in (39). Unlike in Larson and Segal’s model, where the indexical 
indices are conceived as bearing no relation to the numeric indices, in my model orientation 
overlays the numeric tier. Unlike character, however, orientation does not functionally 
evaluate to individuals but to numeric indices. Notationally I will use a  for the syntactic 
orientation function, and maintain a for the semantic function of index to individual. In the 
context shown, g j («-) =  2 and u(-*) =  3, while as before a(2) =  Y and cr(3) =  Z. Thus (39) 
represents the formal context in the circumstances where Y is speaking to Z.
—
I 2 3 n
© © © ©
/X\ /Y\ IZ\ /N\
A A A A
The formal context in (39) details the link in the logical form derivations of (34) and (35) 
discussed in the previous section, which are repeated below. From line 1 to line 2, the 
numeric indices are derived through the function co o f syntactic orientation.
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(34) line 1: I*- am hungry
line 2: I2 am hungry
(35) line 1: Are you-* hungry
line 2: Are you3 hungry
When the formal context changes, «- and -»• may appear in different positions on the top tier
and aj will at that point derive different numeric values, but the output o f the semantic
function a for a particular numeric index will remain the same.
Note that the syntax can only "see" the top two tiers, and in this sense my proposal is 
agnostic concerning the entities that are claimed to be in the third tier. From my choices in 
illustrations, the reader will no doubt have concluded that I am sympathetic with theories that 
propose actual real-life individuals as the output of a. But the proposal o f syntactic 
orientation as a function from arrow to index that I have here put forth is consistent with the 
bottom tier o f the context containing properties, individual concepts, or any other 
philosophical construct.
The manner of context change will be very different in (38) versus (39). In Larson 
and Segal’s representation of context, the individuals in the bottom tier will fluctuate with 
changing circumstances. For example, if Tom is speaking to Larry, Tom would be in the 
sequence position designated by a in (38), and Larry would be in position b. Then if Larry 
replies to Tom, which person is in which position would reverse. In contrast, people don’t 
move around in the new model—only arrows do. That is, the patterning o f arrows in the top 
tier may change from moment to moment—even in mid-sentence, depending on the 
circumstances, while the numeric second tier and individuals in the bottom tier stay relatively 
fixed. This fact about the structure of the new model makes it a more attractive one than 
Larson and Segal’s in which to explain the various kinds of "context change."
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Let’s run through the derivation for a simple exchange that contains a cross-person 
"spin" in an ellipsis site, as when Alice says to Susan Jack loves me, and Susan responds 
Teddy does, too. Suppose that in the part of the context sequence that stays fixed across 
speakers, <r(l) =  Alice, o(2) =  Jack, <x(3) =  Susan, and a(4) = Teddy.
When Alice speaks to Susan, cn(*-) = 1 and &>(-»>) =  3, thus the syntactic derivation o f 
the first sentence is as follows.
(40) line 1: Jack2 loves me*-
line 2: Jack2 loves met
When Susan replies, oj(*-) =  3 and co(-*) =  1, thus syntactic reconstruction of the derivation 
of her reply is as follows.
(41) line 1: Teddy4 [loves you-*J, too
line 2: Teddy4 [loves youj], too
Note that syntactic identity holds between the verb phrases in line 2 of (40) and line 2 of (41), 
since the noun phrases have the same numeric index, thus licensing the ellipsis in the reply.
On this proposal, sentences containing non-indexicals are derivationally simple, using 
only the fixed bottom tiers of the formal context and only for interpretation. The syntactic 
structure of sentences containing indexical expressions, on the other hand, is derivationally 
complex, depending on a more complex formal context structure, that contains a constantly 
shifting upper tier. Assuming this model, it is not very surprising that very young children 
stick to their own names to refer to themselves, and even when they start using the indexical 
pronouns, confuse them. Part of our knowledge of language is the function of these complex 
formal contexts, and it seems that once it is learned how the arrows are shifted when speakers 
change, it is a small step to knowing how the arrows are shifted when the circumstances
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include ventriloquists or answering machines.
What are the constraints on the pattern o f orientations in the top tier o f a well-formed 
context? In the typical "actual" circumstances, if X is addressing Y, it will be the case that in 
the formal context«(«-) =  i and <r(i) =  X, and cd(-*) =  j  and cr(j) =  Y, for some i ^  j.
That is, because the orientation tier overlays the numeric tier, it will not be possible for 
different arrows to functionally evaluate to the same numerical value. Thus the co function, 
unlike the a function, is not many-one. Thus a particular numeric value cannot appear in 
more than one sequence position, although a particular individual can. An entailment of this 
is that, although it is possible for a speaker to refer to himself in the first person and third 
person without changing the formal context, it will not be possible for a speaker to refer to 
himself in both the first and second person unless he happens to be in two sequence positions. 
This situation is depicted in (42), which represents the formal context when Tom is talking to 
himself.
-
. . . 5 6 n . . .
©
/Tom\
A
©
/Tom\
A
©
/N\
A
For example if Tom, while shaving, says to himself you really let me down this time, the 
derivation is as shown in (43).
(43) line 1: You-* really let me«- down this time
line 2: You6 really let me5 down this time
Note that although these two expressions corefer, the evidence is that they are not numerically 
covalued; if they were, we would expect a condition B violation for me.
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I have assumed that orientation is a function, and as such, it should be determinant— 
that is, it should not be one-many. A possible objection may be that orientation is not 
necessarily a function, however, if there is evidence that it is possible, in a well-formed 
context, for both cj(«-) =  i and w(«-) =  j, where i ^  j. For example, recall the
circumstances of George having the strange dream that he is Brigitte Bardot, and the two
examples (26) and (27) in this "dreamscape," repeated below as (44a-b).
(44) a. I dreamt that I was Brigitte Bardot and that I kissed me
b. I dreamt that I was Brigitte Bardot and that I kissed myself
Assuming a (l) =  George, the syntactic derivation o f the first part of (44a) or (44b)—that sets 
up the hypothetical situation—clearly is derived through the typical "actual" formal context, in 
which co(*~) =  1, as shown in (45).
(45) line 1: I«- dreamt that I«- was Brigittej and that I*- kissed me«-/myself«-
line 2: I[ dreamt that I ( was Brigitte2  and ...
But the formal context has clearly changed for the second part of the sentence, which is 
occurring in the hypothetical dream circumstance. Earlier I described this situation as one in
which there were somehow two individuals who were both "first person." Taking this
intuition seriously might lead to the suggestion that the formal context that represents the 
dream circumstances simply contains two left arrows in the top tier, as shown in (46).
(46) -
1 2 3 . . .
\© / \© / ©
George ‘Brigitte’ IZ\
A A A
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
77
The idea would be that since George is dreaming he is Brigitte, George is actually in two 
sequence positions—his original position and the one that was Brigitte’s in the actual context. 
But if (46) were a well-formed context, then there is more than one value that the "function" 
could return, and what would decide the matter? Perhaps all possible combinations o f 
l ’s and 2 ’s are derivable in the consequent and it is up to a pragmatic account, such as 
Reboul’s, to decide who ends up kissing whom. But I think giving up the notion of 
orientation as a function would be a terrible blow in this model, since as conceived, 
orientation is a syntactic function through which the input into another functions—the numeric 
indices—are derived. I thus reject (46) as illegitimate on these theoretical grounds; a  must 
return a single value.
There is evidence that (46) should be rejected on empirical grounds, as well. If (46) 
were indeed the formal context that correctly represented the world of the dream, then it 
presumably would be the context in operation within the dream. But during the dream, while 
still dreaming that he is Brigitte, George could not say I  kissed me with the same meaning as 
in (44a). It seems that the reason he can use different first person expressions in (44a), is 
because he is reporting on the dream from  the actual world. Similarly, the reason that 
different first person expressions can be used in the "counterfactual" examples seems to be 
that what would happen in the hypothetical situation is being reported in the actual world.
How, then, are the cases of more than one "first" person to be handled? Through 
context change. Just as when a speaker addresses four people in succession you,, you2, you, 
and you4, the idea is that the formal context changes as required. In the dreamscape case, the 
idea is that there is an "actual" context, depicted in (47), in which co(^) =  1, but the content 
of the first clause sets up an alternate dream circumstance, the formal "dream" context 
depicted in (48), in which u(*~) =  2. Set up this way, it will follow that within the dream, 
the dreamer cannot say I  kissed me with anything but a reflexive interpretation, but that upon
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
waking, he can, in reporting on the dream, shift from one context to the other.
78
*-
1 2 3 . . .
\© / \© / ©
George Brigitte ,'Z\
A A A
-
1 2 3 . . .
\© / \© / ©
George ‘Brigitte’ /Z\
A A A
In the second halves of (44a-b), then, the syntactic derivation shifts to the "dream" alternate 
context in (48). Note that both "actual" and "dream" formal contexts are functionally well- 
formed in the sense that there will be only one numeric value that a particular orientation 
function will return. Subsequent to the shift to the "dream” context and the derivation of the 
subject expression in the second clause, the interpretations available indicate that the 
derivation thereafter may at any point shift back to the "actual” context. That is, return to the 
"actual" context is possible at any time. In the derivation o f (45), this would mean that the 
numeric index for the subject I in the consequent would be derived in the "dream" context to 
be w(*-) = 2. If that same "dream" context is still in place when the numeric index for the 
object noun phrase is derived, it will still be the case that «(«-) =  2. This will be fine if the 
object is the reflexive, but will lead to a binding violation for the pronoun. On the other 
hand, if the context shifts back to "actual" mid-consequent, for the object gj(«-) =  1, which 
will be fine for the pronoun but a violation for the reflexive. Four structures are thus 
derivable, half of which are ungrammatical due to binding theory. Thus only one possible 
numeric indexing will result for each, and the intuitive indexing for the dreamscape examples
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shown above in (28) have been derived. Note that a character-based or alphabetic indexing 
account cannot achieve this result; even if the theories were modified to include a mechanism 
of context shift, all four readings would be derived, and there would be no way to rule out 
the two that do not occur.
It should be noted that many people find the dreamscape and counterfactual sentences 
difficult to understand, and that the judgments of what they can mean are not consistent across 
speakers. I have to this point discussed my own judgments in these cases, but as noted in 
footnotes 6 and 8, Reboul, for example, claims that in addition to the first two readings 
indicated by the numeric values in (30’), repeated as (49a-b)—both of which I find good—that 
these sentences also have the possible readings indicated in (49c-d). The former are derivable 
on the account I have given here, parallel to the dream cases, but to derive the latter—in 
which the "hypothetical" context is shifted to as soon as it is set up by the conditional—my 
account would have to be modified to allow a freer choice in shifting possibilities.
(49) a. If IL were you2, I2 wouldn’t trust me[
b. If 11 were yotio, I2 wouldn’t trust myself,
c. If I( were you2, I t wouldn’t trust me2
d. If Ij were yoiio, I, wouldn’t trust myself
I have serious reservations concerning the interpretations in (49c-d), but apparently there are 
native speakers of English for whom these readings are available. If these readings do indeed 
exist, the model is capable of accommodating them without fundamental changes to the 
theory. The idea would be that the formal context shift to the hypothetical from the actual 
could occur at any time, or not at all for a case like (49d).
I do think that there is evidence, however, that in the case of two competing 
contexts—an "actual" versus a "hypothetical," as in the dreamscape or counterfactual—that the
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contexts cannot arbitrarily shift back and forth; that rather, once the derivation returns to the 
"actual" from the "hypothetical" that it cannot willy-nilly return. Consider the eight possible 
meanings for (50) shown in (51). Now (50) has been constructed to avoid the complications 
of Lakoffs and Reboul’s examples that are due to binding violations. According to my own 
intuitions, the only available readings for (50) are the first three shown in (51a-c), consistent 
with my description about how context shift in the model works: for me, it seems, the formal 
context must shift immediately upon being set up, and thus the subject o f the consequent must 
be interpreted in the "hypothetical" context. There seems to be a choice after that point to 
either stay in the "hypothetical" context or to return to the "actual" context. Interpretation 
can proceed according to the "hypothetical" for the entire second clause, deriving the struc­
ture in (5la), or return to the "actual" at any point within the second clause—(51b) and (51c) 
reflecting different points at which this can occur. What can’t be done is to jump back and 
forth: it seems to be impossible to leave the "hypothetical" context for the "actual” context 
and derive the middle pronoun, and then jump back to "actual" for the final pronoun, to 
derive the structure in (5 Id). To mean what (5Id) represents, I would have to say ... /  would 
give my resume to your mother.
(50) If I were you, I would give my resume to my mother
(51) a. If I, i
b. If I, i
c. If I, \
d. * If I
e. * If I
f. * If I
CT&* * If I
h. * If I
were you2, I] would give my2 resume to my[ mother
were you2, I, would give my2 resume to my2 mother
were you2, I, would give my, resume to my2 mother
were you2. I, would give my, resume to my, mother
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But if there is a grammar like Reboul’s that allows the subject o f the consequent to be 
interpreted in the "actual" context, then it is clear what intuitions would be predicted for them 
for (51e-h), all of w'hich are, as indicated, not possible interpretations for me. I would 
predict that shifting back and forth would be difficult or impossible, and thus (51e) should be 
bad. However, (51f-g) should be allowed in this grammar, and possibly (51 h) as well, in 
which the "actual" is never left. Unfortunately, the informants who have assured me that 
(49c-d) are possible interpretations in the wouldn't trust examples, were not able to evaluate 
an example complicated with more pronouns; I must therefore leave this prediction open for 
evaluation to any reader who is in agreement with Reboul’s judgments.
I have argued that numeric indices are necessary at logical form for sentences 
containing indexicals, and have proposed a two-tiered formal context through which numeric 
indices may be functionally derived in the syntax. This proposal constitutes, on the face o f it, 
a highly explanatory model of direct reference, providing a unified account for expressions 
containing indexicals and non-indexicals alike. Furthermore, it allows a natural explanation 
of context shift, and provides mechanisms tor describing different grammars that may exist in 
this regard. However, while I have hypothesized a property of syntactic orientation, I have 
offered no direct evidence for its presence at logical form. In the next two chapters, support 
for syntactic orientation is advanced through observations o f  what I call the "switch” 
phenomenon. Analysis of switch reference reveals that orientation interacts with the syntactic 
property o f dependency, and thus can be seen as further evidence for the model I have 
proposed. It remains to be seen, however, how this model will fare in the larger picture 
beyond first and second person singular pronouns. In the final chapter of this dissertation, the 
theory of syntactic orientation will be extended to plural indexical pronouns, as well as to 
locative and temporal indexical expressions, coming full circle back to a proper account o f the 
so-called "demonstratives" within the theory.
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C hapter 3: The syntax of switch
3.0 Introductory remarks
In this chapter, I will discuss a specific problem in the linguistic description of 
indexical expressions. My central concern will be sentences containing first and second 
person pronouns that have, under ellipsis, what I call a "switch" interpretation. I will argue 
that current theory does not provide an explanation for this phenomenon, but that a natural 
explanation can be advanced if the formal syntactic description o f expressions containing first 
and second person pronouns is augmented with the hypothesized property of orientation, as 
proposed in chapter 2. In this light, the switch phenomenon can be seen as evidence for 
syntactic orientation.
As mentioned in the previous chapters, I assume the theoretical framework of Indices 
and identity (Fiengo and May 1994), but to this point I have not discussed the central 
innovations of dependency theory that are developed therein. Fiengo and May hypothesize 
that occurrences of indices may be o f two types—"independent" or "dependent"—formally 
indicated in the theory by a  and 0, respectively. Assuming that some form of binding theory 
determines the distribution o f the numeric values of noun phrases in a syntactic structure, 
dependency theory determines the distribution of the index types. 1 Along with the syntactic 
account of verb phrase ellipsis, discussed in the previous chapter, the a/jS distinction, in its 
simplest application, accounts for the two possible interpretations o f the second clause in (1), 
where the first clause is taken to mean that John loves John’s mother.
1 A terminological note is in order here. For Fiengo and May, the word "indexical" is 
used as the adjectival form o f "index," thus in their formal syntactic descriptions, all noun 
phrases will have an "indexical value" and an "indexical type." whether or not they are 
"indexicals" as I have used the term. To prevent confusion, I have substituted for Fiengo and 
May’s terms "numeric value" and "index type,” respectively, reserving the form of the word 
"indexical” for "indexical expressions" as discussed in chapter 1.
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(1) John loves his mother, and Bill does, too
The "strict identity" reading of the second clause is that Bill loves John's mother; the "sloppy 
identity" reading is that Bill loves Bill’s mother. The two readings arise, on Fiengo and 
May’s account, because the first clause is structurally ambiguous in terms of the index types it 
contains; which of these interpretations is available turns on whether the noun phrase 
containing the pronoun his in the first clause is syntactically independent or dependent. There 
are correspondingly two possible structures at the syntactic level of logical form (LF), as 
shown below, with the reconstructed verb phrases o f the second clause represented in square 
brackets.
(2) a. John; loves hisla mother, and Bill2 [loves hisla mother], too 
b. Johnt loves his10 mother, and Bill2 [loves hisog mother], too
The noun phrase [to] in the first clause contains an independent or a-occurrence of the index 
1 in (2a), and a dependent or /S-occurrence of the index 1 in (2b). Identity conditions at LF 
require that the reconstructed verb phrase in the second clause be identical to the first.
Simply stated, for noun phrases with independent a-indices to be identical, their numeric 
values must be equal; thus the reconstructed [ to ]  in the second clause o f (2a) must have the 
index I . On the other hand, for noun phrases with dependent /3-indices to be identical, they 
must occur within the same "dependency," defined linearly within phrase structure theory.
The index I on [to] in the first clause of (2b) is a dependent occurrence, possible because of 
the presence of another noun phrase [John] o f index 1 earlier in the clause. The reconstructed 
[ to ]  in the second clause o f (2b) must have the index 2; so it too is a dependent occurrence.
If it had any other numeric value, it would not be occurring in a dependency identical to the
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dependency realized in the first clause.2
The structural ambiguity of the first clause—the difference in index types—does not 
result in different interpretations of the first clauses across the two sentences—both mean that 
John loves John’s mother. The distinction becomes "visible" in the interpretation of the 
second clauses: from (2a) is derived the so-called "strict”—Bill loves John’s mother: and 
from (2b) the so-called "sloppy”—Bill loves Bill’s mother. In general, reconstruction of 
independent, a-type indices leads to strict readings, while reconstruction of dependent, /3-type 
indices leads to sloppy readings.3
The cases I will be concerned with in this chapter also exhibit an ambiguity in verb 
phrase ellipsis sites. However, their interpretations cannot be analyzed, on the face of it, as 
following a "strict" versus "sloppy" pattern of readings. The phenomenon in question occurs 
robustly in sentences containing first and second person pronouns. The paradigm example is 
given in (3).
(3) a. Speaker 1: Ij love you  ^
b. Speaker 2: I2 do, too
For many speakers of English, two interpretations are available for (3b), one making the 
declaration in return, the other meaning that speaker 2 loves the same person that speaker 1 
loves—suggesting that (3b) has the following possible LF structures (shown without index 
type).
2 In the discussion of "cross-person identity" in chapter 2 there were examples of verb 
phrase identity in reconstruction sites, but for simplicity of exposition I did not include 
indications o f index type there. The cases in that discussion were similar to (2a), and in a 
fuller description the noun phrase indices would have been marked as a-occurrences.
3 This generalization is actually a simplification of the facts, as will be seen in section 
3.32.
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(4) a. Speaker 2: I2 [love you J ,  too
b. Speaker 2: I2 [love me/myself2j, too
Only the structure in (4b), however, is expected by dependency theory. Since the indices in
(3a) are different values, they must both be a-occurrences; to fulfill the condition of identity 
with an a-indexed noun phrase o f value 2, the numeric value of the reconstructed noun phrase 
must also be 2. Thus (4b) evaluates to the straightforward strict reading, and as no other 
pattern of index types is available for (3a), it is the only interpretation predicted to occur for 
the reply in (3b).
How, then, can the existence of (4a) be explained? It cannot be analyzed as sloppy, 
as there is no dependency in the structure. As the numeric values have seemingly reversed 
positions in antecedent and consequent, I call this problematic interpretation "switch." The 
apparatus provided by dependency theory seems to offer no solution for its derivation. 
Nevertheless, the switch interpretation in (4a) is not only available to English speakers, it is 
by contrast to (4b) the more usual one. Judgments generally pattern as follows: for speakers 
who like the switch in (4a), the strict in (4b) is marginal, the "funny" or "joke” interpretation. 
For speakers who don’t accept (4a), the only possible reading of speaker 2’s reply in (3) is 
the strict (4b)—often offered within a caveat such as "well, if it means anything, it means 
that.” For the moment, I seek to explain the grammar of the former speakers; however, the 
"marginality" of the strict reading will be returned to.
Perhaps, some readers may be thinking, appeal to dependency theory is needlessly 
complex: why bother with numeric values and index types, when one notices that in the 
switch reading for (3), the words o f the verb phrase [love you] are identical across the two 
speakers? Such an observation might lead to the hypothesis that for purposes o f 
reconstruction, the overt and elided verb phrases can be considered identical just in case they
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contain the same exact words. One of those words—namely you—will simply have a different 
meaning for speaker 2 than it did for speaker 1. Though attractive, this idea must be 
rejected, as it would overgenerate is cases such as (5).
(5) a. Speaker 1: I[loveyou2
b. Speaker 2: AIice4 does, too
That is, if the proposal had any merit, (5b) should be able to have the LF structure in (6), 
since the verb phrase here contains the "same exact words" as the verb phrase in (5a).
(6) Speaker 2: Alice4 does [love yoU[], too
In fact, however, only the strict reading—Alice loves me, too—is available for (5b); (6) is 
impossible.
Dependency theory is not alone in failing to account for the switch reading. For 
example, appeal to semantic theories that account for verb phrase ellipsis under a predicate- 
based approach, such as those inspired by Sag 1976 and Williams 1977, offers no remedy.4 
In such theories the interpretation of elided verb phrases is analyzed to be a case of 
predicating the same semantic property as in the antecedent. In the case of a strict reading, as 
in (2a) and (4a), the predicated property is that of loving a particular person, formally 
expressed, using the device o f lambda abstraction, as a lambda expression containing a 
constant. For a noun phrase to be interpreted sloppily, it must be a variable inside the 
lambda predicate, under the scope of the prior noun phrase; for example for (2b), Xjc [x loves
4 Although the failure of a predicate-based approach to explain the full range of "strict" 
and "sloppy" occurrences of noun phrases in English has been convincingly shown by Fiengo 
and May (see especially chapter 4), I will be returning now and then to such approaches for 
comparison purposes. In the next chapter, I will discuss in some detail an analysis developed 
by Rebuschi (1994, 1997) within such a framework for the switch phenomenon.
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x ’s mother]. Since in a switch interpretation, no preferential prior noun phrase for the elided 
pronoun is available, a predicate-based sloppy analysis is untenable: the elided pronoun 
would be a free variable in the lambda expression, and the property would thus be 
illegitimate.
In both dependency theory’s syntactic account o f ellipsis, and in the semantic 
predicate-based theories, analysis o f "sloppy" readings involves the existence o f a prior noun 
phrase having the same index or referent, that has not been elided and is therefore overtly 
available. Since in the switch cases such a prior phrase is not evident, analyzing switch as a 
kind of sloppy reading seems impossible on either approach. Nevertheless, a careful 
examination of the cases where switch occurs reveals regularities that will make it possible to 
conclude that switch readings, like sloppy ones, are derivable through an analysis 
incorporating dependent index types in an extension of dependency theory—on the 
assumption, that is, that orientation is a syntactic property o f indexical expressions.
3.1 The switch phenomenon
After examining possible alternative explanations for the switch phenomenon in 
section 3.2, I will in section 3.3 put forth my proposal for a dependency analysis that relies 
on the hypothesis of syntactic orientation. In this section, however, let’s put these issues 
aside, in order to more thoroughly review the data concerning the switch phenomenon in 
English. Where do switch readings seem never to occur, and where do switch readings most 
robustly occur?
3.11 Switch and the third person
The first observation to make is that switch appears to occur only between indexical 
expressions, as in the paradigm example given in (3) above. There are no cases in which
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switch occurs between first person and third person, in either order, as in (7) and (8), or 
between second and third, as in (9) and (10).
(7) a. Speaker 1: 1, loveJack3
b. Speaker 2: He3 does, too ^  He3 [loves you,], too
(8) a. Speaker 1: Jack3 loves me,
b. Speaker 2: You, do, too You, [love Jack3], too
(9) a. Speaker 1: You^ love Susanj
b. Speaker 2: She5 does, too ^  She5 [loves meo], too
(10) a. Speaker 1: Susan5 loves you2
b. Speaker 2: I2 do, too ^  I2 [love Susan5J, too
None of the (b) examples in (7-10) has the switch reading indicated to the right.
Neither does switch occur between two non-indexical noun phrases, as in (II).
(11) a. Speaker I: Jack3 loves Susan5
b. Speaker 2: She5 does, too ^  She5 [loves him3], too
Do the (b) examples in (7-11) have strict interpretations? It seems that they do, but the status 
of the strict readings is rather marginal. With the caveat that these kind of fuzzy judgments 
constitute not the best data, the strict readings of ('1)—He loves himself, too, and (9) and 
(11)—She loves herself, too, seem "worse" than the strict reading for (8)—You love yourself 
too, and (10)—/  love myself too, which in turn seems "worse" than the strict reading for (3) 
discussed earlier. Before moving on to the switch cases, let’s consider why this might be so. 
Note first that if alternate (b) responses were supplied for (7-11), strict readings would
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occur quite robustly. For example, when the conversation in (12) is compared to (7), where 
(12a) = (7a), the different response in (12b) straightforwardly yields a strict interpretation.
(12) a. Speaker 1: I[Iov eJack 3
b. Speaker 2: Susan5 does, too =  Susan5 [loves Jack3], too
This is as predicted by dependency theory, since all o f the indices here are of type a.
Recall that an important tenet of dependency theory is the availability of what Fiengo
and May call "vehicle change," defined in the previous chapter under the discussion of cross- 
person identity. The numeric value and index type of two noun phrases determine whether 
they are identical for purposes o f reconstruction; it does not matter, from the standpoint of 
dependency theory, what "vehicle" carries the index. Vehicle change allows identity among 
names, pronouns, reflexives, and even zero-elements. One noun phrase containing—say—a 
name, while another contains a reflexive, is irrelevant to identity, although it may be relevant 
to other conditions in the grammar, such as binding.
Note that because (7-11) were constructed to examine whether switch occurs in these 
cases, the object o f the first utterance becomes the subject of the elliptical reply. Thus the 
"marginal” strict readings in (7b-l lb) are all cases where the numeric index of the 
reconstructed pronoun is the same as the value of the overt subject of the sentence. Let’s 
examine more closely what the structure at LF would be that would yield the strict reading for
(7). One possibility is shown in (13).
(13) a. Speaker 1: I t love Jack3a
b. Speaker 2: He3 [loves him3J ,  too
While (13b) fulfills the identity conditions o f dependency theory, it runs afoul of condition B 
of binding theory and must therefore be rejected. Similarly, if  the reconstructed verb phrase
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were [loves Jack3a], identity conditions would be met, but binding condition C would be 
violated. Dependency theory, however, allows yet another possibility:
(14) a. Speaker I: I 1 IoveJack3a
b. Speaker 2: He3 [loves himself3a], too
Although vehicle change allows identity between a name and a reflexive, reflexives of type a  
are, in general, marked. In the unmarked case, reflexive pronouns are dependent, that is, 
they bear ^-indices. But Fiengo and May do observe marked positions in which "a- 
reflexives" can appear: generally noun phrase positions within intensional domains, including 
complements of certain verbs such as vote for. The complement o f the verb love is not 
generally a position allowing an a-reflexive. If the verb is changed in the example from love 
to vote for, the status of the strict reading goes up in acceptability; in (15b), the strict reading 
is perfect.
(15) a. Speaker 1: I ( voted for Jack3a
b. Speaker 2: did, too =  He [voted for himself3a], too
The marginality of the strict readings in (7-11) can be attributed, then, to the relative 
markedness of a-reflexives in the position of the complement to the verb love. Why, then, do 
some of the readings seem "better" than others? For the time being, I will leave this 
question unanswered: a certain understanding of this mystery will, however, be achieved in 
chapter 4.
3.12 Core cases of switch
While switch occurs only between the indexical pronouns, it does not do so in every 
sentence containing them. Descriptively, the circumstances in which the switch reading is
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most salient are intimate situations such as romantic love, as in (3) and (16-18), and 
accusations like (19-21). Sometimes these overlap, as in (22). The linear order of the 
pronouns in the sentence—that is, which appears before the other—does not seem to matter 
for switch to occur.
(16) a. Speaker 1: I , want your2 body
b. Speaker 2: I2 do, too =  I2 [want your, body], too
(17) a. Speaker 1: Do you2 love me,?
b. Speaker 2: Do you,? =  Do you, [love mei]?
(18) a. Speaker 1: I, think you2’re wonderful
b. Speaker 2: I2 do, too =  I2 [think you [’re wonderful], too
(19) a. Speaker 1: You2 cheated me,!
b. Speaker 2: You, did, too! =  You, [cheated meo], too!
(20) a. Speaker 1: You2 don’t scare me, one bit!
b. Speaker 2: You, don’t, either! =  You, don’t [scare me^ one bit],
either!
(21) a. Sibling 1: [ j’m going to tell Mom on yoo,!
b. Sibling 2: I2 am, too! =  I2’m [going to tell Mom on you,],
too!
(22) a. Speaker 1: Yot^ don’t love me, anymore!
b. Speaker 2: And you, do?! =  And you, [love me-, (still)]?!
For all of these switch is not only the usual reading, it seems to be the only reading: a strict 
interpretation seems impossible. It is probably the case, however, that the status of the strict
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readings here is the same as in (7-11) discussed in the previous section, but that because the 
switch reading is so strong, it drowns out the marginally available strict reading. The lower 
availability of strict here may also be due to the pragmatic unlikeliness o f their meanings: 
declaring I want my body is certainly odd for most people, as is telling someone you don’t 
scare yourself one bit. Asking do you love yourself? instead o f answering the question in (17) 
flouts the Gricean cooperative principle; it nonetheless seems the "best" o f the possible strict 
readings in (16-22).
In many other types of circumstances—usually duller ones—the switch reading either 
is a stretch or is unavailable, as in the examples given in (23-26).
(23) a. Speaker 1: I, saw you2 in the library
b. Speaker 2: I2 did, too ^  I2 [saw you, in the library], too
(24) a. Speaker 1: Do youo think I, should ask for a raise?
b. Speaker 2: Do you,? Do you, [think I2 should ask for a
raise]?
(25) a. Speaker 1: I , 'd  like a copy of your-, paper
b. Speaker 2: I2 would, too jt- I2’d [like a copy of your, paper], too
(26) a. Speaker 1: You2 met my, husband last year
b. Speaker 2: You, did, too ^  You, [met my2 husband last year],
too
A further difficultly is illustrated by (27), in which switch is unavailable as well.
(27) a. Speaker 1: I, think Jack loves you2
b. Speaker 2: I2 do, too ^  I2 [think Jack loves you,], too
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The switch meanings shown to the right of (23b-27b) are perfectly understandable; there is 
nothing pragmatically odd about them as responses. Nevertheless, the (b) examples only have 
the strict meanings here, even when they are a bit strange or useful only as wise-cracks: /  
saw m yself in the library, too; I ’d like a copy o f  m y paper, too; You met your husband last 
year, too.
Let’s review, examining the structural positions o f the first and second person 
pronouns where switch does and does not occur. Switch is available in cases where the first 
and second person pronouns are in subject and object argument positions of a verb, as in (3),
(17), (19), (20), (22); but switch is unavailable in (23) which has this same co-argument 
arrangement. Similarly, switch occurs in (16), with one pronoun in subject position and the 
other within the object, but does not occur in the structurally similar (26).
Switch can occur when the pronouns are not in a c-command configuration, as in (28- 
30); but often does not, as in (31).
(28) a. Speaker 1: My, heart is yourso
b. Speaker 2: Mine^ is, too =  My0 heart [is yours,], too
(29) a. Speaker 1: Your2 hair turns me, on
b. Speaker 2: Yours, does, too =  Your, hair [turns me, on], too
(30) a. Speaker 1: My, house is your2 house
b. Speaker 2: Mine;, is, too =  My2 house [is your, house], too
(31) a. Speaker 1: Your2 paycheck is on my, desk
b. Speaker 2: Yours, is, too Your, paycheck [is on my2 desk], too
Finally, locality does not seem to be a requirement for a switch reading. While there
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is no switch in (24), (25) and (27) where the second pronoun is in some position within an 
embedded sentence, switch does occur in (18) and (21), similarly "distant” structural 
environments. Furthermore, there are plenty of examples such as (32-35), in which the first 
and second pronouns are quite "far away” syntactically from each other, and yet the switch 
readings for these are quite good.
(32) a. Speaker 1: You2 don't know the first thing about the way I, feel
b. Speaker 2: You, don’t, either =  YoU[ don’t [know the first thing 
about the way U feel], either
(33) a. Speaker 1: I, think the world would be a terrible place if you-, weren’t in it
b. Speaker 2: I-, do, too =  I2 [think the world would be a 
terrible place if you, weren’t in it], 
too
(34) a. Speaker 1: How dare you2 imply that the graduate program shouldn’t have
accepted me,?
b. Speaker 2: How dare YOU,? =  How dare you, [imply that the 
graduate program shouldn’t have 
accepted meo]?
(35) a. Speaker I: My, heart leaps into my, throat whenever anyone passes by who has
your2 color hair, your2 walk, vour, smell
b. Speaker 2: Mine2 does, too My2 heart [leaps into my2 throat 
whenever anyone passes by who has 
your, color hair, your, walk, your, 
smell], too
To summarize these observations, the only absolute requirement for a switch reading 
to occur has been the presence o f both a first person pronoun and a second person pronoun 
somewhere in the sentence. Positionally, the two indexical expressions do not have to be in 
the syntactic relationship o f c-command, nor do they have to occur in the same local domain.
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The linguistic relationship that this recalls is syntactic dependency; dependency relations are 
defined linearly, and do not require c-command or locality. Switch, then, may be analyzable 
as resulting from some kind of dependency between the first and second person pronouns.
The LF structure leading to a switch reading would, on such an analysis, contain a
pronominal noun phrase of type /3: for the reconstructed verb phrase to meet identity 
conditions with the prior verb phrase, the dependencies of the contained noun phrases would 
have to be the "same," however this notion would be defined.
A dependency analysis would straightforwardly predict that switch could not occur 
unless the initial pronoun were outside the ellipsis site; otherwise, the postulated dependency 
would be wholly contained and result in a strict reading. In all o f the cases of switch seen so 
far, the initial pronoun is indeed overt. And the prediction is borne out: switch cannot occur 
if both pronouns are elided, as in (36) and (37).
(36) a. Speaker 1: Alice4 thinks I, love you2
b. Speaker 2: Larry7 does, too ?£ Larry7 [thinks I2 love yoU[], too
(37) a. Speaker 1: It looks like you2’ve got me,
b. Speaker 2: It certainly does ?£ It certainly [looks like you (’ve got
me^ J
The dependency analysis would also predict that the relationship between the pronouns 
in antecedent and ellipsis must be structurally parallel for switch to occur; this prediction is 
also borne out. For example, in (38b), where the pronouns are in structurally different 
positions than in (38a), there is no switch.
(38) a. Speaker 1: My, heart burns for you2
b. Speaker 2: I do, too I2 [burn for you,], too
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On the other hand, if speaker 2's response in (38) were Mine does, too, the switch 
interpretation is perfect, as would be predicted by a dependency analysis.
The evidence, then, suggests that the relationship between the indexical pronouns that 
leads to a switch interpretation is one o f syntactic dependency. It must, o f course, be a 
different kind of dependency than the familiar one. Although similar to the usual dependency 
in the ways just discussed, this special dependency somehow occurs between noun phrases 
bearing indices of different values. In the remainder of this chapter, [ will pursue this 
approach, developing an analysis o f switch along these lines. But care needs to be taken 
concerning the limits of this approach. While a dependency analysis seems promising in 
determining the conditions under which switch can occur, it is as yet unclear why switch does 
not occur in many sentences structurally similar to those where it does.
3.2 A different kind of dependency?
3.21 The theoretical description of dependency
In the theory developed by Fiengo and May in Indices and Identity, syntactic 
dependencies may exist only in structures that contain at least two occurrences of the same 
value numeric index. Dependent or /3-type indices are licensed just in case there is an co­
occurrence of the same value in some linear factorization of the phrase structure. Formally, a 
dependency is a triple consisting of: the noun phrases bearing the numeric index; the numeric 
value itself; and the smallest portion of the structural description that contains the noun 
phrases. As a simple example, the formal descriptions of the dependencies realized in the 
sentences o f (39) are shown in (40).
(39) a. Johnla loves him self^ 
b. Bill2a loves himself2/3
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(40) a. <  ( [NP John]a , [NP himself]^ ), 1, <N P, V, NP> > 
b. <  ( [NP Bill]a  , [NP himself]^ ), 2, < N P , V, NP> >
Recall that the well-formedness of reconstruction depends on the identity o f dependencies. 
Fiengo and May formally define two dependencies to be "i-copies”—that is, syntactically 
identical—just in case they differ only with respect to numeric value—formally, the second 
member o f the triple. By this definition, (40a) and (40b) are i-copies, since the only syntactic 
difference between them is that (40a) has value 1 and (40b) value 2. Importantly, lexical 
differences are not relevant to the identity: dependencies are part of syntactic structure—they 
occur among noun phrases, not among the lexical items contained in noun phrases. Identity 
holds despite the fact that the (40a) dependency contains the lexical item John and (40b) 
contains Bill; furthermore, both would be considered identical to the dependency encoded in 
Mary loves herself\ although lexically, the reflexives differ in gender.
To explain switch under a dependency analysis, the notion of dependency must be 
extended to allow a /3-occurrence of an index without an a-occurrence o f that same index. It 
is clear that the theory should not allow dependent, /3-type indices freely, even if this were 
somehow restricted to noun phrases containing first and second person pronouns. That is, the 
extended notion of dependency developed here must not operate in cases like (5) and (36), 
repeated below.
(5) a. Speaker 1: I jlo v ey o u 2
b. Speaker 2: Alice4 does, too ^  Alice4 [loves you(], too
(36) a. Speaker 1: AIice4 thinks I{ love yoi^
b. Speaker 2: Larry7 does, too ^  Larry7 [thinks I2 love you,], too
In the examples in which switch occurs, an overt noun phrase containing the alternate
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indexical pronoun is always present earlier in the sentence, although it has a different numeric 
value than the lower noun phrase that will be analyzed as "dependent." The new kind of 
dependency must therefore include the overt a-type noun phrase as well as the elided /3-type 
noun phrase, in which the lower indexical expression noun phrase will be a dependent 
occurrence in virtue of the other’s presence.
To allow this dependency between non-coindexed noun phrases, my proposal will be 
to appeal to the hypothesis advanced in chapter 2  that indexical expressions have the 
additional syntactic property of orientation. I will advance the idea that dependencies are 
licensed to occur not only among coindexed expressions, but also among syntactically oriented 
expressions. For reasons of economy, however, such an approach needs to be treated with 
caution. That is, before appealing to an additional hypothesized property, it must be asked 
whether a dependency analysis can be constructed using existing structural properties. Thus 
before developing the orientation proposal any further, let’s consider some alternate 
approaches for deriving the switch reading that do not involve the complication of syntactic 
orientation.
3.22 Alternative hypothesis #1: cross-indexed dependencies simpliciter
An analysis of switch as involving a different kind of dependency will, of course, 
involve a complication somewhere in the theory. One way to express the new dependency 
would be to license additional structures such as (41), allowing dependency to simply occur 
among non-coindexed noun phrases. Let’s call these hypothetical dependencies "cross- 
indexed.”
(41) a. Speaker 1: I la love you2jj
b. Speaker 2 : h a  [love you^l, too
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The formal description of dependency could be altered to accommodate such an 
approach by defining the second member o f the dependency triple to be an ordered pair of 
numeric values instead of a singleton. 5  On this approach, the dependencies in (41) would 
have the following descriptions.
(42) a. <  ( [j^p I]a , you] 0  ), < 1 ,2 > ,  <N P, V, N P> >
b. <  ( [Np I]* . [np y°ul0  ). <2 ,1  > ,  <N P, V, N P> >
Technically, this alteration would be unproblematic for the existing machinery of dependency 
theory; the ordered pair in a "normal" dependency of noun phrases both bearing numeric 
value 1 would be <  1,1 > . Defining the dependencies in (42) as such, however, would not 
by itself license (41). For the reconstruction in (41b) to be well-formed, (42a) and (42b) 
would also have to be syntactically identical. The current definition of i-copy has it that two 
dependencies may differ in indexical value; now that the "value" may be an ordered pair of
values, the definition would have to be amended to accommodate this fact. For example, the
definition could be extended as follows.
(43) Two dependencies are i-copies just in case they differ only with respect to their 
numeric indices in either of the following ways:
a. value: < i , i>  versus < j , j>
b. order: < i , j>  versus < j , i>
Fiengo and May’s identity condition for dependencies is preserved in (43a), so that the 
existing analysis o f "sloppy identity" would remain intact. The alternate identity condition in 
(43b) would deem the cross-indexed (42a) and (42b), which differ only with respect to the
5  I limit discussion here to simple dependencies containing two noun phrases; on the 
hypothesis suggested in the text, dependencies containing three noun phrases might require an 
ordered triple of numeric values, and so on. (Switch cases involving more than two pronouns 
will be discussed later in this chapter.)
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order of their values, to be i-copies. Thus, reconstruction would be licensed in (41b). leading 
to the switch reading.
The reader may be wondering why the i-copy condition needs amendment, for if 
dependencies may differ in value, what difference does it make if that "value" is an ordered 
pair, <  1,2> being a different value than <2,1 > ?  The complication is necessary because 
without something like (43b), not just the "switched" values would be licensed, but any 
numeric pair of values would be licensed. For example, two dependencies whose values were 
<  1,2> and < 3 ,4 >  and otherwise identical would also be i-copies—and these do not occur. 
To illustrate such a case, imagine a situation in which two lovers are watching a movie, in 
which one of the characters says I  love you to another character. The intuition here is that if 
one of the viewers turns to the other and say I  do, too, this can only have the strict meaning 
that he loves the movie star, and not mean that he loves his companion in the theater.
(44) a. Movie star 1 to Movie star 2: I t love yoii2
b. Movie goer 3 to Movie goer 4: I3  do, too ^  I3  [love you4], too
This example shows that on the cross-indexed hypothesis, the i-copy condition needs 
something like the added complexity as shown in (43).
Note that the structural requirement of the i-copy condition has not been affected, and 
that structural identity must remain a requirement no matter along what lines a dependency 
analysis develops. Recall that in cases like (38), repeated below as (45), the switch reading 
does not occur.
(45) a. Speaker 1: Myt heart burns for you2
b. Speaker 2: I do, too I2  [bum for yout], too
The dependencies realized in (45) would have the following formal descriptions:
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(46) a. < ( [NP my]a , [NP you]^ ), <  1,2 >  , <N P , N, V. P, N P>  > 
b. <  ( [NP I]a  , [NP youj^ ), < 2 ,1  > ,  < N P , V, P, N P> >
The lack of a switch reading in (38) is directly explained by the cross-indexed hypothesis, as 
it would be by any dependency analysis. (46a) and (46b) are not i-copies, due to the 
difference in structural description.
It should be clear that the revised treatment o f identity set forth above is not the only 
technical solution for "cross-indexing." On an alternate approach, the dependency could be 
defined with respect to an unordered pair o f indices, while preserving the one numeric value 
o f the "normal" dependency as a singleton. The identity condition for dependencies with 
singleton values would remain intact; the identity condition for non-singleton dependencies 
would be that the value sets cannot differ—that is, they must be identical. Such a solution 
would have the same results as (43), licensing the switch reading in (41b) but not in (44b).
The alterations to the theory thus far, however, whether stated in terms of ordering or 
not, would not be enough. While allowing cross-indexed identical dependencies correctly 
derives the switch reading in (41) and correctly prevents the switch reading in (44) and (45), 
it also massively overgenerates, predicting switch readings in sentences where they never 
occur, such as between third person pronouns. For example, nothing yet in the cross-indexed 
hypothesis would rule out the strict reading in (47b).
(47) a. Speaker 1: HeSo, loves her6 j3
b. Speaker 2: She6a does, too ^  She6a [loves him5^] too
Formally, the cross-indexed dependencies realized in (47) would be as shown in (48).
(48) a. < ( [NP he]a , [NP her] 0  ), < 5 ,6 >  , <N P , V, NP> >
b. < ( [NP she]a  , [NP him]^ ), < 6 ,5 > ,  <N P , V, NP> >
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There is no relevant difference between (48a-b) and (42a-b); both pairs are i-copies by either 
revised definition of i-copy. It is unclear that any further revision would allow identity in
(42) but not in (48) except in a purely stipulative way. To repeat, dependencies are syntactic 
in nature; the lexical contents of the noun phrases in a dependency are irrelevant.
Perhaps some general pragmatic condition could be called upon to filter out cases like
(47), allowing a switch reading to occur only if the dependency is between speaker and hearer 
in a conversation. Theoretically, this would move the job of restricting all o f the non-switch 
cases to conditions on use; in an extreme version, the syntax would license cross-indexed 
dependencies everywhere, but some of the sentences would be unusable. Such a condition 
would filter out the switch in (47) but allow it in (41). The difficulty with this pragmatic 
solution is that the largest cut between switch and non-switch cases really does seem internal 
to language. To make this clear, imagine a situation in which two lovers have pet names for 
each other: she calls him "Pookie" and he calls her "Snookums." Now consider the 
following exchange between them.
(49) a. Speaker 1: Snookums t loves Pookie-, 
b. Speaker 2: Pookie2  does, too
The intuition here is that (49b) does not have a switch reading, even though the noun phrases 
therein ultimately refer to speaker and hearer in the conversation. The lexical contents of the 
noun phrases in (49) are not, however, in the first and second person, but in the third. 
Intuitively, while there may be pragmatic conditions that differentiate I  love you from I  saw 
you , making the switch reading less available following the latter, it seems unlikely that 
pragmatic conditions can do the entire job of also differentiating I  love you from he loves her. 
Suppose there were a way to restrict the i-copy condition for cross-indexed
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dependencies just in case the noun phrases were third person expressions. The conditions for 
the syntactic relation o f dependency would then be referring not only to numeric values but 
also to person features. Although it is not clear to me exactly how this condition would be 
stated, even with such revision, the new condition still would not suffice. This becomes clear 
when considering what Bob Fiengo has dubbed the "same-speaker problem." shown in (50). 
When a standard switch example like (41) is placed in the mouth of one individual, instead of 
across two speakers in a conversation, the switch reading disappears.
(50) I love you and you do, too ^  I Ia love you2 / 3  and you2a [love
melj3], too
The cross-indexed dependencies realized in (50) would be:
(51) a. < ( [NP Ha , [NP you ) 0  ), <  1 ,2 > , <N P , V, NP> > 
b. <  ( [Np y o u l«  , [np  mf%  ). <2,1 > ,  <  NP, V, NP> >
Since none of the noun phrases in the dependencies in (51) contain third person pronouns,
(5 la) and (Sib) would be i-copies even with a revised i-copy condition that specifies non-third 
person, and the switch reading is predicted to be available for (50). But it is not.
Summarizing the "cross-indexed” hypothesis, we began by altering the formal 
definition of dependency to include an ordered pair of values, and then revised the definition 
of i-copy to allow cross-indexed dependencies to be identical. While solving the technical 
difficulty of deriving dependencies among non-coindexed noun phrases, these alterations 
massively overgenerated switch readings. Attempting to further restrict the solution led to 
other problems. A pragmatic filter failed to make the proper cut, as the switch really is 
restricted to noun phrases whose lexical contents are not third person. But even if a way 
were found to state a third person restriction in a way that wouldn’t matter within the theory,
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there still remains the same-speaker problem, where switch never occurs between first and 
second person. The astute reader will no doubt have realized that I have in this discussion 
made every attempt to "save" the cross-indexed dependency hypothesis up to hypothesizing an 
additional syntactic property on first and second person expressions—such a move would, of 
course, make it isomorphic to the hypothesis I will in fact later defend. It must be concluded 
that crossed-indexed dependencies simplicirer, however, are unworkable.
3.23 Alternative hypothesis #2: lexical dependencies
In section 3.0, it was observed that in a switch reading, the words of the verb phrase 
are identical across the two speakers. In examining the difference between the dependencies 
that allow switch, such as (42), and the dependencies that never do, in (48) and (51), a 
similar observation holds: the lexical contents o f the noun phrases are identical in (42a) and 
(42b), but differ between (48a) and (48b) and between (51a) and (51b). That is, in the cases 
that switch, the words are the same. The different kind o f dependency seen in the switch 
cases might, then, be hypothesized to be not a syntactic dependency among noun phrases but 
a "lexical” dependency among words.
Such an approach would presuppose that Fiengo and May’s independent and 
dependent a- and /3-types are more universally available in the grammar than proposed in 
Indices and Identity. In addition to independent and dependent occurrences of noun phrase 
numeric indices, there would also be independent and dependent occurrences of words 
themselves. Such an approach would fall naturally in line with the radical "anti-indexing” 
position discussed in the previous chapter.
The attraction of this idea lies in its simplicity. First of all, the problem of different 
numeric values in the switch cases would become irrelevant. Since indices are borne by noun 
phrases, not by lexical items, lexical dependencies could not have numeric indices as part of
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their definition. Formally, a lexical dependency would be defined not as a triple but as 
consisting of two members: the lexical items involved; and the smallest portion of the 
structural description that contains the lexical items. The lexical dependencies realized in (41) 
would thus look like (52).
(52) a. <  ( Ia , you0), < N , V, N >  >
b. <  ( Ia , youp), < N , V. N >  >
A cursory look at (52a) and (52b) suggests an extremely simple definition of identity here: 
two lexical dependencies can be defined to be "i-copies" just in case they do not differ— 
period. That is, they are identical just in case they are identical. In contrast to the 
disjunctive i-copy condition in (43) required for the cross-indexed hypothesis, this definition is 
entailed by the definition o f i-copy already existing in the grammar.
The identity o f the lexical dependencies in (52) would license the switch reading for 
(41), but switch readings would be correctly predicted not to occur in the third person 
examples in (47) and (49). The lexical dependencies that would lead to switch readings in 
these cases are, respectively:
(53) a. <  ( hea , her$), <N , V, N >  >
b. <  ( shea , himg)% <N , V, N > >
(54) a. < ( Snookumsa , Pootie^), < N , V, N >  >
b. <  ( Pooldea , Snookums^), < N , V, N >  >
Interestingly, the simple definition of the identity of lexical dependencies does not need to 
mention first, second or third person to distinguish switch and non-switch cases. (5 3 a) and 
(53b) are not identical, nor are (54a) and (54b). Further, the lexical dependencies in the
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same-speaker problem are also not i-copies, as (55a) is not identical to (55b).
(55) a. < ( Ia , youg), <  N, V, N >  > 
b. < ( youa , mep), <N , V, N >  >
Thus the lexical dependency hypothesis correcdy predicts the lack o f a switch reading in the 
same-speaker example (50).
Unfortunately, this hypothesis fails when a larger class of cases are considered. Like 
the previous hypothesis, lexical dependencies massively overgenerate, though to a different set 
of sentences. For example, the reconstructed structure indicated in (56b) would be licensed.
(56) a. Speaker 1: love him5
b. Speaker 2: I2  do, too ^  I2  [love him7], too
(57) a. <  ( Ia , him fi, < N , V, N >  >
b. < ( Ia , himp), < N , V, N >  >
The lexical dependencies (57a) and (57b) are identical, both occurring between the words /  
and him. The inadequacy of the lexical identity definition is that since indices are irrelevant, 
they are, well, irrelevant. It appears that numeric indices must somehow be brought back in 
to the picture. But since the center of the definition is on identity of lexical form, the 
difficulty remains with (58b), which does not have a switch reading. The lexical 
dependencies realized in (58a) and (58b) are identical.
(58) a. Speaker 1: Let me tell you about John and Bill. He5a loves him7 j3
b. Speaker 2: H e ^  does, too ^  H e ^  [loves him5j3], too
Yet another problem arises in the imagined situation in which two lovers have the same pet
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name for each other: each calls the other "Pookie." Consider now the following exchange 
between them.
(59) a. Speaker 1: Pookie[ loves Pookie2  
b. Speaker 2: Pookie, does too
The intuition here is that (59b) has only the strict reading Pookie,  loves Pookie 9, too, and not 
the switch Pookie2 loves Pookiev  too.
It might be thought that these problems could be solved by specifying that lexical 
dependencies can only occur among first and second person expressions. But not only does 
the lexical dependency hypothesis overgenerate in (56), (58) and (59), which all contain third- 
person forms, but it also would overgenerate in non-third person cases. Recall the movie­
goer example, repeated below, in which one of the characters in the film says (60a). Said by 
a viewer, (60b) can only have the strict meaning that he loves the movie star, and not that he 
loves his companion in the theater.
(60) a. Movie star 1 to Movie star 2: I, love you2
b. Movie goer 3 to Movie goer 4: I3  do, too ^  I3  [love you4], too
Without access to numeric value, there is no way to distinguish the lexical dependencies 
realized in (60) from those in (52) that licensed the paradigm switch example; (61a) and (61b) 
are identical, and the reading shown in (60b) would be incorrectly predicted to occur.
(61) a. <  ( Ia , youp), < N , V, N> >
b. <  ( Ia , yow0), < N , V, N> >
Perhaps most damaging to the lexical dependency hypothesis, identity of form is not 
required for switch to occur, as is shown by a switch example that involves plurals. I heard
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this next example in a recent revival of the play Holiday.6 The switch is perfect in (62b), 
but the lexical dependencies, shown in (63), are not identical.
(62) a. Laura: Oh Susan and Nick, I lct love you2 0 3g
b. Susan: Darling, we do, too =  - - .w e ^ ^  [love you1)3], too
(63) a. <  ( /a , you0), < N , V, N >  > 
b. <  ( wea , you^), <N , V, N >  >
The notion of a lexical dependency is, initially, an extremely attractive hypothesis. It 
fails precisely because it is defined at the lexical level. Without access to numeric values, the 
identity of lexical dependencies can only be identity with respect to form. But switch does 
not occur in some cases where there is identity of form, such as the third person examples
(58) and (59), or the movie-goer example (60), and does occur in other cases where there is 
not identity o f form, such as the Holiday example (62). But if reference to numeric value is 
required to explain these special dependencies, then they are not lexical dependencies. They 
are syntactic ones.
3.24 Alternative hypothesis #3: alphabetic dependencies
Before moving on, let’s recall Larson and Segal’s "dualist" proposal, discussed in the 
previous chapter, and consider the possibility o f explaining switch through hypothesizing 
syntactic dependency among their proposed alphabetic indices. Recall that on their analysis, 
first person pronouns have the index a and second person have index b. To derive switch, 
the new dependency would have to be licensed between a 's and b's. Technically, alphabetic
6  I assume that the plural form has a "fusion" index here, notated by © in the structure, 
although nothing turns on this in the current example. The analysis o f plural indexical 
pronouns will be returned to in later discussion.
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indices are appended to lexical items in Larson and Segal’s system, not noun phrases, while 
dependencies are defined between noun phrase occurrences. To reconcile this difference, we 
can assume as before that the indices have "percolated" up to the containing phrase.
At first blush, this hypothesis fares far better than the cross-indexed or lexical 
hypotheses, accounting for many more of the observations made thus far, without running into 
a problem of overgeneration. Since third person expressions do not have the special 
alphabetic indices in Larson and Segal’s proposal, but rather have standard numeric indices, 
the cut between the indexical expressions and third person expressions occurs up front. The 
structures for the paradigmatic switch example would on this approach be as follows.
(64) a. Speaker 1: love youb 0
b. Speaker 2: 1^, do, too =  Iaa [love youb|3], too
Identity of dependencies in (64a) and (64b) is simply identity, and in fact, the same result
could have been achieved without defining a dependency to exist in the structure at all, by
assuming everything to be a , since b =  b. and because the alphabetic index b evaluates via its 
"utterance role" to the addressee, who it picks out will be different in (64b) than in (64a).
Furthermore, it is unproblematic for the alphabetic dependency hypothesis to correctly 
predict that switch will not occur in the "same speaker" problem example, repeated below.
The alphabetic dependencies realized in (65) would be as shown in (6 6 ); all that would have 
to be said is that a dependency with the alphabetic values < a,b>  is not identical to a 
dependency with the values < b ,a > .
(65) * 1^ love youb / 3  and y o u ^  [love m e^], too
(6 6 ) a. < ( [Np I]a  , [NP youlg ), < a ,b > ,  <N P, V, NP> > 
b. <  ( [np you]a , [NP me] 0  ), < b ,a >  , < N P , V, NP> >
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There are a few difficulties with the alphabetic dependency hypothesis, however.
First, although the switch reading is easily derived in (64), it seems that it is the only reading 
that can be derived using alphabetic indices. As noted above, the switch reading seems as if 
it would occur whether a dependency was in the structure or not. But impossible to derive is 
the strict reading for that example, which is after all a possible interpretation. This is, in fact, 
another case of the general problem of deriving strict readings using alphabetic indices, which 
I earlier called the "cross-person identity” problem.
Secondly, the alphabetic dependency hypothesis fares no better than the lexical 
dependency hypothesis with the movie-goer example, repeated again as (67). The patterns of 
alphabetic indices in the structures shown in (67) should be allowed by the same mechanisms 
used to derive (64), incorrectly predicting that a possible interpretation of (67b) would be that 
movie goer #3 loves movie goer #4.
(67) a. Movie star 1 to Movie star 2: Ia love youb
b. Movie goer 3 to Movie goer 4: Ia [love y o u j, too
Despite its initial appeal in separating indexical from non-indexical examples, the 
alphabetic dependency hypothesis has been shown to be inadequate. Although it is a syntactic 
account, the alphabetic account fails in just those cases where appeal to numeric value seems 
to be necessary, just as the lexical hypothesis did. Thus in addition to the arguments 
advanced in the previous chapter for abandoning the alphabetic indexing proposal, it may be 
added that it offers little help in the description of the switch phenomenon.
3.3 The orientation analysis of switch
Alternatives to the syntactic property of orientation for a dependency analysis of 
switch have been examined and shown to be inadequate. Attempts to utilize the existing
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properties o f numeric value or lexical form lead to massive overgeneration. Appeal to 
alphabetic indexing as an alternative syntactic property also fail. Let’s return, finally, to the 
hypothesis that indexical expressions are syntactically oriented: first person noun phrases 
informally described as having an "inward" orientation and second person "outward." As 
hypothesized in the previous chapter, orientation is a syntactic property, operating as a 
function from arrow to index, the derivation of which occurs at the syntactic level o f logical 
form. When Susan says /, for example—assuming that co(«-) =  3 and cr(3) =  Susan—the 
derivation of that noun phrase at LF would be as shown in (6 8 ).
(6 8 ) line 1: [ I  In­
line 2: [ I ] 3
Understood as a derivational process, orientation and numeric value exist on adjacent 
structural lines; however, for ease o f exposition I will conflate lines 1 and 2 in 
representations. Thus notationally, indexical expressions such as (69a-b) will be distinguished 
from third person noun phrases (69b-d) as indicated.
(69) a. [Np I ] 3
b. [NP you ] 7
c. [NP she ] 3
d. [NP Susan ] 3
That the four noun phrases in (69) are "cross-person identical" is indicated by the same 
numeric value across the four expressions. There is no context, of course, in which (69a) and 
(69b) could be simultaneously derived, since in no context can «(•*-) =  w(-*). But assuming 
as before that <r(3) =  Susan, all four of these expressions pick out Susan.
Hypothesizing that dependencies can occur among orientations offers a better
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explanation for switch than the alternatives discussed above. It does not overgenerate as the 
cross-indexed or lexical dependency hypotheses did. Like the alphabetic hypothesis, the 
orientation hypothesis makes the cut between indexical expressions and third person 
expressions up front, since the latter are not syntactically oriented. But because indexical 
expressions structurally have derived numeric values as well as orientation, the former may be 
utilized in the description of the switch phenomenon—an option that was unavailable for the 
alphabetic proposal.
3.31 Dependency and orientation pattern
On my proposal, syntactic dependency will be sensitive to either numeric value or 
orientation. Recall that in Fiengo and May’s theory, dependent occurrences are licensed to 
occur in structures containing an a-occurrence of the same numeric value. Let’s call these 
numeric dependencies, to distinguish them from the oriented dependencies that are now 
proposed. Both are still dependencies, occurring among noun phrases under a particular 
structural description. But there is now an additional licensing condition for |9-hood to which 
numeric value is irrelevant: a dependent (3-occurrence of an oriented noun phrase may occur 
in structures containing an oriented independent a-occurrence. Importantly, the a-occurrence 
need not have the same orientation, it merely must have some orientation. With this condition 
in place, the structure leading to the switch interpretation will be as shown below for the 
paradigm example. The dependent, oriented noun phrase containing you is, in each of (70a) 
and (70b), licensed to occur in virtue o f the independent, oriented noun phrase containing /.
(70) a. Speaker 1: I^a love youjg
b. Speaker 2: ITa [love you"^], too
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Intuitively, the new dependency is a pattern of orientations: descriptively, two such 
dependencies will he identical just in case they have the same pattern. The notion of an 
orientation pattern implicitly requires order, so by definition, the new dependency will contain 
an ordered set o f orientations. The set o f  numeric values in the dependency, however, need 
not be ordered. Formally, the definition of a dependency will on this proposal be a quadruple 
consisting of the noun phrases, the unordered set of indices, the ordered set o f orientations, 
and the structural description. By this definition, the dependencies realized in (70a-b) are 
formally shown below.
(71) a. <  ( [NP I]a , [NP youjg ), (1,2), < * -,-* > . <N P, V, N P>  >
b- <  ( [NP I]a , [NP youjg ), (1,2), < —,—> ,  <N P, V, N P>  >
Defining the new dependency as containing an orientation pattern and an unordered set of 
indices has the result that (7la) and (71b) are identical. Formally, there is no need for 
additional stipulations in the identity condition on dependencies: (70a) and (70b) encode the 
same dependency. Note that Fiengo and May's definition of dependency is contained in—and 
thus falls out from—the revised version: the formal description of dependencies among same­
valued third person noun phrases will contain three non-null members, as in the original 
definition. Since third person noun phrases have no orientation, the third member in such a 
dependency will be empty; furthermore, the set o f indices will be a singleton.
In addition, the i-copy condition needs to be clarified: as noted in the discussion of
the cross-indexed hypothesis, while dependencies among same-valued third person noun 
phrases can differ in numeric index, dependencies among oriented noun phrases must contain 
the same set of values. The formal definition o f i-copy should, therefore, be reworded to 
allow difference of numeric value only in the case where the value set contains one member.
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(72) Two dependencies are i-copies just in case they differ by no more than a singleton 
numeric value set.
It will be entailed by (72) that the only way for dependencies that contain a set of more than 
one numeric value to be identical will be for them to be identical.
The explanation for strict interpretations, it should be noted, is not lost under the 
orientation analysis, as it was in the alphabetic dependency proposal. While the new 
definition allows the oriented noun phrase containing you in (70a) to bear a dependent or (3- 
occurrence of an index, nothing prevents it from alternatively bearing an independent or co­
occurrence. The structure leading the strict reading for the paradigm example is as shown in
(73).
(73) a. Speaker I: rj"a  love youTo,
b. Speaker 2: IVa [love m eTJ, too
Recall that for noun phrases with independent co-indices to be considered syntactically 
identical, their numeric values must be equal. What (73) teaches is that for identity of co-type 
indices, this condition has not changed; orientation is irrelevant to cross-person identity. It 
does not matter whether the numeric value has been derived through one orientation or the 
other, or not derived at all: the value T is identical to T is identical to 2 .
Now that the preliminary notation of the oriented dependency analysis is in place, 
let’s return to examples where the earlier hypothesis failed in various ways. Under the 
orientation analysis, dependencies can occur either among noun phrases of the same numeric 
value, or among oriented noun phrases, but there will be no ''mixed” dependencies. As a 
result the cases involving third person that have only strict interpretations are readily 
explained. For example, recall (5), repeated below as (74).
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(74) a. Speaker 1: r^a love you^/g
b. Speaker 2: A lice^  does, too =  A lice^ [loves m eT J, too
A lice^ [loves y o u ^ J, too
There is a structural ambiguity in (74a), as indicated: the oriented noun phrase containing 
you may bear an independent a-index, or it may bear a dependent /3-index licensed by the 
oriented a-occurrence earlier in the structure. Only one of these can be utilized without 
violation for purposes o f reconstruction in (74b), however—the one that contains an 
independent noun phrase and leads to the strict interpretation, shown in the first reconstructed 
structure in (74b). Since the values of the contained a-noun phrases are equal, syntactic 
identity holds; the verb phrases in antecedent and consequent are reconstructions of each 
other. An alternate structure containing a /3-occurrence, such as the one shown second in 
(74b), is illegitimate, as there is no a-oriented noun phrase in the structure to license the 
dependent noun phrase. Thus the only possible reading of (74b) is strict. A similar violation 
occurs in all the third person cases where the cross-indexed or lexical dependency hypotheses 
fail; because third person forms do not occur in oriented noun phrases, the only legitimate 
dependencies in such structures will be numeric ones, explaining why switch interpretations 
do not occur.
The orientation pattern realized in (70) is not the only one possible. In (75), for 
example, the orientation set differs. The dependencies realized in (75) are shown in (76).
(75) a. Speaker 1: Do y o u ^  love m e ^  ?
b. Speaker 2: Do you7a ? =  Do you-^  [love m e ^ ]  ?
(76) a. < ( [np you]a  , [NP me] 0  ), (1,2), < -* ,« -> , <N P, V, N P>  > 
b- < ( [Np you]a  . Enp mel/3 )• < N P < N P>  >
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The orientation set in (76a) is the same as the one in (76b), and the dependencies are 
otherwise identical, allowing the structure in (75b) that leads to the switch interpretation.
Note that the <-*,*-> pattern is, however, different from the <«-,-*> pattern seen 
in (71), since orientation sets are, by definition, ordered. This fact becomes crucial to the 
solution of the same-speaker problem, repeated below as (77), where recall switch does not 
occur. Recall that the cross-indexed hypothesis predicted a switch interpretation in the same- 
speaker example.
(77) * I^a love you^p and y o u ^  [love me*^], too
An examination of the oriented dependencies realized in (77) reveals that they are not i-copies 
under the proposed analysis, as they encode different orientation patterns: in (78a), the 
orientation set is <•*-,-*■>; in (78b), it is < -* ,* -> .
(78) a. < ( [NP , [NP you] 0  ), (1,2), < N P , V, NP> >
b. < ( [Np you]a  , [NP mejfl ), (1,2), <-*,>«-> , < N P , V, NP> >
The verb phrases in (77) are thus not reconstructions o f each other, and the structure is 
illegitimate. As a result, the same-speaker example is correctly predicted to have only a strict 
interpretation.
That indexical expressions have numeric values as well as orientation has allowed 
strict readings to be derived under this proposal as well as switch readings. And as seen 
earlier, including the set o f numeric values as part o f the definition of dependency has the 
result that the familiar same-valued dependency is contained in the new definition, but nothing 
in the switch cases has yet turned on this inclusion. However, when returning to cases where 
the lexical and alphabetic dependency hypotheses failed, such as the movie-goer example, 
repeated below as (79), having the numeric values included becomes crucial to the explanation
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of why switch does not occur. The oriented dependencies realized in (79) are shown in (80).
(79) a. Movie star I  to Movie star 2: rj"a love youTg
b. Movie goer 3 to Movie goer 4: I^a [love y o u ^ J , too
(80) a. <  ( [NP I\a , [NP you]0 ), (1,2), < N P , V, N P> >
b .  <  ( [Np ’ [ n p  y ° uh  < N P '  V - N P >  >
Although the orientation patterns in (80a) and (80b) are identical, the dependencies are not 
otherwise the same. In this case, the set o f numeric values differs across the two
dependencies: they are thus not i-copies, and the structure shown in (79b) is illegitimate.
The movie-goer example underlines the importance of the clarified i-copy condition (72). 
Dependencies with singleton value sets can differ in numeric index and still be i-copies; where 
the value sets have more than one member, as in (80), difference is not tolerated.
Finally, recall the Holiday example, repeated below as (81), which the lexical 
dependency hypothesis incorrectly predicted would not have a switch interpretation.
(81) a. Laura: Oh Susan and Nick, iya love you^®3^
b. Susan: Darling, we2 ©3a [love yo u jy , too
Under the orientation analysis, the dependencies realized in (81) are as shown below.
(82) a. < ( [NP I]a , [NP y ou^  ), (1 ,2 0 3 ). < N P , V, NP> >
b. < ( [NP we]a , [NP you ] 0  ), (1 ,203), , < N P , V, NP> >
Like numeric dependencies, oriented dependencies remain defined as part of syntactic 
structure; they occur among noun phrases, not among the lexical items contained in noun 
phrases. The only difference between (82a) and (82b) is lexical; this is not relevant to
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syntactic identity. (82a) and (82b) are i-copies, and the switch interpretation is correctly 
predicted to occur.
In sum, for the data examined so far, the oriented dependency analysis is superior to 
the earlier hypotheses tested. With the analysis now developed for simple cases of switch, 
let's consider more complex examples. The switch interpretations seen to this point have 
occurred in simple two-sentence exchanges involving statement and response, and have 
included just two noun phrases in the oriented dependency. Does the orientation analysis 
make correct predictions in extended discourse? Do oriented dependencies exist in structures 
containing more than two pronouns? In the next two sections, these questions will be 
examined in turn.
3.32 Extended discourse and the Dahl strict
Examining extended discourses leads to puzzles that at first seem problematic for the 
oriented dependency hypothesis; close analysis of these cases, however, reveals that they 
pattern exactly as predicted by dependency theory, adding further support to the analysis that 
switch interpretations result from syntactic dependencies among oriented noun phrases.
Consider, for example, the extended exchange below. The reading of interest is the 
one in which (83b) has the switch interpretation. In this case, the intuition is that speaker I's  
counter-response in (83c) has a strict interpretation relative to (83b), as shown.
(83) a. Speaker 1: I love you
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I [love you], too
c. Speaker 1: You do? =  You [love me]?
The interpretation of (83c) is an immediate challenge to the oriented dependency analysis 
developed here. The switch/strict ambiguity in such ellipsis sites has been analyzed as
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parallel to the sloppy/strict ambiguity in third person cases: it occurs when the antecedent 
predicate has two possible structures, being licensed to contain either a dependent or 
independent occurrence o f a noun phrase. The switch or sloppy interpretation results when 
the structure contains a dependency; the strict results when it does not. In (84b), for 
example, the strict reading results because all the noun phrases are independent. Orientation, 
recall, is irrelevant to the determination of identity among noun phrases o f type a.
(84) a. Speaker 1 : r f a  love y o u ^
b. Speaker 2 : You"^ do? =  You"j'a [love meVa ]?
On the other hand, the indexing of (83), shown in (85), does not contain any a-type 
noun phrases. By hypothesis, the switch interpretation of (85b) cannot result unless (85a) and 
(85b) contain oriented dependencies in their structures. The only possible structure of (85c), 
then, must also contain an oriented dependency.
(85) a. Speaker 1 : r fa  love you^g
b. Speaker 2: ITa [love you'j'p], too
c. Speaker 1 : Y o u ^  [love m e^]?
However, when the dependencies in (85) are examined formally, the dependency realized in 
(85c) is revealed to not be an i-copy of the others: its orientation pattern differs.
(86) a. <  ( [Np I]a , [Np you]^ ), (1,2), <N P, V, N P> >
b- <  ( tNp . [np youjg ), (1,2), < NP, V, N P> >
c. <  ( [Np you]a  , [Np me] 0  ), (1,2), <N P, V, N P> >
Recall that orientation sets are ordered; the analysis developed here relies on just this 
difference to explain the lack of a switch reading in the same-speaker problem discussed in
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the previous section. Since (85c) does not encode the same dependency as (85b) or (85a), the 
verb phrases are not reconstructions of each other and the structure in (85c) should be 
illegitimate. In fact, by the assumptions made thus far, no grammatical reconstruction should 
be possible for (85c). Nevertheless, the interpretation shown in (85c) is readily available to 
speakers of English.
A solution to this problem already exists within dependency theory that does not entail 
abandoning the ordered orientation sets that explain the same-speaker problem. Loosely 
speaking, there are two possible ways to "copy" a ^-occurrence. The most common is under 
the condition of i-copy for dependencies, which has been discussed above in detail. The 
second possibility derives mixed sloppy-strict interpretations in multiple clause sentences such 
as (87), which Fiengo and May call the "Dahl puzzle" after its discoverer Osten Dahl (see 
their chapter 4).
(87) Max thinks he is strong, Oscar does, too, but his father doesn’t
The relevant reading here is the one in which the interpretation of the second clause is sloppy
and the final clause is strict relative to the second clause: Max thinks Max is strong, Oscar
thinks Oscar is strong, his (Oscar’s) father doesn ’t  think Oscar is strong. Fiengo and May 
observe that such a construal is possible only when his in the final clause is taken to be 
coreferential to Oscar, the final clause does not have this strict reading when his is taken to 
be someone else, or is replaced by a non-coreferential noun phrase, such as in (8 8 ).
(8 8 ) Max thinks he is strong, Oscar does, too, but Sam’s father doesn’t
On Fiengo and May’s analysis of the mixed sloppy-strict interpretations, a /3-occurrence may 
"copy" with the same numeric value if and only if there is a dependency that is "resolvable” 
in the reconstruction. In other words, an alternative way for two verb phrases to be
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reconstructions o f each other will be the case where the numeric indices of the ^-occurrences 
are the same and each (3-type noun phrase is part of a dependency on some line of their 
respective phrase markers; crucially, the structural parallelism required by the i-copy 
condition does not have to hold in resolving the dependencies when the values of the 
contained noun phrases are the same.
To make this clear, let’s review the circumstances under which syntactic identity holds 
for two verb phrases. The three ways are shown schematically below.
(89) a. [vp ..X ..N P ia =  [vp ..X ..N P ia ..¥ ..]
b. [yp-.X.. NPj£ ..Y..] =  [yp-.X.. NPjg ..Y..] iff dependencies are i-copies
c. [yp .X.. NPiS ..Y..] =  [yp-.X.. NP i 0  ..Y..]
The two verb phrase identities shown in (89a-b) are the familiar ones. If the included noun 
phrases bear independent a-indices, as in (89a), they must be structurally identical down to 
and including the numeric values, leading to the standard strict interpretation. If the included 
noun phrases bear dependent (3-indices, their numeric values may differ as in (89b); however, 
identity holds in this case only if the dependencies realized in the overall structures are 
identical by the i-copy condition. This leads to the traditional sloppy interpretation, as well as 
to switch. In the third circumstance, shown in (89c), if the verb phrases are identical down to 
and including the numeric values o f included dependent noun phrases, syntactic identity 
holds—the i-copy condition is irrelevant. Nothing special need be said to achieve this result: 
identity in (89c) and identity in (89a) are, simply, identity: the special case is (89b), in which 
difference of a sort is tolerated and an additional condition is required. The conditions 
allowing (89c) are independent of verb phrase identity. Unlike the verb phrases in (89a), 
which will be grammatical in whatever sentence they occur in, each dependent occurrence in 
the (89c) verb phrases must be licensed to occur in its respective overall structure; when
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licensed, this dependent occurrence results in a strict interpretation, which I will call the 
"Dahl strict."
The strict/sloppy ambiguity, this makes clear, should not be mistaken to be identical 
or parallel to the a/|S type distinction: strict readings may result from either independent or 
dependent occurrences of indices. The final clause o f the Dahl puzzle example (87) contains 
a ^-occurrence o f  the same value as the one in the middle clause, which is resolvable in the 
structure due to the presence of the covalued noun phrase containing his, as shown in (90a); a 
same-valued /3-type noun phrase is not licensed in (8 8 ), however, as shown in (90b).
(90) a. Maxla thinks he I j 3  is strong, Oscar 2a [thinks he2 (3  is strong], too, but his2a father 
doesn’t [think h e ^  is strong]
b. * Maxla thinks he1/3 is strong, Oscar2a [thinks h e ^  is strong], too, but Sam’s3a 
father doesn’t [think h e ^  is strong]
Given Fiengo and May’s insight into the Dahl puzzle, the strict interpretation of (85c) 
relative to (85b) can now be accounted for as a reconstruction of a verb phrase containing a 
/5-type noun phrase—in this case, a noun phrase licensed to be dependent due to orientation. 
Because the dependent [NP me] in (85c) has the same value I  as the dependent [NP you] in 
(85b), verb phrase identity holds and is legitimate in any structure in which the dependency 
can be resolved. In (85c), the dependent occurrence is licensed by the presence o f the 
oriented a-type noun phrase containing you. That is, because the numeric value of the 
dependent noun phrase has stayed the same, the difference of the orientation pattern is 
irrelevant, because the dependency can be otherwise resolved.
That analyzing (85c) as Dahl strict is correct becomes clear when the subject of (85c) 
is replaced with a noun phrase on which the dependency cannot resolve, as in (91). Exactly 
as is predicted on the Dahl strict analysis of (85c), (91c) does not have a strict reading 
relative to (91b); indeed, (91c) is uninterpretable on any reading when (91b) has switched.
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(91) a. Speaker 1: r fa love youTg
b. Speaker 2 : I7a do, too
c. Speaker I: Sam3a does, too
=  TTa do [love you7 j^], too 
Sam3a does [love m e^I, too
If the Dahl strict does occur in oriented structures, same-valued reconstructions of 
oriented /3-occurrences would also be predicted to occur in structurally non-parallel 
dependencies, as in the original Dahl puzzle. This prediction is borne out: unlike (91c),
(92c) does have a strict interpretation relative to (92b).
(92) a. Speaker 1 : rj^, love you
b. Speaker 2: I7a do, too =  ITa do [love you^g], too
c. Speaker 1 : Your7a mother does, too =  Your7a mother [loves me*^], too
Despite the structural difference between the dependencies in (92b) and (92c), since the 
numeric values o f the dependent noun phrases are the same, verb phrase identity holds. The 
dependent noun phrase in (92c) is licensed by the presence o f the oriented a-type noun phrase 
containing your.
In both (85c) and (92c), the strict reading is the only interpretation available when the 
previous sentence has the switch interpretation. In those examples, the only possible way for 
the ^-occurrence to be reconstructed is with the same value and resolution in some 
dependency; an i-copy dependency with different value is not possible due to differences in 
orientation set in (85) and structural differences in (92). There are cases, however, where 
both the Dahl strict reading and a standard switch reading are available. Consider the 
following, where (93b) has the switch reading.
(93) a. Speaker 1: rj"a love youT^
b. Speaker 2: IVa do, too =  ITa do [love you^g], too
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c. Speaker 1: Actually, r f a don’t
The intuition here is that there are two possible interpretations for (93c), that actually, speaker 
1 doesn’t love speaker 2  (a "reswitch’'), or that actually, speaker 1 doesn’t love himself 
(strict) . 7  Both interpretations are explained upon examining the two possible structures for 
(93c) under the orientation analysis, shown in (94).
(94) a. Actually, IYa don’t [love youT^l 
b. Actually, IYa don’t [love me"^]
The dependency realized in (94a) is an i-copy of the dependency in (93b), which in turn is 
identical to the dependency in (93a); the interpretation of switch in (93b) therefore switches 
back again in (93c) . 8  On the other hand, the dependent noun phrase containing me in (94b), 
of the same value as the dependent noun phrase in (93b) and therefore identical to it, is 
licensed because it is resolvable in some dependency within the (94b) structure: in this case, 
by the presence o f a covalued a-noun phrase. To repeat, the resolution of same-valued 
dependent noun phrases does not require i-copy; in this case, the dependent noun phrase in 
(93b) occurs in a dependency containing more than one value in its numeric set, while the 
dependency in (94b) contains a singleton.
The Dahl strict analysis also explains contrasts such as between (95) and (96). The
switch interpretation is impossible in (95b), but apparently available for the same string of
words in (96b).
7  Stress differences can best bring out the two interpretations for (96c): said flatly, the 
interpretation is the reswitch; with stress on I, it is strict.
8  Robert May has pointed out to me that alternatively, the "reswitch" reading for (98c) 
might be analyzed as a case of verb phrase identity back to (98a). Whichever analysis o f the 
"reswitch” is chosen, however, is irrelevant to the point here, which is the explanation for the 
"strict” reading in (98c) relative to (98b).
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(95) a. Speaker I : I^a  love youT^
b. Speaker 2: MyTa mother doesn’t t  MvTq, mother doesn’t [love you^J
(96) a. Speaker I : IYa  love youT^
b. Speaker 2: IT do, too, but myTa 
mother doesn’t
12 a [love youT^I, too, but myTa 
mother doesn’t [love yo u ^]
The lack o f the switch reading in (95b) is predicted, as the i-copy condition does not hold 
among the dependencies realized due to structural differences: <N P V N P> in (95a) versus 
<N P N V N P>  in (95b). Alternatively, a Dahl strict /8-noun phrase in (95b) would need to 
have an index of the same numeric value 2, which although resolvable in the structure would 
not result in switch: the interpretation of such a structure collapses extensionally with the 
strict reading resulting from a-occurrences all around. Thus the only possible interpretation 
of (95b) is strict.
If speaker 2 first utters a legitimate switch, however, as in (96b), the same string o f 
words my mother doesn’t can have a "switch" interpretation relative to speaker l ’s utterance. 
In fact, the final dependent noun phrase containing you in (96b) is identical in value to the 
dependent noun phrase containing you in the first clause, and is thus analyzable as a Dahl 
strict 8-occurrence, resolvable due to the presence of the a-oriented noun phrase containing 
my. Without such an a-oriented noun phrase, the dependency would not be resolvable, 
correctly predicting the lack of a "switch" for the second clause in (97b).
(97) a. Speaker 1: IYa love youT^
b. Speaker 2: IT do, too, but Sam3a ITa [love you^J, too, but Sam3re
Finally, further extending the discourse beyond three sentences results in 
interpretations that are consistent with the analysis developed here. As an interesting
doesn’t doesn’t [love you^]
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example, recall (85), where the strict reading of (85c) was analyzed as resulting from a Dahl 
strict /3-occurrence. Because this structure in (85c) contains an oriented dependency, a switch 
reading is predicted to be available tor a subsequent utterance. And indeed this is the case, as 
shown in (98), in which a fourth sentence has been added to (85). The interpretation o f (98d) 
can switch (a reading that is best brought out by stressing you).
(98) a. Speaker 1: r [a love youT^
b. Speaker 2: do, too =  ITa do [love yoifj^], too
c. Speaker 1: YouTq do? =  YouTa do [love m e^]?
d. Speaker 2: YOU'j,Q,do? =  You7a do [love meT^]?
As mentioned above, the verb phrase in (98c) is identical to the verb phrase in (98b) on the 
(89c) schematic, the contained dependent noun phrase being licensed in the overall structure. 
The (98c) verb phrase is also identical to the verb phrase in (98d), in this case by the (89b) 
schematic; because the numeric values differ, the i-copy condition must o f  course hold—and it 
does. In (98b-d), a switch, a Dahl strict, and a switch follow each other in succession- 
possible because the occurrences within the three verb phrases are all dependent.
The problematic nature of extended discourse to the oriented dependency analysis as 
presented at the beginning of this section is thus explained as a natural consequence of well- 
studied processes within dependency theory that have been shown to be operating in the third 
person. Extended exchanges that include oriented dependencies parallel cases o f third person 
dependencies across many clauses. Verb phrases containing same-valued dependent noun 
phrases, whether licensed by an independent oriented noun phrase or an independent covalued 
noun phrase, can be proper reconstructions of each other just in case the dependent 
occurrences are resolved. We have seen here that it does not matter to the resolution of a 
dependent noun phrase whether it occurs within an oriented dependency or within a numeric
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dependency. The challenge to the theory would come if Dahl strict noun phrases were not 
found in oriented dependencies; the extended discourse examples in fact add further support to 
the oriented dependency analysis.
3.33 Many pronouns and the ATB many indexical pronoun puzzle
In the previous section, we saw that, given the orientation analysis, the switch 
phenomenon occurring for first and second person pronouns in extended discourse shows no 
special behavior in terms of the syntactic dependencies involved, but rather parallels the 
"many clauses" cases involving third person pronouns. I turn now to switch examples that 
are similar to Fiengo and May’s "many pronouns" cases, increasing the complexity of the 
core switch sentences by additional pronouns. Switch interpretations do indeed occur in 
sentences containing more than two indexical pronouns, showing that like numeric 
dependencies, oriented dependencies can contain any number o f noun phrases. However, 
sentences containing additional indexical pronouns do not appear to have the same number of 
structural possibilities as their third person counterparts. Unlike in the extended discourses 
cases, these differences cannot be readily explained by processes already operating elsewhere 
in the grammar.
To begin, let’s review third person cases involving many pronouns. Example (99) is 
taken from Fiengo and May, chapter 4.
(99) Max, said he, saw his, mother, and Oscar0 did, too
When the three noun phrases in the first clause of (99) are preferential, as indicated, Fiengo 
and May observe that the second clause has three possible interpretations. The first of these 
is strict across-the-board (ATB): Oscar said Max saw M ax’s mother. The second is sloppy 
ATB: Oscar said Oscar saw Oscar’s mother. The third, less salient than the first two, is a
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mixed reading in which the medial pronoun is sloppy and the final pronoun is strict: Oscar 
said Oscar saw M ax’s mother. Totally unavailable is another mixed interpretation of the 
medial pronoun as strict and the final pronoun as sloppy: Oscar said Max saw Oscar’s 
mother.
That there are three—and only three—interpretations of the second clause of (99) is a 
direct result of the possible patterns of index types in the structure of the first clause. The 
distribution of types indicates which of the noun phrases—if any—are contained in the same 
dependency. A sentence containing n covalued NPs has 2(n' l) possible distributions of alphas 
and betas within the verb phrase. In the verb phrase in the first clause o f (99), there are four 
possible distributions—a a ,  /S/3, /Sa, and a/3—indicated in the first clauses o f (lOOa-d). 
Reconstruction of the verb phrase in (100a), in which both noun phrases are independent, 
leads to the strict ATB reading for the second clause; while (100b), in which both noun 
phrases are dependent, leads to the sloppy ATB. (100c), in which the noun phrases are 
respectively dependent and independent, results in the mixed sloppy/strict interpretation. 
Reconstruction of the verb phrase in (lOOd), in which the noun phrases are respectively 
independent and dependent, wholly contains a dependency, and thus results in the same ATB 
strict interpretation as (100a).
(100) a. Maxla said hela saw hisla mother, and Oscar2a [said hela saw hislcc mother], too
b. Maxla said he1;3 saw his1(3 mother, and Oscar2a [said h e^  saw his2|3 mother], too
c. MaxIa said heIj3 saw hisla mother, and Oscar2a [said he2j3 saw hisla mother], too
d. Maxla said heIo, saw hislj3 mother, and Oscar2a [said hela saw hisIj3 mother], too
The four possible distributions thus reduce to three possible readings. Note that none 
o f the possible type distributions results in the (unobserved) mixed strict/sloppy interpretation. 
The likeliest candidate is (lOOd), since the distribution of types within the verb phrase is a/3.
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To result in the strict/sloppy reading, however, it would have to be possible for the 
dependency in the first clause of (lOOd) to contain [Np MaxJ and [Np his], skipping, as it 
were, the medial noun phrase. But by definition, ^-occurrences must be resolved in the 
smallest part o f a factorization; thus the only possible dependency in (lOOd) is one containing 
[NP he\ and [NP A/s], which, as mentioned, is wholly contained in the verb phrase, leading to 
the strict ATB interpretation.9
Why is the mixed sloppy/strict marginal compared to the across-the-board 
interpretations? Fiengo and May observe that the preference in the grammar is for structures 
that contain the fewest possible dependencies; a structure containing more dependencies is 
marked with respect to an alternative with fewer dependencies. Using their markedness 
metric, the structure leading to the available mixed reading in (100c) will be marked to degree 
1, whereas (100a) and (100b), which result in the ATB interpretations, are 0-degree marked.
Let’s now turn to oriented dependencies that contain three indexical noun phrases.
The data here become more complex. For third person noun phrases, the only possible 
dependencies have the same value regardless o f the number of noun phrases; for n oriented 
noun phrases in a sentence, the number of possible orientation patterns is (2n-2) (excluding the 
two patterns with singleton numeric value sets). In the case of three noun phrases, there are 
therefore six patterns to consider: <-»,<-,-»>,
, and <-*,-*,«-> . Exchanges containing each of these are shown in turn below, 
along with intuitions concerning their possible interpretations; unavailable readings are 
indicated by *.
9 Like the solution to the Dahl puzzle, Fiengo and May’s account of the "many pronoun" 
cases provides a compelling argument against semantic approaches to ellipsis. Unlike 
predicate-based accounts, which in the three-NP case would predict four readings, dependency 
theory correctly predicts the reduced number of readings that are actually observed. (For 
discussion, see chapter 4 o f Fiengo and May 1994.)
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(101) a. Speaker I: I think you love my mother
b. Speaker 2: I do, too
strict ATB: /  think I  love your mother 
switch ATB: I  think you love my mother 
switch/strict: * I  think you love your mother 
strict/switch: * I  think I  love my mother
(102) a. Speaker 1: I think you love your mother
b. Speaker 2: I do, too
strict ATB: I  think I  love my mother 
switch ATB: /  think you love your mother 
switch/strict: * /  think you love my mother 
strict/switch: * I think I love your mother
(103) a. Speaker 1: I think I love your mother
b. Speaker 2: I do, too
strict ATB: I think you love my mother 
switch ATB: I  think I  love your mother 
switch/strict: I think I  love my mother 
strict/switch: * I  think you love your mother
(104) a. Speaker 1: Do you think I love your mother?
b. Speaker 2: Do you?
strict ATB: Do you think you love my mother? 
switch ATB: Do you think I  love your mother? 
switch/strict: * Do you think I  love my mother? 
strict/switch: * Do you think you love your mother?
(105) a. Speaker 1: Do you think I love my mother?
b. Speaker 2: Do you?
strict ATB: Do you think you love your mother? 
switch ATB: Do you think /  love my mother? 
switch/strict: * Do you think I  love your mother? 
strict/switch: * Do you think you love my mother?
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(106) a. Speaker 1: Do you think you love my mother?
b. Speaker 2: Do you?
strict ATB: Do you think I  love your mother? 
switch ATB: Do you think you love my mother? 
switch/strict: Do you think you love your mother? 
strict/switch: * Do you think I  love my mother?
Parallel to third person cases, all of (101-106) have salient across-the-board interpretations, 
both strict and switch, and none has the mixed strict/switch reading, as would be expected. 
However, only two out of the six orientation patterns have the expected mixed switch/strict
interpretation. Degree 1 markedness does not seem enough to explain the complete lack of
the switch/strict in (101), (102), (104) and (105), which is completely unavailable and not 
merely marginal. It is rather the available mixed readings in (103) and (106) that have the 
feel of degree 1 markedness.
Let’s examine the structures for one o f the problematic orientation patterns; the 
grammatical possibilities for (101), for example, are shown below. Like in the third person 
example containing three noun phrases in (100), there are 2(3‘[) or four possible index type 
distributions within the verb phrase of the first sentence of the exchange, shown respectively 
in (107a), (108a), (109a), and (110a).
(107) a. Speaker 1: I*j"a think you^,* love my7a mother
b. Speaker 2: ITa [think PTa love y o u r^  mother], too
(108) a. Speaker 1: iya think youTp love myf^ mother
b. Speaker 2: ITa [think youf# love myT/j mother], too (i-copy)
I7a [think ITfl love y o u r^  mother], too (Dahl)
(109) a. Speaker 1: r f a think you^a love my"^ mother
b. Speaker 2: IVa [think ITa love y o u r^  mother], too (Dahl)
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(110) a. Speaker 1: think youTg love m y ^  mother
b. Speaker 2: IVa [think y o u ^  love y o u r^  mother], too (i-copy)
IVa [think 12 $ love yourj^ mother], too (Dahl)
The act distribution within the verb phrase leads to the strict ATB in (107b).
Paralleling the third person, the a/5 distribution in (109b) also leads to the strict ATB—in this 
case, the wholly contained dependencies in (109a) and (109b) are not i-copies, and the only 
possible reconstruction of the verb phrase will have a dependent Dahl strict in the final noun 
phrase position. Switch ATB results in (108b) from the /S/5 distribution: the dependency here 
has the value set (1,2) and the orientation pattern <«-,-*,*->, which is an i-copy of the 
dependency realized in (108a). An alternative Dahl strict reconstruction of (108a) is also 
legitimate in (108b), as it is in (110b)—both of these result in the strict ATB again. The
puzzle comes from the legitimate /3a distribution in (110a), which the theory predicts should
result in the mixed switch/strict in the i-copy reconstruction in (110b), although marked to 
degree 1 with respect to the degree-0 ATB interpretations. But as observed above, this mixed 
reading is completely unavailable.
Although the complexity increases for additional pronouns, there is a consistency in 
the intuitions concerning available readings. To see this, let’s examine just one of the (24-2) 
or 14 possible orientation patterns in a four noun phrase sentence, such as in (111). Of the 
eight interpretations imaginable, only the across-the-board ones are available; the six mixed 
readings are all impossible. However, dependency theory predicts four readings here and not 
just the two across-the-boards: the first two mixed readings shown—the switch/switch/strict 
and the switch/strict/strict—are also predicted to occur under dependency theory assumptions.
(111) a. Speaker 1: I think you should tell your mother about me
b. Speaker 2: I do, too
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ATB strict: I  think I  should tell my mother about you 
ATB switch: I  think you should tell your mother about me 
switch/switch/strict: * I  think you should tell your mother about you 
switch/strict/strict: * I  think you should tell my mother about you  
switch/strict/switch: * I  think you should tell my mother about me 
strict/strict/switch: * I  think I  should tell my mother about me 
strict/switch/switch: * I  think I  should tell your mother about me 
strict/switch/strict: * I  think I  should tell your mother about you
Of the 2(4' I} or eight possible type distributions within the verb phrase of a sentence 
containing four oriented noun phrases, four—acta, aa@, apa, apP—result in the strict ATB 
interpretation for (11 lb), while the switch ATB results from the PPP distribution. In 
addition, the various Dahl reconstructions of the patterns containing dependent occurrences 
also result in the strict ATB reading. Each of the ATB readings has a degree-0 marked 
structure; but although marked, the first two mixed readings shown in (111) should also be 
available: I  think you should tell your mother about you, which results from the pPa 
distribution and is marked to degree I by the metric, and I  think you should tell my mother 
about you, which results from either PotP or Paa, marked to degree 1 or 2. But both of 
these predicted mixed interpretations are entirely unavailable for (11 lb). As already 
mentioned, dependency theory correctly predicts the unavailability of the final four mixed 
interpretations shown in (111), since in each o f these cases, the dependency would have to 
"skip" one or more medial noun phrases for the structure to result in the mixed reading 
shown.
The many indexical pronoun case has led to a serious puzzle. Unlike extended 
discourses containing oriented noun phrases which parallel the many clauses cases in the third 
person, the structural possibilities for many oriented noun phrases do not seem to parallel 
those for many noun phrases of the same numeric value in the third person. Strict ATB and 
switch ATB interpretations are available, but mixed readings are for the most part not found
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in examples containing many oriented noun phrases. For a sentence with three oriented noun 
phrases, the one mixed reading that is predicted in addition to the two ATBs is only available 
in one-third of the cases examined. For a sentence containing four noun phrases, two mixed 
readings are predicted, yet only the two ATB readings are available.
3.34 Level of licensing and the fifth many pronoun structure
The many oriented noun phrase exchanges raise an important question that does not 
come up in two-noun phrase switch cases such as /  love you—I  do, too. In the latter, an 
oriented dependency is the only kind of dependency possible—there can be no numeric 
dependency in I  love you as the two noun phrases have different numeric values. When more 
indexical pronouns are added, however, noun phrases within the structure do have the same 
numeric value—in the three-noun phrase case, for example, two of them will always have the 
same numeric value. The available switch ATB interpretations in (101-106) show that all 
three oriented noun phrases within such a structure may be in the same oriented dependency; 
the question that arises is whether there can be an alternate structure in which the two 
covalued noun phrases are in a numeric dependency.
Recall that as hypothesized, the syntactic property of orientation is derivationally 
separated from numeric value, occurring on a structurally adjacent line, although for purposes 
of ease of exposition I have represented orientation and value coexisting together in the same 
structure. The analysis I have proposed licenses dependencies among syntactic orientations— 
which is in fact a proposal that dependency is licensed on two distinct structural lines. What 
happens in the case where dependency can be licensed at one line or the other—are both 
oriented and numeric dependency structures allowed by the grammar, or does one take 
priority over the other? In the three indexical pronoun case, this question specifically 
becomes: in addition to the four a/@ type patterns among the orientations that are predicted
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by dependency theory, is there also a fifth  possible structure that encodes a numeric 
dependency among the two that happen to have the same value?
To illustrate, let’s reconsider the grammatical possibilities for (101a), which in the 
previous section, \ assumed had the four possible structures shown in (107a), (108a), (109a), 
and (110a). The representations in all o f these, of course, are conflated showing orientation 
and numeric values together, which I have repeated in (112) without the complication of 
indexical types. That is, (112) is an abbreviation for two lines of LF structure, shown 
properly reseparated on adjacent structural lines in (113).
(112) Ff think you2 love my^ mother
(113) line I: I*- think you-* love my«- mother
line 2: It think you2 love m y( mother
The possible fifth structure in this example would be one in which the final noun 
phrase is in a numeric dependency with the covalued initial noun phrase. Such a possibility 
might be illegitimate, since by definition a dependent occurrence must be resolved in the 
smallest part of a factorization, and a smaller factorization does exist for the resolution of the 
final noun phrase—namely, in the oriented dependency with the medial noun phrase.
However, the resolution would be on a different line of structure, and thus the fifth structure 
may be allowed. In fact the evidence suggests that the numeric dependency that "skips" the 
medial noun phrase is indeed a possible structure for (112), as shown by (114). The 
interpretation given for (114b) is quite salient.
(114) a. Speaker 1: I think you love my mother
b. Speaker 2: Susan5 does, too =  Susan5 [thinks I love her5 mother],
too
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In order to result in the interpretation shown, the structure of (114b) must encode a 
dependency between the noun phrases containing Susan and her, entailing that the structure of 
(114a) contains a numeric dependency between [NP /] and [NP my]. How can this be, since 
there is a closer noun phrase in which the dependent [Np my] can be resolved? The 
conclusion is that there must be a structural possibility for (1 14a) in which the closer noun 
phrase cannot resolve the final /S-occurrence, because the dependency is licensed not on the 
structural line 1 containing orientation, but on the adjacent structural line 2 containing 
numeric values. If the dependency in (114a) is licensed at the numeric level, the medial noun 
phrase is irrelevant and a numeric dependency containing the initial and final noun phrases is 
possible. The fifth possible structure, then, becomes legitimate; the analysis o f  (114) would 
be as follows.
(115) a. Speaker 1: I Ia think you2a love mylj3 mother
b. Speaker 2: Susan5a [thinks I2ft love her5(3 mother], too
The ability to license dependency at different levels solves another problem heretofore 
unexamined, which arises in cases of cross-person sloppy identity. The available 
interpretations shown in (116) are difficult to explain under an analysis in which dependency 
must be defined at the level of orientation.
(116) a. I love myself and you do, too =  ...and you [love yourself], too
b. I love myself and he does, too =  ...and he [loves himself], too
By the definitions developed above, a dependency among indexical noun phrases includes an 
orientation set as part of its formal description. If the dependencies among the noun phrases 
containing first and second person pronouns in (116) are licensed at the level o f  orientation.
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the dependencies cross person will not be i-copies. since some will have orientation patterns 
and some will not, as shown in (117). No pair o f these are i-copies, as they differ not only 
with respect to their numeric value, but also with respect to their orientation sets.
(117) a. <  ( [NP I]a , [NP myself^ ), (1), <N P , V, NP> >
b. <  ( [NP you]a , [NP yourself]^ ). (2), <N P , V, NP> >
c. <  ( [NP heja , [NP himself]^ ), (3), <N P , V, N P> >
On the other hand, if dependency is licensed at the numeric level, the orientation sets o f all 
the dependencies in (116) will be null. Differing only with respect to a singleton numeric 
value, they will be i-copies, and cross-person reconstruction is readily explained.10
Returning to many pronoun cases, a new difficulty emerges, but this one can quickly 
be put to rest. The apparent problem is as follows: if a numeric dependency between initial
and final noun phrases is possible as in (115a), why is the mixed strict/switch reading in
(101), repeated below as (118), unavailable? In the previous section, this possibility was 
assumed not to occur because the dependency in the first sentence could contain only the 
medial and final noun phrases. At the numeric level, however, as (115) shows, there is a 
legitimate dependency containing the initial and final noun phrases.
(118) a. Speaker 1: I la think you2a love my1(3 mother
b. Speaker 2: I2q do, too I2a [think I2a love my2(3 mother], too
10 Paul Postal informs me that apparently there are many people for whom sloppy identity 
cases like (116), that differ in person features, are ungrammatical. An explanation on the 
account offered here might be that in the grammar of such people, dependencies that can be 
resolved on the orientation level must be, so there could not be i-copy across the encoded 
dependencies due to difference in orientation pattern. A straightforward prediction of this 
account would be that someone who does not get the sloppy reading in (116) would also get 
only ATB readings for (103) and (106).
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Comparing the structures in (118) with those in (1 15) makes clear why the mixed strict/switch 
interpretation in (118b) is unavailable. The dependencies in (115a) and (115b) are i-copies; 
the dependencies in (118a) and (118b) are not. The independent medial noun phrase in (115b) 
has a different value and thus does not affect the encoded dependency. In (118b), however, 
the independent medial noun phrase is covalued with the final dependent occurrence; the 
dependency realized in this structure, by definition, must occur in the smallest factorization 
and thus contains the medial and final noun phrases. Because the structural descriptions of 
the dependencies realized in (118a) and (118b) are different, the i-copy condition fails. By 
the same reasoning, the lack of a mixed strict/switch in (104) is explained. Note that a Dahl 
strict reconstruction of the (118a) verb phrase is also not possible, as the final (non-oriented) 
dependent noun phrase of value 1 would not be resolvable in the overall (118b) structure.
Returning to the ATB many pronoun puzzle in light of the optionality of licensing 
dependency at the different levels of structure, it turns out that the problem has been greatly 
reduced. The cases where mixed readings are observed are just those interpretations that are 
derivable from the fifth structural option of numeric dependency. Cases without mixed 
readings are those in which the fifth structure does not lead to an interpretation for other 
reasons. Reexamining the judgments in the many pronoun cases that do have mixed readings 
versus the ones that do not, the generalization emerges that the mixed is available when the 
orientation pattern is <  xxy > ,  and is not when the pattern is <  xyx > or < xyy > .  The two 
examples of available mixed readings in (103) and (106) occur when the initial and medial 
noun phrases have the same numeric value and thus might be in a numeric dependency.
Mixed readings do not occur when the initial and medial noun phrases have different numeric 
values.
In (118), we examined the fifth numeric dependency structure for the many noun 
phrase exchange (101) on the <xyx>  orientation pattern, in which the initial and medial
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pronouns had different values. This structure did not result in an additional reading for 
(101b) but rather in ungrammaticality. The numeric dependency structure for an exchange 
such as (102) on the < x y y >  pattern, in which the initial and medial pronouns are also 
different, is shown in (119).
(119) a. Speaker 1: I Ia think y o u ^  love y o u r^  mother
b. Speaker 2: I2a do, too =  I2a [think I2a love my2j3 mother], too
No violation occurs in (119b), but since the numeric dependency is wholly contained, it
results not in a mixed reading but in another ATB strict reading. On the other hand, the 
numeric dependency structure for an < x x y >  pattern like (103), shown in (120), in which the 
initial and medial pronouns have the same value, is legitimate and does result in an additional 
reading.
(120) a. Speaker 1: I la think IIj3 love y o u r^  mother
b. Speaker 2: I2a do, too = I2a [think l2g love my2a mother], too
The dependencies encoded in (120a) and (120b) are i-copies: they have the same structural 
description, differing only with respect to a singleton numeric value. Unlike (117b), (120b) is 
legitimate, resulting in the interpretation I  think I  love my mother. This reading is indeed 
available; it is in fact the reading that I called the mixed "switch/strict" in (103). In both
(103) and (106) with the < xxy>  orientation pattern, the possibility of a numeric dependency 
leads to the attested "mixed" reading; in (101), (102), (104) and (105), where no mixed 
reading is observed, such a dependency does not lead to a mixed reading. Since the observed 
mixed readings are accounted for by assuming that numeric dependencies, and not just 
oriented ones, can be licensed in sentences containing indexical expressions, the simplified 
generalization can be made that no structure containing an oriented dependency leads to a
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mixed interpretation. On this reasoning, unlike the case with numeric dependencies, in an 
oriented dependency all the orientations in a structure are required to be included in an 
oriented dependency; partial dependencies among a subset of the oriented noun phrases are, 
for some reason not yet explained, disallowed. Thus is revealed a split between the different 
kinds of dependency: not only are oriented dependencies defined on a different level from 
numeric dependencies, but they are further restricted in some as yet unknown way.
To summarize, sentences containing many first and second person pronouns have the 
following three structural options. First, the indexical expressions may all be independent co­
occurrences, leading to the strict ATB interpretation in reconstruction. Orientation is 
irrelevant in this case, as identity of a-occurrences is determined by numeric value alone. 
Second, the indexical noun phrases may behave syntactically like third person noun phrases, 
in that the covalued noun phrases may be in a numeric dependency, licensed at the post­
orientation level of structure. In some cases, such numeric dependencies may lead to the 
"mixed" interpretations o f these sentences in reconstruction, in cases where the i-copy 
condition holds. Finally, the noun phrases may occur together in an oriented dependency, 
licensed at the syntactic level of orientation, leading to the switch ATB interpretation in 
reconstruction. In contrast to numeric dependencies, however, partial oriented dependencies 
do not occur. That dependency can be licensed at different derivational levels has thus 
reduced the ATB many pronoun puzzle to the question of why partial dependencies are not 
possible in structures containing many oriented noun phrases. There is an important aspect to 
the "many indexical pronoun" cases that is, as yet, unexplained.
3.35 The Jack puzzle
Reviewing the observations made at the beginning of this chapter o f examples in 
which switch does or does not occur, another puzzle arises for which there is, as yet, no
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explanation. Compare (27). repeated below as (121). to (122).
(121) a. Speaker 1: I think Jack loves you
b. Speaker 2: I do, too ^  I [think Jack loves you], too
(122) a. Speaker 1: I think my mother loves you
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I [think my mother loves you], too
The switch interpretation is not available when Jack (or any other third person form) occurs 
in the medial noun phrase position as in (121); switch becomes available in a parallel structure 
such as (122), in which the medial noun phrase contains a first or second person pronoun. 
Neither does switch occur when Jack occurs in the final noun phrase position, as in (123), in 
comparison to the available switch when my mother is in this position, as in (124).
(123) a. Speaker 1: I think you love Jack
b. Speaker 2: I do, too ^  I [think you love Jack], too
(124) a. Speaker 1: I think you love my mother
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I [think you love my mother], too
1 will call this problem "the Jack puzzle." It’s solution may shed light on the ATB many 
pronoun puzzle: could whatever is blocking partial dependencies in a sentence containing 
many indexical noun phrases also be responsible for blocking an oriented dependency among 
indexical expressions in a sentence that also contains a third person noun phrase like Jack!
In the previous section, it was shown that certain sentences that contain numerically 
covalued indexical expressions may be ambiguous between whether they contain an oriented 
dependency or a numeric dependency. The evidence showed that both oriented and numeric 
dependency structures are allowed by the grammar. The Jack puzzle raises a related question:
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can both kinds of dependency coexist in the same derivation? That is, given that a sentence 
may be ambiguous between structures containing the different dependencies, can there be a 
structure that contains both an oriented dependency and a numeric dependency at the same 
time? Analysis of the Jack puzzle reveals the answer to be no.
Let’s examine the orientation-to-numeric derivation o f (121a), shown in (125) below, 
and consider the licensing of dependencies that would be required for the switch reading in 
(121b).
(125) line 1: I*- think Jack3 loves you-*
line 2: It think Jack3 loves you9
To derive switch, there would have to be an oriented dependency in the line 1 level of 
structure including the noun phrases containing I  and you. However, this leaves the noun 
phrase containing Jack undefined with respect to a dependency—and as it is a referential 
expression, it must be contained in a dependency, even if that dependency has only one 
member. However, the dependency containing Jack cannot be defined at line 1, as it is not 
oriented; rather, it must be licensed at the numeric line 2 level of structure. For the switch 
reading to occur, an oriented dependency would have to be licensed at line 1, and a numeric 
dependency containing Jack would have to be licensed at line 2. It is this double-licensing 
that appears to he illegitimate: in the derivation of a particular structure, the dependencies 
may be licensed on one line or the other, but not both.
The ban on double-licensing has the result that oriented dependencies will only occur 
in sentences that contain noun phrases that are or contain indexicals. In contrast to (125), the 
dependency in (126) may be defined only on the oriented level. Unlike in the Jack sentence, 
no noun phrase is left undefined with respect to dependency.
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(126) line 1: I*- think my<- mother loves you-*
line 2: Ij think myt mother loves you2
An objection might be raised with respect to (126) that not all the referential noun phrases 
have been taken into account. Doesn't the compositional noun phrase [my mother] also have 
an index? Evidence that it does can be shown by examples like (127).
(127) [My mother]5 loves herself5
However, the structural description of the dependency encoded in (127) is a less expanded 
line of the phrase marker than the structural description of the embedded clause in line 1 of
(126); <N P, V, NP> versus <N P, N, V, N P> . The point is that there is a line of 
structure in the my mother sentences at which the oriented dependency can be licensed, and at 
which no numeric index is undefined with respect to dependency. Thus an oriented 
dependency will be structurally licensed as long as all the referential noun phrases are or 
contain an indexical expression. This is not the case in the Jack sentences—any line o f 
structure that contains both *- and -* in (125) also contains the numeric index of Jack, which 
can only be licensed in a dependency at the numeric level.
Does the ban on double-licensing offer anything for the ATB many indexical pronoun 
problem? That is, can the impossibility o f partial dependencies among orientations be seen to 
follow from this? I believe that it does. Recall the ATB problem, repeated in example (128) 
below. As discussed above, the index types shown in (128a)—a!3a, indicating that the first 
two noun phrases are in a dependency, and the final noun phrase is independent—should be 
allowed on the oriented structural line, as there is evidence that this pattern occurs in numeric 
dependencies. However, the "mixed" reading that should result from this structure in (128b) 
is unattested.
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(128) a. Speaker 1: think youT^ love my7a mother
b. Speaker 2: I7a do, too IVa [think y o u ^  love youfj"a
mother], too
Structures like (128), which contain an ctfia pattern of types, encode two dependencies, the 
first containing the noun phrases [/] and [vow] and the second containing the one noun phrase 
[my). Dependencies are defined with respect to structural descriptions, and a dependency 
containing a single noun phrase is one such possibility. Recall that oriented dependencies 
intuitively contain a pattern of orientations, and are defined with respect to that pattern, while 
numeric dependencies are defined with respect to a singleton numeric index. I would put 
forth the hypothesis that dependencies containing a single expression are inherently numeric, 
arguing that a dependency containing a single noun phrase, even if it is an indexical 
expression such as [my], cannot be licensed as an oriented dependency, because it contains no 
pattern. The failure to find partial dependencies among orientations, on this proposal, follows 
from the ban that prevents structural dependencies from being licensed on the two levels 
simultaneously: if any one of the indexical expressions in a many pronoun case is left out of 
the dependency, like Jack it would have to be licensed at the numeric level. Therefore the 
only grammatical oriented dependencies will be across-the-board.
3.4 Orientation patterns as sentential properties
The syntactic account of dependency among orientations has come a long way towards 
accounting for switch interpretations. Simple cases of switch versus non-switch have been 
explained, including the "same speaker" problem. The analysis has made correct predictions 
in extended discourse examples, and further, has accounted for the occurrence of switch in the 
many indexical pronoun cases. The lack o f "mixed" readings in exchanges containing many 
indexical noun phrases, along with the failure of sentences to "switch" if Jack is along for the
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ride, have been shown to follow from the fact that orientation occurs on a different structural 
level than the numeric indices that are derived from it. The data suggest that dependencies 
can be licensed at the level of orientation or at the numeric level, but not at both levels in the 
same structure. As a result, oriented dependencies, in contrast to numeric dependencies, 
occur either across-the-board or not at all.
For a sentence that contains only indexical expressions, these various factors in the 
grammar provide a structural possibility that encodes an orientation pattern, and another that 
does not. I will call the former structures oriented sentences. For a sentence to be oriented, 
part o f its grammatical description includes an oriented dependency in which all referential 
noun phrases therein are included: without dependency, there is no orientation pattern.
Because oriented dependencies among partial structural factorizations are excluded, an 
orientation pattern can be described as a sentential property.
For all its success in offering an explanatory account o f a great deal of the data, 
unaccounted for under this syntactic analysis are examples occurring in the many 
circumstances described as "non-intimate," where switch does not occur, in comparison to the 
intimate circumstances, such as loving or cheating, where switch robustly occurs. Across two 
exchanges where the same pronouns occur in structurally parallel positions, often one has a 
switch interpretation while the other does not. For example, compare (16), which switches, 
repeated below as (129), to a close correlate (130) which does not.
(129) a. Speaker 1: I want your body
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I [want your body], too
(130) a. Speaker 1: I like your car
b. Speaker 2: I do, too ^  I [like your car], too
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The syntactic analysis thus far predicts that switch should be as available in intimate as well as 
non-intimate circumstances. So although the oriented dependency analysis has accounted for a 
great deal of the switch data, there remain several unresolved puzzles.
In the next chapter, I will compare the conventional uses of oriented sentences to 
those that are not. Sentences that contain the different kind of dependency and have an 
orientation pattern will be shown to fill a specific communicative requirement. Furthermore, 
this discussion will reveal that there are regularities o f the context structure in which switch 
occurs. Through this discussion, the remaining mysteries of switch will be accounted for. In 
addition, I will review an alternative analysis of the switch phenomenon under a predicate- 
based semantic approach.
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Chapter 4: The use and meaning of oriented sentences
4.0 Introductory remarks
The syntactic analysis developed in the previous chapter has accounted for much of 
the "switch" phenomenon. Similarly to "sloppy identity," which occurs in elliptical utterances 
due to encoded numeric dependencies, switch interpretations have been analyzed to occur due 
to encoded oriented dependencies. There are, however, important differences between 
numeric and oriented dependencies—differences that follow from the fact that they are 
licensed at different levels. Since all of first, second, and third person expressions are 
numerically indexed, numeric dependencies can occur in any sentence that contains two or 
more numerically covalued expressions—it is irrelevant whether they are indexical or non- 
indexical— and partial numeric dependencies are common, though marked with respect to their 
across-the-board counterparts. But because all dependencies in a structure must be licensed at 
one level or the other, oriented dependencies are more restricted than numeric dependencies.
A sentence that contains one or more non-indexical expressions cannot encode an oriented 
dependency, and even in a sentence that contains only indexicals, a dependency among 
syntactic orientations must occur sentence-wide or not at all. Thus it is only for a sentence in 
which all of the referential noun phrases are or contain indexicals that the grammar provides 
the structural option of an oriented dependency. A sentence that encodes an oriented 
dependency I have called an "oriented sentence."
The discussion of "switch," however, is not yet complete. The availability of a 
switch interpretation provides a diagnostic tool for determining whether a particular sentence 
can encode an oriented dependency. But although oriented dependencies can thus be detected, 
there are structural configurations in which switch is not observed where it might be expected. 
This has not yet been explained. As noted in the previous chapter, across similar structural
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configurations, switch robustly occurs in some circumstances but not others. To shed light on 
this problem, the use o f oriented sentences needs to be examined—a discussion that will 
comprise the first part of this chapter. The implications o f oriented dependencies for the new 
model of context structure developed in chapter 2 will then be explored. In the final section
of this chapter, an alternative theory of switch, developed in a semantic framework proposed
by Rebuschi (1994, 1997), will be evaluated in contrast to the analysis I have developed here.
4.1 The use o f oriented sentences
As sketched in chapter 1, the Precision principle says, "Select the most precise tool 
for the task." It was suggested that Precision should be thought of as a corollary of Grice’s 
maxim of quantity. The idea was that a speaker chooses sentences under syntactic 
descriptions, with respect to given tasks. To repeat an example, consider the following 
choices that a particular speaker may have:
(1) a. IT am hungry
b. Tom2 is hungry
Putting aside floutings and violations for the moment, depending on the circumstances, the 
speaker following Precision will choose either (la) or (lb). It was submitted in chapter 1 that 
because a first person expression is structurally more complex than a third, it is, for most 
tasks involving referring to oneself, the more precise tool. Given the model of context as 
developed in chapter 2, we can add a little to our understanding o f how this is so. Because 
the numeric value o f the indexical in (la) is derived at logical form through its syntactic 
orientation, the expression is guaranteed to unambiguously pick out one and only one 
individual, assuming that the formal context is in place. However, if the speaker has reason 
to believe that the formal context may be opaque or unknown to the addressee, (lb) may be
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the pragmatic preference, despite the fact that understanding it may require knowledge beyond 
knowledge of language.
Now that an oriented dependency has been argued to be a structural possibility for 
sentences containing indexicals, let’s ask how the operation o f such pragmatic choices may be 
affected. In an example such as (la), there is no possibility o f an oriented dependency, since 
there is only one noun phrase in the sentence—which as claimed in chapter 3, must therefore 
be an a-occurrence licensed at the numeric level of logical form. Thus the analysis does not 
increase the choices a speaker has in (1)—there are still just the two possibilities (la) and (lb) 
from which to choose. Even though (1) was presented as a choice between sentences, in fact 
it constitutes a choice between two subject expressions—one indexical, one non-indexical—for 
the task of referring. However, when there is a structural possibility of an orientation 
dependency, the pragmatic situation becomes more complex, because in this case not only is 
there an indexical versus non-indexical choice of expressions, as in (I), but there are two 
structural possibilities for a sentence containing indexicals—one that contains an orientation 
dependency and the other not. In deciding among the choices in (2), for example, the speaker 
must truly choose among sentences, the structural possibilities as shown below.
(2) a. I7a love y o u ^
b. I7a love you7a
c. Jackla loves Susan2a
Both (2a) and (2b)—the choices containing indexicals—are structurally more complex than 
(2c), in that they contain syntactic orientation. However, (2a) contains a dependency where 
(2b) does not. Thus while (2a) and (2b) both contain indexicals, only (2a) is an oriented 
sentence. Structurally, (2b) shares properties with each o f the others: like (2a) it contains 
only indexicals, but like (2c) its expressions are all independent occurrences. In terms o f
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representational complexity, (2a) and (2b) are equivalent, so it seems unlikely that the 
Precision principle can decide between them. Are there distinct tasks, however, for which 
each of these would he the best tool? Why would a speaker choose to utter an oriented 
sentence, such as (2a), when he or she might "say the same thing” using a sentence that 
contains only indexicals but does not encode a dependency, such as (2b)? These are the 
issues before us.
In the model that I have proposed, indexical expressions are derivationally more 
complex than non-indexicals. Unlike non-indexicals, each indexical expression is guaranteed 
to be anchorable into the discourse context, without an assumption of any knowledge beyond 
the formal context. The formal context—a new model of which was proposed in chapter 2—is 
a structure that reflects circumstances in the discourse situation and functions as an anchor to 
individuals in those circumstances. But is there any difference in this regard between a 
sentence that contains an oriented dependency and one that contains independent indexicals? I 
would argue that there are two important differences, both entailments of the fact that an 
oriented sentence structurally contains an orientation pattern. First, an orientation pattern can 
be anchored to the context all at once, regardless of the number of noun phrases, while 
structures that contain independent occurrences of indexicals must attach through the 
individual orientations of each noun phrase. An appropriate metaphor is to liken an oriented 
sentence to an old-fashioned string of Christmas tree lights wired in series. When plugged in 
to the context, all the bulbs in the string—that is, noun phrases in the sentence—light up at 
once. This metaphor also illustrates the across-the-board property of oriented sentences: in a 
string of lights that is wired in series, none of the bulbs will light when even one of the bulbs 
is removed or is blown. On the other hand, in the non-oriented sentence each of the bulbs is 
plugged in individually, independent of the others. So although any sentence containing only 
indexical expressions is guaranteed attachment into the discourse, only the oriented sentence
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attaches easily.
The second difference is an entailment of the fact that in a structure that contains an 
oriented dependency, no other dependencies are possible. A sentence that contains only 
indexical expressions can be anchored to things in the discourse situation; an oriented sentence 
goes one step further. What follows from the syntactic conditions licensing an oriented 
dependency is the guarantee that there is no anchoring outside the immediate discourse 
situation: thus an oriented sentence ensures exclusivity. A speaker, in choosing an oriented 
sentence, has selected a tool that is guaranteed to concern only the conversational participants. 
So the question becomes, under what conditions would it serve the interests of a speaker for 
his utterance to have a guarantee of exclusivity? To answer this, let’s evaluate more closely 
the circumstances in which switch occurs.
4.11 Oriented sentences and speech acts
Switch interpretations have been observed to occur most robustly in what I have called 
"intimate" circumstances. Interestingly, for many of the cases where a switch interpretation 
seems initially unavailable, it can be brought out if the intonation is "souped up" or if an 
intimate situation is contrived. Recall the final example in the previous chapter, repeated 
below as (3), in which speaker 2’s reply did not have a switch interpretation.
(3) a. Speaker 1: I like your car
b. Speaker 2: I do, too
Now imagine a Baywatch situation for (3), such as a hunk in his Jaguar and a babe in her 
Ferrari, stopped side by side at the same red light. She smiles at him suggestively and purrs,
I like your car. In this scenario, (3a) isn’t really about the car but is some sort of come-on, 
and the switch reading for (3b) becomes perfect: when the hunk leers back, /  do, too, it can
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clearly mean I like your car, too—which, note, is not really about a car either.
That switch becomes available in a "souped up" version of (3) shows that the 
conditions limiting the switch in these kinds o f structural configurations are not syntactic in 
nature. By way of comparison, switch does not occur in the Jack puzzle, repeated below, 
however intimate a circumstance is contrived. Imagining that (4) takes place in a Baywatch 
situation—a sexy lady purring (4a) to an interested suitor—does not bring out a switch reading 
for (4b).
(4) a. Speaker 1: I think Jack loves you
b. Speaker 2: I do, too
In the previous chapter, the lack of switch reading in (4b) was argued to follow from syntactic 
conditions that disallow both an orientation dependency and a numeric dependency in the 
same structure—an analysis that now has additional support, given the rigid nature of the lack 
of switch in the Jack sentences, even in Baywatch circumstances. The intimacy versus non­
intimacy puzzle, on the other hand, is pragmatic in nature.
As another example, consider (5), first brought to my attention by Ruth Reeves. The 
initial intuition is that (5b) does not have a switch interpretation.
(5) a. Speaker 1: You love me
b. Speaker 2: You do, too
This example is minimally different from the paradigm switch case /  love you—I do, too, the 
obvious difference being that the pronouns are in the reverse linear order. But we have 
observed as many switch interpretations with second person preceding first person as vice 
versa. What are the pragmatic differences? I  love you is a declaration, while you love me is 
not—rather it is some kind of statement of fact. You love me remains a statement of fact even
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when the circumstance in which it is said is limited to two individuals who love each other. 
Interestingly, though, when a story is provided for (5) where it is something other than 
statement of fact, a sw'itch reading does become available. Imagine, tor example, a Bogart 
and Bacall movie, in which neither of them realizes that they are in love with each other.
Our hero and heroine eventually find themselves huddled alone against the bad guys in a 
secluded setting. They stare into each other’s eyes, each realizing the truth at that moment. 
They say (5): the switch is perfect. Note that given such a story, you love me is something 
like an expression of discovery, and not a simple statement of fact.
In considering these cases, the generalization emerges that oriented sentences seem to 
not be used for simple statements of fact. The presence of a structural oriented dependency 
apparently makes the sentence such that speakers use oriented sentences in situations where 
their given task is to do something other than make a statement of fact. The switch readings 
that occur robustly in "intimate" conversations between lovers are declarations, not simply 
merely statements of fact. Notice that in the circumstances where (3) switched, the Baywatch 
character was not stating a fact about her preferences in cars, but rather extending a sexual 
invitation. Furthermore, when a statement-of-fact interpretation is forced on the paradigm 
switch case I love you, such that it is no longer a declaration, such as in (6 b), the switch 
interpretation disappears for (6 c).
(6 ) a. Speaker 1 : Name something that you love
b. Speaker 2: I love you
c. Speaker I: I do, too ^  I [love you], too
Similarly, the situations in which other strong switch examples have been observed include 
accusations and threats—or as in the Bogart and Bacall story for (5), a discovery—all 
examples in which the speaker has with the utterance done something other than stating a fact.
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Observations of a distinction of this sort—that is, between utterances that state facts 
and utterances that do something different—have been made by many people over the years. 
For example, Kimball (1970) contrasted "expressive" uses of sentences with "reportive" uses. 
He observed that a sentence like it hurts can be used expressively by a person experiencing 
pain, similar to an utterance like ouch!, which is always expressive. The sentence it hurts can 
also be used reportively, however, as in response to a doctor asking how does your head feel? 
(If the patient instead says ouch! in response to the doctor’s question, he does not actually 
report his pain, although the doctor might well conclude that, based on his expression.) 
Kimball’s reportive use is similar to what I have called "stating facts,” while the expressive 
use is doing something different. Similarly, and perhaps more famously, Austin (1962) 
distinguished sentences that have mere "locutionary force" from those with "illocutionary 
force"; the former are confined to acts of "saying that” (which were not, for Austin, 
performative1), while the latter can be used to make explicit "speech acts.” We have seen 
that a sentence that encodes an oriented dependency seems never to be used as simply 
reportive or in acts of "saying that," suggesting that oriented sentences are used only as 
expressives.
Might orientation be related to Austin’s original notion of illocutionary force? Let’s 
explore this idea. In exchanges containing explicit speech acts, switch interpretations are in 
fact, in most cases, the only ones available. Both speakers in (7) are doing the speech act of 
promising, in (8 ), betting, and in (9), apologizing—and since all three examples must switch, 
they must, under the analysis here, encode oriented dependencies.
1 That is, in Austin’s original observations of performatives, which do something, which 
are separated as a class from other, non-performatives that ’’merely" say something. In 
Austin’s later observations, and subsequently in speech act theory, this distinction is somewhat 
lost, as just about everything said becomes a speech act. For Searle 1969 "saying that” is a 
speech act. Similarly, from a linguistic perspective, Ross (1970) proposed that all English 
declaratives were hidden "performatives," again blurring the distinction I wish to preserve.
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(7) a. Speaker 1: I promise to love you forever
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I [promise to love you forever], too
(8 ) a. Speaker 1: I bet you $5
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I [bet you 55], too
(9) a. Speaker I: I'm sorry I hit you
b. Speaker 2: I am, too =  I’m [sorry I hit youj, too
Although they are not in my dialect, I have been told that certain other classic performative 
formulas, shown in ( 1 0 - 1 2 ), also have switch readings. 2
(10) a. Speaker 1: I bid you farewell
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I [bid you farewell], too
(11) a. Speaker 1: I give you my word
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I [give you my word], too
(12) a. Speaker 1: I thank you
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I [thank you], too
Considering that "speech acts," at least in the classic sense, only occur using 
sentences that contain a first person subject and non-negated present tense performative verb, 
it cannot be assumed that all switch cases are speech acts. We have seen many occurrences of 
switch with a second person subject, and switch interpretations do occur in sentences 
containing negation and past tense. Under the analysis developed in chapter 3, because the
2  The equivalent of (12) in my dialect would have to be thank you—me, too, which is 
terrible, suggesting that there is no /  syntactically present in thank you to depend on, which 
seems to match intuitions concerning what has become a fixed, conventional phrase.
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switch interpretation occurs in (13), both (13a) and ( 13b) must structurally encode oriented 
dependencies, and yet neither speaker has performed a speech act of "promising."
(13) a. Speaker 1: I never promised you a rose garden
b. Speaker 2: I never did, either =  I never [promised you a rose garden],
either
Although the utterances in (13) are not classic speech acts, they do seem to qualify as 
expressive, in Kimball’s terminology, as they do something other than merely report.
So there are oriented sentences that are used expressively but not as speech acts—but 
are there speech acts that are not oriented? The hypothesis that explicit speech acts of the sort 
discussed by Austin are a proper subclass o f expressives, and can only be made with oriented 
sentences seems to have support: evidence that this proposal is on the right track comes not 
from switch cases but from sentences that contain only first person pronouns. Consider (14), 
a classic explicit performative act o f promising.
(14) a. Speaker 1: I promise I’ll be on time
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I [promise I’ll be on time], too
The sloppy interpretation of (14b) suggests that there is a dependency encoded among the two 
noun phrases containing I  in (14a), but since these are co-oriented as well as numerically 
covalued, is this dependency an oriented dependency or a numeric dependency? As seen in 
the discussion of the many pronoun switch cases, which structural line such a dependency is
licensed on in such a case is an open question, as both kinds of dependency are structurally
possible. (14a) might then be structurally encoding the dependency in either (15a) or (15b).
(15) a. < ( [NP I]a , [NP Ik  ), (1), <N P, V, N P>  >
b. < ( [NP I]a , [NP I] 0  ). (1), < N P , V, NP> >
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The sloppy reading of (14b) is consistent with either of these dependencies, since it would 
result from the encoding of either (16a)—an i-copy of (15a), or ( 16b)—an i-copy of (15b).
Each pair differs only with respect to a singleton numeric value. Thus from the interpretation 
of (14) alone it cannot be determined whether these are oriented sentences or not.
(16) a. <  ( [NP I]tt , [NP %  ), (2), < - , - > ,  <  NP, V, N P> >
b- <  ( [np \  • [np %  >* O ’ <N P’ V. N P> >
The evidence comes when the second speaker changes to third person, as in (17). In 
this case, there is no sloppy interpretation. But if the dependency encoded in (17a) were a 
numeric one as in (15b), then the dependency realized in (17b) would be (18), which is 
identical to (15b) by the i-copy condition.
(17) a. Speaker 1: I promise I’ll be on time
b. Speaker 2: John does, too John [promises he’ll be on time], too
(18) <  ( [NP John]a , [NP ht]0 ), (3), <NP, V, N P> >
The lack of a sloppy interpretation in (17b) suggests that the structure of the sentence used by 
the first speaker to make an explicit promise does not encode an ordinary, non-oriented 
numeric dependency. On this reasoning, the only structure that (17a)—and thus (14a)—can 
have will be one including an oriented dependency, and the hypothesis that only oriented 
sentences are used to make speech acts has some support.
But is this the only possible explanation for the lack o f a sloppy reading in (17b)?
For example, one might suggest that, by convention, the present tense use of promise must 
have a first person subject, and that the violation in (17b) might be that the present tense
promise has a third person subject. However, the present tense use o f promise does have uses
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other than in speech acts—for example, in (19).
(19) a. Speaker 1: Every day I promise I’ll be on time
b. Speaker 2: John does, too = [Every day] John [promises he’ll be
on time], too
In (19a), the present tense is used in the "habitual" sense, forced by the sentential adverbial 
every day, and is not a speech act of promising. And unlike in (17b), in (19b), the sloppy 
interpretation is available.
The contrast between (14b) in the first person, which has a sloppy interpretation, and 
(17b) in the third person, which does not, seems particular to the verb promise. Note that by 
convention, first person, present tense promise—as in /  promise I ’ll be on time—is generally 
used only for the speech act of promising: to say this utterance is to promise. Under the 
analysis being offered here, while the grammar provides both oriented and non-oriented 
structures for such a sentence, only the oriented one is conventionally used, making the
sloppy reading in (17b) impossible. In a case where the convention can be subverted, as in
the "habitual” (19), the non-oriented structure is available and the sloppy interpretation 
becomes available for (19b). Other performative verbs have not become as narrowed in their 
conventional use—for example, in addition to the use of to be sorry to perform the speech act 
of apologizing, there is a non-speech act use to report an emotional state. In response to 
(2 0 a), the sloppy interpretation is available whether speaker 2  stays within first person or 
changes to the third person—and this without forcing a "habitual" present tense interpretation.
(20) a. Speaker 1: I’m sorry I lied
b. Speaker 2: I am, too = I’m [sorry I lied], too
John is, too =  John is [sorry he lied], too
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In contrast to (I4a) or (17a), for which it is hard, though not impossible, to find 
circumstances in which they are not speech acts, there are not as strong conventions 
governing the use of to be sorry—an utterance of (2 0 a) can be used as a speech act or not, 
more or less interchangeably. This would mean, on this analysis, that an utterance of (20a) is 
ambiguous between two possible dependency structures equally available—one containing an 
oriented dependency that is used to express the apology, and the other containing a numeric 
dependency, which is available for the reportive use of describing one’s feelings. Only the 
second can be reconstructed without an i-copy violation when changing to the third person— 
and indeed, John is sorry he lied is not a speech act of apologizing but rather is a report o f 
John’s feelings. In addition to the two structures containing the different dependencies, there 
is a third structure possible for (2 0 a) with independent a-occurrences all around, which leads 
to the strict readings for (20b) I ’m sorry you lied, too and John is sorry you lied, too—both 
also reports, not apologies.
That oriented sentences are the ones that are used to not merely report facts, but to do 
something other than report facts, could offer further insight as to why the switch reading in 
conversations such as I love you—I do, too is so salient, often the only available reading, in 
contrast to the strict reading, which for many speakers is only a joke, if available at all. The 
idea would be that although to utter I  love you isn’t to love you, in the way that to utter I  
promise is to promise, the oriented structure of I  love you is used expressively to make the 
declaration, just as oriented sentences are used for promising or other speech acts. For the 
strict, "joke" interpretation to occur for I  do, too , there must be reconstruction of the other 
possible structure of I  love you, that contains no dependency. Thus for a second speaker to 
reply I  do, too, intending the strict, "joke" reading, is to deny the expressive nature of the 
first speaker’s utterance—which is to deny that a declaration has been made—and instead 
assume a reportive use for the original utterance that contains no dependency. While this
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assumption is allowed by the grammar, it is easy to see why this "joke" might be objected to 
by many speakers in actual conversations. Although an utterance o f I  love you is syntactically 
ambiguous between a structure that contains an oriented dependency and a structure that 
contains no orientation and no dependency, to use it to make a declaration a speaker has 
chosen the former structure, just as the conventional use of first person, present tense promise 
to make a promise chooses the oriented, dependent structure. Note that similarly, the strict 
reading of utterances containing explicit performatives such as in (7-9) above is far less salient 
than the loud and clear switch. In line with previous observations, note that the relative 
weight of the readings is quite different for promise, while in the case o f the ambiguous to be 
sorry, however, the readings are rather on a par.
Why would oriented sentences be the structure of choice—the best tool for the task— 
for making a speech act or expressive utterance? The answer is convention, but the 
convention can be seen to follow, I believe, in consideration of the fact that oriented sentences 
are "exclusive." As discussed above, because it structurally contains an oriented dependency, 
it is entailed that an oriented sentence is not only guaranteed anchoring to the discourse 
situation, it is also guaranteed that there is no anchoring outside the immediate discourse 
situation. A speaker, in choosing an oriented sentence, selects a tool that is guaranteed to 
concern only the conversational participants. In considering the classic speech acts, they are 
generally not about the participants in the conversation but acts that take place between them. 
Promising, betting, apologizing—all constimte deals made between the speaker and hearer.
The oriented sentence, because it is exclusive, is the best tool for such a task, and so by 
convention, is the structure used for expressive utterances.
Given that there is a conventional use o f oriented sentences, certain pragmatic 
conditions must be in place for a switch reading to occur. It appears that not only must the 
original structure containing an oriented dependency have an appropriate expressive use, but
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so also must the switch reply, which reconstructs the oriented dependency. In most of the 
cases of switch we have seen, the second speaker is making the same utterance as the first 
speaker, reciprocally—as an expressive, the pragmatic status of the reply is no different from 
the original utterance. Interestingly, changing the sentence type in the reply often makes the 
switch reading disappear. While changing from a positive to a negative, as in (21), will often 
allow the switch reading, in (22) and (23), where one speaker is asking a question and the 
other is not, the switch reading is not available.
(21) a. Speaker 1: I love you
b. Speaker 2: I don’t =  I don’t [love you]
(22) a. Speaker I: I love you
b. Speaker 2: Yeah, but do I? ^  ...do I [love you]?
(23) a. Speaker I: Do you love me?
b. Speaker 2: No, but you do ...you [love me]
If an oriented dependency is encoded in the structure of (22a) and (23a)—as it must be to 
derive the switch reading if the replies were I  do, too or do you?, respectively—then why 
does the switch not occur in (22b) and (23b)? In the reconstruction of numeric dependencies, 
where one is within a question and the other is not, i-copies are perfectly legitimate. In (24), 
for example, the sloppy interpretation is fine.
(24) a. Speaker 1: Alice, loves her, mother
b. Speaker 2: Does Larry4  ? =  Does Larry4  [love his4  mother]?
However, changing the sentence type does not always prevent switch from occurring.
In (25), speaker 2’s changing from an imperative to a question switches fine.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
162
(25) a. Speaker 1: Kiss me!
b. Speaker 2: Why don’t you? =  Why don’t you [kiss mej?
The lack of switch in (22) and (23) does not seem to be due to the change in sentence type 
syntactically, but rather a change in pragmatic status that changes the relative expressiveness 
in the reply. (22a) is a declaration of love, and (23a) is a request for such a declaration—both 
expressive uses. Note that the replies in (22) and (23) are yeah and no—what follows these is 
additional, reportive material. The switch interpretation of (23b) would be just be reporting a 
fact, and in the switch interpretation of (2 2 b), the speaker would questioning his own feelings, 
which seems to be a question of fact. Since an oriented dependency is a structural possibility 
in (22a) and (23a), syntactically, an oriented dependency is possible in (22b) and (23b), since 
the i-copy condition holds. These structures run into a pragmatic problem, however, in that 
they do not have any expressive interpretation, so the orientation in them is not being used 
according to convention. On the other hand, in terms of illocutionary force, both (25a) and 
(25b) are requests or demands, an appropriate expressive use for an oriented sentence. There 
may also be additional pragmatic requirements coming into play in these examples, such as 
conditions on what constitutes an appropriate reply, of which I will not attempt here to make 
even a partial account. As Clark (1979) observes, "In ordinary conversation, many speech 
acts, whether direct or indirect, come in what have been called adjacency pairs. Requests are 
responded to by promises o f compliance, questions by answers, offers by acceptances or 
refusals and assertions by acknowledgements." (p. 200) It is felicitous, following a 
declaration like I  love you, to make another declaration. It is common, following an 
accusation, to make a counter-accusation. It is happy in response to a declaration to make a 
denial; however, it is unhappy, in response to a declaration, to question one’s own feelings in 
the matter.
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In summary, let’s return to the questions that were asked at the beginning of this 
section. In consideration o f the choices that a speaker has in (2), repeated below, pragmatic 
principles must choose among three structural possibilities.
(2) a. r f a love you^g
b. I7 a love youoa
c. Jack[ft loves Susan^
Since (2a) and (2b) contain indexicals and are thus syntactically more complex than (2c), there 
are tasks for which Precision will reject (2c).
The choice between (2a) and (2b), however, does not seem to be decidable under 
Precision. These two structural choices are available because the grammar provides the 
option of dependency among syntactic orientations. Following Kimball’s terminology, it 
appears that by convention, sentences that contain oriented dependencies are used 
expressively, while non-oriented sentences are used reportively. I have argued that this 
convention follows from the fact that an oriented sentence such as (2 a) has an "exclusivity" 
guarantee that its counterpart (2 b) does not, even though both are guaranteed attachable into 
the discourse situation. Thus the oriented sentence is the best tool for the task o f  making 
deals between the participants in a conversation, such as in the making of explicit (traditional) 
speech acts, or more generally, any expressive utterance. Only with (2a) can a speaker 
declare love. When the task that the speaker faces, on the other hand, is to report facts that 
involve himself or his interlocutor, the oriented sentence will not be the tool for this task. In 
this case, the speaker will rather select (2 b) or (2 c), the choice between them resting on 
Precision.
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4.12 Context shift and bifurcated contexts
Under this analysis, the presence of a switch interpretation has become a diagnostic 
for determining whether a structure contains an oriented dependency. Some problematic cases 
of switch interpretation occur, however, where an oriented dependency would be expected to 
be disallowed under the analysis developed in chapter 3. The first kind of case involves 
quotation—direct and indirect—and the second what I call bifurcation. I will argue that the 
unexpected switch interpretations in both of these cases are attributable to alterations of the 
formal context.
To illustrate the first cases, imagine that Max is planning an upcoming declaration of 
love to his sweetheart Sally. The intuition is that Max can say, to no one in particular or to a
helpful friend, either (26a) or (26b), the contents of the embedded sentences to mean that Max
loves Sally, and Sally loves Max, respectively. In both (26a) and (26b), the switch 
interpretation o f the embedded elliptical reply is perfect.
(26) a. First, I’ll say, "I love you," then she’ll say, "I do, too" 
b. First, I’ll say I love her, then she’ll say she does, too
Furthermore, assuming everything goes according to Max’s plan, the friend can, in a report 
of what happened between Max and Sally, say either (27a) or (27b), parallel to the above: 
the interpretation of the elided verb phrase in each switches . 3
(27) a. First, Max said, "I love you," then she said, "I do, too”
b. First, Max said he loved her, then she said she did, too
The obvious problem raised by these cases for the analysis I have developed is that switch
3  I am indebted to Robert May for this example.
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interpretations are occurring in sentences that contain non-indexical expressions, and in (27b), 
switch occurs in a sentence that contains only non-indexical expressions. Under my 
assumptions, there should be no orientation dependency structure possible in any of (26-27) 
and thus no switch. That is, the switch should be ruled out in these for the same reasons it is 
ruled out in Max loves Sally, and she does, too.
Let’s begin with the direct quotation cases (26a) and (27a). As discussed in chapter 
1 , the felicitous presence o f indexicals in the first place in such embedded sentences is 
licensed by the context shift made possible by the verb o f saying. It seems logical to argue 
that because o f this transplanting, the structure of the quoted sentences is independent of the 
larger sentence that they are embedded in, since for the embedded direct quotations the 
syntactic function from orientation to numeric value, as well as the semantic function from 
numeric value to individual, must be in the shifted formal contexts o f Max speaking to Sally 
and her replying. Thus the presence of oriented dependency among the indexicals in (26a) 
and (27a) are easily accounted for by assuming that these embeddings are merely lifted from, 
and have identical structure to, the sentences in the exchange in (28). Thus the switch 
interpretation in the direct quotation cases is not a surprise.
(28) a. Max to Sally: I love you 
b. Sally to Max: I do, too
What is surprising, though, is that the switch interpretation also is available in the indirect 
quotation versions (26b) and (27b)—cases that do not appear to contain a shift from the 
"actual" context, since they do not contain indexicals to pick out Max and Sally. How can 
there be an oriented dependency if there is no orientation? The answer that I suggest is that 
these indirect discourse cases show that orientation can in fact be, in such circumstances, a 
structural property of third person expressions.
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Why might this be so? The requirement in reporting what someone said indirectly is 
to remain as true as possible to what they said. But in this case, it is not really what is said 
but what is done that needs to be conveyed to ensure a true report. What Max is planning in
(26), what is being reported in (27), are speech acts, which according to convention as 
discussed above, contain oriented dependencies. To be accurate in reporting what Max said 
to Sally, even indirectly, an orientation dependency must be present, otherwise the speaker is 
not giving a true report of what happened between Max and Sally. So although in the indirect 
case, the indexicals of (28) have spun to non-indexicals, it appears that the arrows have 
remained. Thus the context is a hybrid, altered in such a way that Max is speaking to Sally, 
but not shifted to the extent that Max is /  and Sally is you.
Note that neither o f the sentences in (29) has a switch interpretation comparable to 
(27b). This is because in neither of these cases are the embedded sentences speech acts, but 
rather reports, which are contained in the larger report.
(29) a. Max thinks he loves her, and she thinks she does, too
b. Max told me that he loved her, then she told me she did too
I would warn the reader here that judgments in these cases may waver: if one reads (26) and
(27) too many times before eliciting judgments for (29a-b), the switch may seem to be 
available in them. But if one approaches (29) cold, the lack of switch is glaring. The reason 
for this wavering, I believe, is that (26) and (27) somehow leaves the reader in the shifted 
Max-speaking-to-Sally-context, which incorrectly remains in evaluating (29).
Consideration of the quotation cases leads to the conclusion that contrary to initial 
observations, there are context shifting circumstances in which third person expressions can 
be structurally oriented, though we have only seen this grammatical option occurring in the 
case o f indirect quotation. Are there other examples of third person orientation? One other
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possible circumstance in which it apparently can occur is in special situations of context 
bifurcation, to which I now turn. Before discussing the third person cases, however, let’s 
first discuss more common indexical bifurcations in order to appreciate why such contexts are 
natural places to look for evidence of switch with the third person.
Recall that an entailment of the syntax o f oriented dependencies is an "exclusivity" 
guarantee that I argued above is conventionally exploited for pragmatic purposes. Because of 
this exclusivity, the formal context against which oriented sentences are evaluated can be a 
meager structure, required to contain sequence positions for no one beyond the conversational 
participants. There is no need for a sequence position for Jack (or anyone else) in order to 
evaluate the oriented sentence, because the structural conditions licensing an oriented 
dependency entail that Jack (or any other referential noun phrase) will not be in the sentence. 
For economy reasons, it seems reasonable to assume that in natural language, the formal 
contexts will be partial structures that are no larger than is necessary. The minimum partial 
context for an oriented sentence is one in which the binary syntactic orientations account for 
everyone under one orientation or the other—and will thus be a bifurcated structure in which 
every sequence position is oriented one way or the other. The most reduced partial context 
possible is one that includes a single speaker and a single hearer; this limiting case—which I 
call the I/thou bifurcation—is the one for which the majority of the examples of switch have 
been observed.
We have seen an example of a binary distinction that includes more than the speaker 
and hearer: the Holiday example, repeated below as (30).
(30) a. Laura: Oh Susan and Nick, r f Q love you^ 0 3 j3
b. Susan: Darling, we do, too =  ...w e 2 @3Q, [love youj^J, too
(30a) is an example of an I/you all context bifurcation, which reverses in (30b) to we/thou.
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In the reduced partial context for (30), there are three participants—Laura, Susan and Nick. 
These three individuals, however, comprise two groups that can be accounted for under a 
binary distinction: {Laura} on the one hand and {Susan, Nick} on the other. In (30a), the 
"inward" orientation accounts for {Laura} and the "outward" orientation {Susan, Nick}, while 
in the (30b) reply, these groups reverse.
Evaluating slighdy differently from the Holiday example is (31) on the I/you all 
bifurcation. The imagined circumstance is a substance abuse group meeting such as 
Alcoholics Anonymous, in which one participant at a time has the floor.
(31) a. Member I:  Last night I dreamt you (all) were completely recovered
b. Member 2: I did, too = I [dreamt you (all) were
completely recovered], too
The name "switch" is a misnomer in (31), because unlike in the Holiday case, the groups 
indicated do not reverse in the interpretation o f  member 2’s reply to we/thou as in the Holiday 
case, but rather reform under a different I/you all bifurcation. If, for example, there are five 
members in the group, the context bifurcation is {member 1} versus {members 2, 3, 4 and 5} 
in (31a) and {member 2} versus {members 1, 3, 4 and 5} in the reply. That this 
interpretation is good leads to a technical challenge for the dependency analysis developed in 
the previous chapter, because as there is not actually a "switch," the formal description of the 
dependencies realized in (31) are not identical, as shown in (32).
(32) a. < ( [Np I]a , [NP you ] 0  ), ( i,2 © 3 © 4 ® 5 ), < * - , - > ,  <N P, V, N P>  >
b. < ( [NP I]a , [NP you]g ), (2 ,1© 3® 4® 5), <«-,-*>, < NP, V, N P>  >
Although they are differently fused, however, the numeric values in both (32a) and (32b) do
exhaust the partial context that needs to be assumed for evaluation o f (31)—an observation
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that could well lead to a solution, although in the absence o f other cases I will leave it here in 
the form of a suggestion. Note that it needs to be assumed here, as with the Holiday 
example, that orientation is a property o f the plural noun phrase, and thus in the formal 
context structure for (31a), it must be that oj(-») =  2© 3© 4© 5. (The ramifications of 
oriented plurals to the model of formal context will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5 .)
It might be expected that switch should be able to occur in any circumstance under 
which orientation might exhaust a partial formal context. Possible bifurcations might be 
expected among groups—a we/you all bifurcation. The switch interpretation is indeed found 
in such cases, for example in the exchange of threats between military leaders in (33). The 
oriented dependencies realized in (33a) and (33b) are identical.
(33) a. Serb general to Croat general: We will burn your cities!
b. Croat general to Serb general: We will, too! =  We will [bum your
cities], too
So far the bifurcations have stayed among the grammatical first and second person. 
There is a certain sense to this: if the partial context must be exhausted, both speaker and 
hearer must be accounted for. However, circumstances are imaginable in which there are two 
clear groups, one of which includes both the speaker and hearer (inclusive we) versus 
everyone else, a bifurcation of the context that would be grammatically expressed by first 
person versus third person. I call this the us/them bifurcation. And interestingly, if the 
situation has been set up such that the speaker and the hearer are on the same side, such as 
with well-defined teams in the codified structure of a game situation, switch does occur with 
us/them, a third person form. To illustrate, imagine a bridge game, in which the partners 
East and West are playing against the partners North and South, and suppose each side 
suspects the other of cheating. If East, during the game, says (34a) to her partner, the switch
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interpretation of North’s subsequent utterance (34b) to her partner is perfect. (The subscripts 
E, W, N and S are used here instead of numerical indices to indicate the intended readings.)
(34) a. East to West: Should weESW report themN0s?
b. North to South: Should weN 0s? =  Should weN0s [report
themE0w ]?
Like in the indirect quotation case, the switch reading in (34b) suggests that orientation can in 
certain circumstances be structurally encoded on third person forms. Although the surface 
form is the third person plural pronoun them, I would suggest that this is actually a hybrid 
context structure, similar to the Max-speaking-to-Sally context, in which orientation can 
structurally be encoded on a third person expression. In this case, the context hybrid is 
possible because of the highly codified nature of the game situation. The oriented 
dependencies encoded in (34a) and (34b) would be as shown in (35a) and (35b), respectively; 
as they are identical, the i-copy condition holds.
(35) a. <  ( [NP we)a , [NP them ^ ), (E©W , N©S), < « - , - > ,  <N P, V, N P> >
b- <  ( [NP we]a , [NP them]^ ), (E© W , N©S), < « - , - > ,  <N P, V, N P> >
Note that if instead of addressing her own partner, North’s response were to address one of
her opponents with the same utterance, as in (36), the same switch interpretation occurs, but 
the person feature of the elided pronoun changes from third to second. Due to the fact that in 
the reply, speaker and hearer are on opposite sides of the bifurcation, an us/them bifurcation 
has, in the reconstruction, become a we/you all bifurcation, the indexical expressions o f which 
it is not surprising to find syntactic orientation.
(36) a. East to West: Should weE 0w  report themN0s?
b. North to East: Should weN 0s? =  Should weN0s [report youE0w ]?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
171
The oriented dependencies realized in (36a) and (36b) are formally shown in (37).
(37) a. <  ( [NP we]a  , [NP them] 0  ), (E 0 W , N 0 S ), <N P, V, N P> >
b. <  ( [NP we]a  , [NP youl0  ), (E 0 W . N 0 S ), <N P, V, N P> >
Recall that under the orientation analysis, dependencies remain defined as part of 
syntactic structure; they occur among noun phrases, not among the lexical items contained in 
noun phrases. The only difference between (37a) and (37b) is lexical; this is not relevant to 
syntactic identity. It doesn’t matter whom North is addressing, (37a) and (37b) are i-copies 
just as (35a) and (35b) are, and the switch interpretation is correctly predicted to occur in 
both cases.
In sum, the quotation cases and the bifurcation cases show that there are special 
circumstances under which the formal context structure may be altered, such that orientation 
may structurally be encoded on third person expressions. This appears, however, to be a 
grammatical option that occurs only in such highly marked circumstances.
4.13 Different switch grammars
The analysis of switch that I have offered has hypothesized an additional syntactic 
property not previously known, as well as an extension of the licensing of dependencies 
among numerically contra-valued indexical expressions. I have also sketched in some detail 
the pragmatic conventions regarding the use of sentences containing this structural option. At 
this juncture, however, I would like to consider the variability in switch interpretations across 
speakers. In exploring switch, I have encountered many native English-speaking individuals 
who do not judge there to be switch interpretations as robustly as has been described in this 
analysis. Although the differences are at the level of idiolect, it seems that generally, 
speakers fall into one of four categories, as illustrated below.
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(38)
The "grammar" that has been described in this analysis is III, in which switch interpretations 
are available across the widest variety of circumstances for tasks which I have described as 
"expressive" uses. For some informants, however, switch readings of any kind are simply 
impossible ("grammar 0 ”), no matter what pragmatic circumstances are contrived. Other 
speakers find switch readings for some expression types, but not others. Explicit 
performatives seem to be easiest, followed by accusations; the most difficult are declarations. 
The patterns of judgments seem to fall into a hierarchy, as shown in figure 1: although the 
sample of informants is not large enough to make statistically significant conclusions, it seems 
on a qualitative basis that speakers who get switch readings in declarations always get them in 
performatives and accusations as well; those who get switch readings in accusations get them 
in performatives, but not necessarily in declarations.
A complete account o f switch would offer, in the best of all worlds, a systematic 
account of why these different "grammars" coexist within the same language. As a lesser 
goal, the existence of the hierarchy above should be consistent with the analysis o f switch and 
offer lines of further research. The analysis of switch in the previous and this chapter 
achieves this second goal, in that it can provide a coherent description of what may be 
happening across these different "grammars." The true grammatical split occurs between 
"grammar 0" on the one hand and "grammars I, II and III” on the other: dependency among 
syntactic orientations seems to be an available structural option for the latter but not the
Grammar HI:
Switch in explicit 
performatives, 
accusation, & 
declaration
Grammar I:
Switch In explicit 
performatives 
only
Grammar If:
Switch in explicit 
performatives 
& accusation contexts
Grammar 0:
No switch
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former. Ia grammar 0 , dependencies simply cannot be licensed at the level of orientation, 
whereas in all o f grammars I, II, and III, on the other hand, oriented dependencies are 
available. The differences among the second group of "grammars" seems to be a matter of 
pragmatics, perhaps depending on considerations of when an utterance counts as expressive 
versus when it is reportive, or the conventions concerning the appropriate use of oriented 
sentences. These observations are merely suggestive; clearly larger samples of speakers 
would have to be systematically tested to determine the factors at play.
4.2 An alternative semantic analysis
In this section, I examine in some detail an alternative theory of switch developed 
independently by Georges Rebuschi (1994, 1997) using a small class of French data. 4  
Rebuschi—who calls switch "quirky dependence"—analyzes switch not as a special kind of 
dependency, but as a special kind of binding. He hypothesizes that the first and second 
person pronouns act as "counter-anaphors" falling under Principle A, and develops an analysis 
under which a "functional spell-out” of the pronouns prior to LF leads to a non- 
quantificational reciprocity, akin to the reciprocal anaphor each other.
Rebuschrs analysis has some fundamental problems. First, he builds his theory 
around the claim that the distribution of switch parallels the distribution of each other. This 
is doubtful, given the English data as well as some additional French data: as discussed 
earlier, the switch phenomenon is not subject to a c-command requirement and can occur
4  The more detailed, comprehensive development of his theory is contained in the 1994 
manuscript, and this is the version I have relied on most heavily in this section; the 1997 
paper is a summary of the previous analysis, essentially unchanged, that also contains 
commentary on alternate theories. Although a few of Rebuschi’s French examples shown 
below appear in the later paper, since all can be found in the earlier manuscript, I have cited 
Rebuschi’s 1994 example numbers in square brackets in my text, and unless noted, all other 
citations are to 1994. (For additional French examples as well as informant judgments for the 
French data discussed here, special thanks to Sebastien Jeanneret.)
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outside of local syntactic domains. Second, the technical apparatus Rebuschi devises to obtain 
switch interpretations is inadequate to explain even a limited (local, c-commanding) set o f 
data; furthermore, it fails on more complex cases that he does not consider. Finally, because 
Rebuschi assumes a predicate-based semantics, his analysis has the drawbacks endemic to 
such a system in accounting for the interpretation of elided material.
4.21 Rebuschi’s data
Before discussing his actual analysis, let’s review Rebuschi’s data and compare his 
intuitions to those o f an independent French informant, as well as to those for English. 
Rebuschi’s data can be divided into three sets: those that he claims have obligatory strict 
readings, those that have obligatory switch, and those that are ambiguous between strict and 
switch readings. The first set, shown below in (39-42) (=  GR’s [11], [12], [15], [16]) have 
obligatorily strict readings for Rebuschi.
(39) a. Speaker 1 : Je crois que Pierre t ’a vu I think Peter saw you
b. Speaker 2: Moi aussi I do, too
(40) a. Speaker 1: Pierre croit que je  t ’aime Peter thinks I love you
b. Speaker 2: Jacques aussi Jack does, too
(41) a. Speaker I: Tu pretends que Pierre m’a vu! You’re saying that Peter saw me!
b. Speaker 2: Toi aussi You are, too!
(42) a. Speaker 1: Pierre croit que tu m’aimes Peter thinks that you love me
b. Speaker 2: Jacques aussi Jack does, too
For (39-42), my French informant agrees with Rebuschi’s judgments, and the intuitions for
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the English counterparts are in accord with those for the French: no switch interpretation is 
available when neither o f the pronouns is in matrix subject position, or when Jack (or Peter) 
is in the sentence (called the "Jack puzzle" in the previous chapter).
The next set of data have, according to Rebuschi, obligatory switch readings in 
French; these are shown below in (43-50) (=  GR’s [9a-b], [13], fn. 9 [a-b], [20a-c]). For 
Rebuschi, the fact that the switch reading is obligatory in these cases relates to the fact that 
the two pronouns are in co-argument positions.
(43) a. Speaker 1: Je t’ai vu 
b. Speaker 2: Moi aussi
I saw you 
I did, too
(44) a. Speaker 1: Je t’aime 
b. Speaker 2: Moi aussi
I love you 
I do.too
(45) a. Speaker 1: Tu me meprises 
b. Speaker 2: Toi aussi
You despise me 
You do, too
(46) a. Speaker I : Me parler poliment
te generait-il?
b. Speaker 2: Et toi?
Would it bother you to 
talk to me politely?
Would it bother you?
(47) a. Speaker 1: Ca t’ennuiereait de me saluer? Would it annoy you to greet me? 
b. Speaker 2: Et toi? Would it annoy you?
(48) a. Speaker 1: Tu me plais 
b. Speaker 2: Toi aussi
You please me 
You do, too
(49) a. Speaker 1: Tu me dois beaucoup d ’argent You owe me a lot o f money 
b. Speaker 2: Toi aussi You do, too
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(50) a. Speaker 1: Je ne te rendrai pas ton livre I won’t return your book to you 
b. Speaker 2: Moi non plus I won’t, either
Here, the intuitions of the independent French informant differ from Rebuschi in terms of the 
obligatory nature of the switch reading . 5  For my informant, while the switch interpretation 
was the "normal" meaning for all of (43-50), many had strict interpretations as well. The 
examples in which he found the strict meaning unavailable—(46), (47), (49), and (50)—are 
those sentences where it is a pragmatically very odd response: would it bother you to talk to 
yourself politely? would it annoy you to greet yourself? you owe yourself a lot o f  money, too 
and I  won’t return my book to myself either. In the English counterparts to these, the strict 
interpretation is also difficult—complicated circumstances must be contrived such that they 
make sense.
In the other cases that are not as pragmatically odd, strict readings were available for 
the French informant in addition to the switch. As in English, he said that the strict 
interpretation of moi, aussi in (44) is commonly used as a "funny" response; and that both 
(45) and (48) have strict interpretations, although they were less "normal" to him than the 
switch. In an example where neither meaning is pragmatically less likely than the other, such 
as in (51), the informant judged both switch and strict equally "normal."
(51) a. Speaker 1 : J ’aime ton corps I love your body
b. Speaker 2: Moi aussi I do, too
While the strict reading for (43)—/  saw myself, roo—seemed strange to my informant, he
5  Rebuschi himself suspects his "obligatory" claim; in a footnote, he reports that "some 
native speakers of French actually say they accept both [switch and strict] readings" for (43) 
and (44) and also adds that "Finnish...so I am told, consistendy allows both readings."
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offered (52) as a similar example that has both switch and strict interpretations, but in this 
case, the strict is more "normal."
(52) a. Speaker 1: Je t’ai vu & la television I saw you on television
b. Speaker 2: Moi aussi I did, too
Furthermore, these judgments pattern alike whether the pronouns are weak or strong. Even 
though the informant found the strong pronoun to be odd in these sentences, the presence of 
toi had no effect with regard to switch: for je  t ’ai vu toi, switch is the "normal" 
interpretation, and je  t ’ai vu toi a la telnnevision has both interpretations. The judgments of 
the French informant here are in line with the discussion of the English data in chapter 3.
Note that the "obligatory" cases seem to be more likely to be used expressively rather than 
reportively, and in line with the discussion earlier in this chapter, it would be expected that 
the switch reading would be dominant. The relative saliency of one reading or the other 
when /  and you (or je  and tu) are in co-argument positions, whether in French or in English, 
correlates not with their syntax, but rather with the pragmatic circumstances and relationship 
between the speakers that is imagined by the informant. A comparison o f  the minimally 
different (43) and (52)—where switch and strict are respectively the "normal" reading—shows 
that it is not grammatical obligation but rather pragmatic likelihood that is determining the 
reading, since the syntactic relationship between the pronouns, as well as the main verb in the 
sentence, are identical.
Recall that in English, switch readings often become available if the contrived 
situation is "intimate,” which in many cases brought out an expressive use. It might be 
thought that the high saliency of the switch reading for the French examples in (43-50) 
correlates with the fact that they contain the "familiar" singular tu/te/toi, which is used only 
with intimate acquaintances, and not the "polite" singular vous. Unlike in English, perhaps
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there is no background story needed beyond the use of the "familiar" second person to 
indicate that the situation is indeed intimate. On this reasoning, it might be expected that 
sv/itch readings would be more likely in tu/te/toi sentences, and that strict readings would be 
more likely—if not the only possible reading—in vous sentences. For my informant, 
however, the "polite" equivalents of (43) and (44), for example, shown below, have the same 
status as their "familiar" counterparts.
(53) a. Speaker 1: Je vous ai vu I saw you
b. Speaker 2: Moi aussi I did, too
(54) a. Speaker 1: Je vous aime I love you
b. Speaker 2: Moi aussi I do, too
For both (53) and (54), switch is the "normal” reading, and the status of the strict does not 
improve with the use o f the non-intimate, "polite" vous. In fact, where the strict reading of
(44b) is an available, "funny" response, my informant finds it impossible in (54b), saying that
someone would never make this joke with someone he didn’t know well enough to call tu.
Rebuschi does not discuss any sentences containing the "polite" singular vous, but he 
does give one example using the plural vous, finding obligatory switch here as well. To my 
informant, (55) (=  GR’s [17]) is ambiguous between switch and strict. (Beyond providing 
this one example, Rebuschi does not discuss the plural switch case—the analysis is solely 
concerned with je  and tu.)
(55) a. Speaker 1: Nous vous avons We have always
toujours respectes respected you
b. Speaker 2: Nous aussi We have, too
The obligatory nature that Rebuschi observes in French of the strict reading in (39-42) and the
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switch in (43-50) and (55) leads him to the hypothesis that the syntactic configuration between 
the first and second person pronouns that must hold for switch to occur is akin to the 
configuration between each other and its antecedent. He reasons that parallel to (39), where 
switch is impossible, is the structurally similar (56a), which is ungrammatical; and parallel to
(45), where switch is obligatory, is the structurally similar (56b), which is grammatical.
(56) a. * They think Peter saw each other 
b. They saw each other
Rebuschi furthers the each other analogy with (57) and (58) (=  GR’s [29a-b]), in 
which, he claims, only the strict interpretation is available in French, suggesting that c- 
command is required for switch to occur. Recall that this is contrary to what is found in 
English—in chapter 3, many examples were given of English switch examples in non-c- 
commanding relationships. (It is, of course, impossible to bind each other from a non­
e-commanding position within the subject—compare: * their fathers hate each other.)
(57) a. Speaker 1: Mon p&re te deteste My father hates you
b. Speaker 2: Le mien aussi Mine does, too
(58) a. Speaker 1 : Ta sceur m’a frapp6  Your sister hit me
b. Speaker 2: La tienne aussi Yours did, too
Rebuschi is slightly less sure of his judgments for (57) and (58), however, than he is for the 
earlier cases. My informant found both (57) and (58) confusing, saying that perhaps they 
could be either strict or switch, but more likely meant neither— if someone responded Le mien 
aussi or La tienne aussi in these conversations, he said he would ask "What do you mean?"
In the English counterparts to (57) and (58), the switch is available, though perhaps not as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
180
saliently as it is in the counterpart to (59), in which the pronouns are in the same non-c- 
commanding relationship. In contrast to (57) and (58), my French informant found the switch 
perfect in (59).
(59) a. Speaker 1: Ton corps me plais Your body pleases me
b. Speaker 2: Le tien aussi Yours does, too
The switch interpretation is the "normal" one for (59b), suggesting that contra Rebuschi, 
c-command is not required for switch to occur in French. That the switch is not available for
(57) and (58)—that they are "confusing”—must be due to some other, non-syntactic reason, 
such as the fact that (57) and (58) seem more likely to be used reportively, while (59) is more 
likely to be used expressively.
The final set of Rebuschi’s data are ambiguous, having both strict and switch 
interpretations in French. These are given in (60-63) (=  GR’s [10], [14], [18], [19]). The 
English counterparts are also ambiguous. (Rebuschi reports only the "across-the-board" 
readings for (60) and (61) and does not consider whether there is also a "mixed" strict/switch 
reading. My informant was not able to give reliable judgments on possible "mixed" readings, 
but agreed that both ATB strict and ATB switch are available.)
(60) a. Speaker I: Je crois que je t’ai vu I think I saw you
b. Speaker 2: Moi aussi I do, too
(61) a. Speaker 1: Tu crois que je te defendrai? Do you think I’ll defend you?
b. Speaker 2: Et toi? Do you?
(62) a. Speaker 1: Je crois que tu es malade I think you’re sick
b. Speaker 2: Moi aussi I do, too
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(63) a. Speaker I: Je d&este ta patronne I hate your boss
b. Speaker 2: Moi aussi [ do, too
The ambiguity here, Rebuschi contends, is parallel to the scopal ambiguity of each other in 
similar structural positions. In an earlier version of his paper, Rebuschi admits that the 
analogy to each other breaks down in two of these examples, as shown in the each other 
counterparts of (60-63) below. While (64) and (67) are fine, (65) and (6 6 ) are 
ungrammatical.
(64) They think they saw each other
(65) * Do they think that each other will defend them?
(6 6 ) * They think each other is sick
(67) They hate each other’s bosses
My informant provided yet another example that indicates that the analogy to each
other is flawed—for example, in (6 8 ), the first and second person pronouns not in the same
local syntactic domain, and yet the switch reading is quite good (strict is also available).
(6 8 ) a. Speaker I: Je crois que le monde I think the world would be
In sum, the French data, as presented by Rebuschi, is similar in many respects to the 
English observations of switch presented earlier. As in English, switch occurs between first 
and second person pronouns. As in English, switch occurs only when one of the pronouns is 
overt in the elliptical reply. As in English, switch is not possible when a non-first or second 
person noun phrase such as Jack is present. However, the informant did not agree that 
Rebuschi’s "obligatory" switch cases were obligatory. Furthermore, the informant found
serait horrible sans toi horrible without you
b. Speaker 2: Moi aussi I do, too
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switch readings available when the pronouns were in a non-c-commanding relationship, as 
well as in non-local domains.
Anyone dealing with the switch data faces the same problem: as discussed for 
English in the previous section, there is a wide variability across informants in judging the 
saliency o f switch readings. Rebuschi’s English informant clearly had "grammar 0" 
illustrated in (38) and thus did not serve him well: in his classification of the languages that 
have switch versus the languages that do not, English is in the latter group. Apparently 
informant variability is not limited to English, for the points on which Rebuschi’s 
observations in French differ from my own for English are in fact not supported by an 
independent French informant.
4.22 Rebuschi’s analysis
To derive switch, Rebuschi hypothesizes a post-SS, pre-LF "rewriting" of a first or 
second person pronoun when it is in the scope of the other. Having concluded that switch is 
reciprocity in a non-quantificational guise, he builds functional definitions for the first and 
second person pronouns that enable him to analyze them in parallel to Heim, Lasnik and 
May’s (1991) "each-movement” analysis o f each other. It’s to be expected that the analysis 
fails in the circumstances where the each other analogy fails—but in fact, it has serious 
problems in accounting for even the limited (local, c-commanding) set of data.
Rebuschi’s technical analysis begins with the observation that whenever they appear, 
first and second person pronouns are semantic variables whose values must be given by the 
situation of utterance. To be interpretable, he reasons, an operator must be prefixed to the 
logical form of sentences containing these pronouns. The default values are defined, 
respectively, as:
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(69) a. ...I...] =» Xego ...ego.;.]
b. ...you...] =» Xm
The value o f the operators Xego and Xtu are provided by the discourse context to be speaker 
and hearer. For example, the derivation of a simple sentence Peter hates me, said by John, 
proceeds as follows:
(70) John to Mary: Peter hates me
line 1: Peter Xx [x hates me]
line 2: Xego Peter Xx [x hates ego]
line 3: John Xego Peter Xx [x hates ego]
(via X conversion) => Peter hates John
In this conversation, if Mary replies Mike does, too, the only possible interpretation of her 
utterance—the strict reading—is explained in the predicate-based analysis as follows: It is not 
possible to predicate o f Mike a X-expression containing the free (and thus not interpretable) 
variable ego, so first X-conversion of ego from line 3 must occur to derive (71).
(71) line 4: Peter Xx [x hates John]
This logical form now contains an appropriate X-expression to predicate of Mike, and the 
strict interpretation of Mary’s reply is captured.
How, then, is switch derived? Following the idea that for switch to occur, the first 
and second person pronouns have to be interdefined, Rebuschi first defines an additional 
variable nos to have as its range of values ordered pairs of the form < speaker, hearer > that 
will be provided by the discourse context. This allows him to build "lexical equivalences" of 
each pronoun as the "other" individual in the pair selected by nos using a two-argument
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function alter, for example, you will be functionally equivalent to < alter (ego. nos)> , which 
reads something like: the individual other than me in the pair consisting of me and you. He 
stipulates that this "functional spell-out" o f one o f the pronouns can occur only when in the 
scope of the other, otherwise, the default values in (69) apply. Rebuschi hypothesizes that 
these "spell-outs" are syntactically available post-SS, pre-LF, and will be of the form given in 
(72) (=  GR’s [50]).
(72) a. tu <=» [NP [N. alter] ego nos] when in the scope of ego 
b. ego <=> [NP [N- alter] tu /zos] when in the scope of tu
It is not entirely clear in (72) how Rebuschi intends the three elements alter, ego, and 
nos to make up the internal structure of the "re-written" noun phrase; whatever the 
particulars, he assumes that it is possible to move nos from its position without violating 
syntactic movement constraints. On Rebuschi’s reasoning, there is now a constituent alter 
equivalent to other, and a constituent nos equivalent to each, such that "/tos-movement” 
parallel to "eac/z-movement” can proceed at LF. In the derivation o f (73a), for example, 
shown in (74), nos first raises from within the object and adjoins to it (line 1), and then raises 
again (line 2) and adjoins to the subject (designated "informally” by #)- Rebuschi is clearly 
assuming that movement of the nos variable proceeds in the manner of A-bar syntactic 
movement operations, and that it is subject to the same constraints. (The movement occurs 
prior to cashing in the variables, which will occur in interpretation through X-abstraction.)
(73) a. John to Mary: Ij love youm
b. Mary to John: Im do, too =  Im love youj
(74) line 1: [ego loves [nos [alter ego rnoJ]]
line 2 : [[egottnos] loves [rnos [alter ego rn0I]]]
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The derived form in line 2 can be read as something like: I in the pair me and you, love the 
person other than me in that pair. Interpretation can now proceed: as shown in (75), through 
\-abstraction. the pair <John. Mary>  is selected by the variable nos, and John is selected by 
the variable ego—these values are provided, Rebuschi says, by the discourse context. 
Conversion of variables will result in something like: John in the pair made up of John and 
Mary, loves the individual other than John in the pair John and Mary, simplifying to: John 
loves Mary.
(75) <John, M ary> Xnos < Jo h n >  Xego [[egotfnos] loves [tnos [alter ego
Now, to derive Mary’s (switch) response in (73b), Rebuschi copies the predicate from the 
logical form in line 2 o f (74). The working out of this derivation contains many difficulties; 
only the more serious problems will be addressed here . 6
The first problem is, if nos is non-quantificational, why does it undergo A-bar 
movement? There is no answer to this. One way to force nay-movement is Rebuschi’s idea 
that interpretation of the u/rer-expression will fail unless /zos-adjunction to the subject takes 
place. If "the subject...cannot be interpreted as function of nos," Rebuschi states, "the object 
cannot be interpreted as a function o f ego and nos... either.” (p. 15) This claim seems 
contrary to fact: as defined, the object expression containing either function alter (x,
< nos> )  evaluates to the member "other" than x in the pair nos, and since the discourse 
context provides the values of x as well as nos, there does not seem to be anything blocking 
interpretation of the object independently of the subject. Indeed, the interpretation of the
6  Rebuschi does not specify line-by-line detail for his derivations, making a step-by-step 
evaluation difficult, but several small difficulties are obvious. Mixing notations is one of 
these: for example, to solve a particular problem, he introduces the syntactic indexical types 
a  and 0 from Fiengo & May’s dependency theory within semantic X-expressions. It is not 
only unclear that the problem is solved, it is impossible to imagine how abstract predicates 
containing functional operators, indices and dependencies all together can be interpreted.
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object expression seems quite dear without /zoi'-movement—far more problematic, it seems to 
me, is the interpretation of the adjoined subject expression post /zoi’-movement that Rebuschi 
indicates by egottnos in the derivation above, and glosses as "ego IN nos": John in the pair 
John and Mary. It is not clear how the adjunction would lead to the interpretation of the head 
element "in the pair" o f the adjoined element. Unlike eacA-movement, which creates a 
complex expression [each [NP]] whose semantic interpretation makes intuitive sense (each 
quantifying over the set of individuals designated by [NP]), Rebuschi’s /zos-movement creates 
a complex expression [nos [ego]] that makes no intuitive sense: nos is a variable that 
evaluates to the pair <  speaker,hearer > ,  and ego is a variable that selects the speaker: ego 
in isolation evaluates to the speaker; why should a complex of the < speaker, hearer> pair 
adjoined to ego evaluate to the speaker as well?
The suggestion Rebuschi offers to force nos-movement at LF as in (74) is that, 
without it, nos will be a free variable, and thus illegitimate. But in the original sentence in 
which /zoi’-movement supposedly occurs and must be motivated, the variable nos is bound by 
the pair defined as < speaker, hearer> whether it moves or stays in place. His suggestion, 
then, actually is that /zos-movement must occur in order for it to be a predicate, and thus 
copyable. But curiously, the predicate post /zar-movement that Rebuschi copies to derive the 
switch in (73b) contains another kind of free variable—the trace of nos. Although Rebuschi 
does not recognize it as such and therefore a problem, clearly this is a variable trace, which 
(like the moved variable nos) selects a pair of individuals such that the alter function is 
interpretable. Rebuschi in fact binds this trace with an "implicit" nos pair that he finds "in 
Mary’s reply.” But if a nos pair is implicitly available in Mary’s reply, why could it not 
bind the nos variable itself?
In the usual way of dealing with a free variable, of course, nos would be X-converted 
prior to copying. Rebuschi claims that if nos were X-converted, the result would be the strict
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reading, but does not show the derivation. In fact, this is not the result: he assumes that the 
strict reading will ensue because he incorrectly assumes that the function alter <ego, nos>  
will always pick out the second member of the pair nos. If the variable nos were some kind 
of abbreviation for the ordered pair of variables <  ego, tu > , this would be the case, but as 
defined, nos is a variable that selects a pair of individuals directly. As the function is 
defined, alter <ego, nos>  will pick out the individual other than ego in the pair nos: the 
individual the function chooses will only be the second member of the selected pair when the 
first member of the pair is the same individual that is picked out by ego. This is the case in 
the derivation o f (73a), but it is not the case for (73b), as Rebuschi would have realized had 
he gone through the derivation after conversion o f nos. X converting nos instead of moving it 
as in the logical form shown in (74) would lead to (76).
(76) ego loves [alter ego <John, Mary>]
There is now no free variable, and if the predicate from (76) is used to derive Mary’s reply in 
(73b), the result is as shown in (77). After \-conversion of ego takes place to derive line 2, 
the alter function will pick out the individual other than Mary in the pair <John, Mary > ,  to 
derive in line 3 the switch—not the strict—reading.
(77) line 1: Mary Xego [ego loves [alter ego <John, M ary>l]
line 2: Mary loves [alter Mary <John, M ary> ]
line 3: Mary loves John
In (77), using Rebuschi’s own definitions, I have derived the switch reading for (73b) through 
noi'-conversion unproblematically. Afoy-movement did not have to occur for the switch 
derivation shown in (77), as /zos-conversion could occur with or without it. As discussed 
above, post nor-movement, Rebuschi’s derivation o f the switch reply is problematic, because
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of the free trace variable that must be "implicitly" bound. The switch reply is, however, 
derivable independent of /zoy-movement, and this derivation has the additional advantages of 
not involving the interpretation o f a complex, adjoined subject, and not requiring "implicit" 
binding.
Another reason Rebuschi wants to force /zoy-movement in the co-argument case is to 
prevent the strict reading in what are, for him, "obligatory" cases of switch. But in fact, the 
strict reading is derivable whether nos moves or not, through X-conversion o f  both nos and 
ego prior to copying. Regardless o f  movement, conversion of all the variables must be able 
to occur, as it must be possible to derive the strict reading when Mary's response is not first 
person (e.g., Sam does, too)—a case that Rebuschi did not consider. So in fact, forcing 
movement does not result in obligatory anything. This result may actually be a welcome one 
for Rebuschi’s analysis of the co-argument case, for as discussed above, the "obligatory" 
cases of switch that Rebuschi identifies in French do not in fact appear to be grammatically 
obligatory but rather seem to depend on pragmatic factors, as do the English cases.
To summarize the observations so far, zzoy-movement is not motivated, nor is it 
necessary' for zzoy-movement to occur to derive the simple switch derivation. M?y-movement 
does not derive the "obligatory" switch in the co-argument case, as Rebuschi claims: even if 
/zoy-movement is forced, both strict and switch readings are derivable, assuming that the 
complex adjoined subject is interpretable. With or without the movement, X-conversion of 
nos will lead to the switch reading in the co-argument case, as shown above, and with or 
without movement, nothing prevents X-conversion o f  all the variables—ego, nos, and/or the 
trace of nos—to derive the strict reading. Furthermore, while a /zoy-movement analysis 
prevents the switch reading in non-c-commanding cases, as Rebuschi intended, since there are 
non-c-commanding cases that in fact do switch, the movement account has no justification 
from these. There is actually a problem of accounting for the non-c-commanding cases under
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Rebuschi’s analysis no matter what the status of the movement of nos—to account for these in 
an interpretive account of ellipsis, he would have to adopt theoretical assumptions along the 
lines of Dalrymple et al. (1991), for example, in whose "unification" theory abstract relations 
over embedded positions can be formed using "second order matching." However, in 
Rebuschi 1997, a "unification" account is explicitly rejected: "in such a model, there is no 
room for a functional analysis." (p. 183)
Finally, Rebuschi believes a movement analysis crucial in preventing the switch 
interpretation in a Jack puzzle example, repeated as (78), when in fact, the switch 
interpretation is derivable. Rebuschi argues that in the logical form for (78a), shown in line 1 
of (79), syntactic movement constraints will prevent nos from raising in from the embedded 
clause over the intervening subject and adjoin to ego. Since /zos-movement is blocked, he 
says, the only possible X-expression to predicate in (78b) will contain a constant (namely, 
speaker 2 ) in the object position, \-converting both the variables ego and nos in line 2 . (SI 
and S2 abbreviate speakers 1 and 2, respectively.) Thus, he says, only the strict reading will 
result.
(78) a. Speaker I: Ij think Jack loves you2
b. Speaker 2: I2  do, too ^  I2  [think Jack loves youj]
(79) line 1: ego thinks Jack loves [alter ego nos]
line 2: < S 1 , S2>  Xnos <S1 > Xego ego thinks Jack loves [alter ego nos]
Indeed, the strict reading results through conversion of both variables, but as with the
derivation of the switch reading for (73), the switch reading is derivable if nos stays in place 
through conversion of nos alone. X-conversion of nos in the line 2 of (79) would result in a 
perfectly legitimate predicate to copy in the derivation of (78b), as shown in (80).
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(80) < S 2 >  Xego ego thinks Jack loves [alter ego < S l ,  S2> J
From (80), conversion derives the switch reading that speaker 2 thinks Jack loves speaker 1, 
which Rebuschi wanted to prevent. Preventing movement does not prevent the switch 
interpretation.
Returning to the analysis without /zos-movement that derived the simple switch in
(73), why is there not a problem in deriving a reading other than the strict interpretation if 
Mary’s response is—say—Sam does, tool For Rebuschi, the predication is only valid when 
an ego already exists in Mary’s response, but this is clearly not the case—after conversion of 
nos, (81) should be legitimate by the very rules of predicate-based semantics.
(81) Sam \ x  [x loves [alter x  <John, M ary>]
Indeed, nothing should prevent the predication in (81) as it is an "alphabetic variant” that 
differs from its antecedent, shown in (76), only in the particular variable included. However, 
in interpretation, Rebuschi’s account is saved: the alter function in (81) will not be evaluable, 
as it will not be able to locate the individual other than Sam in the pair <John, M a ry > .
Thus only the strict reading will be available.
There will be a problem for Rebuschi, however, in the "same-speaker problem," 
discussed in chapter 3. Recall that in a case like (82), the switch does not occur in the second 
clause of the same speaker’s utterance. (Rebuschi did not consider any examples o f  this sort.)
(82) I love you and you do, too ^  I love you and you love me
The analysis that successfully derives switch in (72) will also incorrectly derive the switch in
(82); the relevant logical form is shown in (83). (< J ,M >  stands for the set <John,
Mary > ,  assuming that (82) is said by John to Mary.)
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(83) John \ego  Mary Xtu [ego love [alter ego < J ,M > ]]  and [tu love [alter tu < J ,M > |]
The "copied" predicate in the second clause is an alphabetic variant of the predicate in the 
first clause, and should therefore be legitimate. And in this case, the alter function in the 
second clause will unproblematically evaluate; the entire interpretation will be John loves 
Mary and Mary loves John.
It is clear that the approach taken by Rebuschi has some serious drawbacks for even 
the simple cases, but before making an overall evaluation, let’s examine how he fares with 
more complex cases o f switch. Rebuschi analyzes one "many pronoun" cases like (84), which 
has, in French and in English, both switch and strict interpretations.
(84) a. Speaker 1: I, think I, love yoi^
b. Speaker 2: I2  do, too
As noted in chapter 3, (84b) is in fact three-ways ambiguous: in addition to the ATB strict 
and ATB switch readings, shown in (85a) and (85b), it also has one "mixed" reading (85c) 
that Rebuschi did not consider. The second "mixed" reading (85d) does not occur.
(85) a. =  I2  think you, love meo
b. =  I2  think I2  love you,
c. =  I2  think I2  love mei
d. ^  I2  think you, love you.
On Rebuschi’s approach, the ATB strict interpretation results by a single movement of nos in 
the lower clause, shown in line 2 below, while the ATB switch results from a double 
movement of nos to the matrix clause, as shown in line 3.
(8 6 ) line 1 : ego thinks ego loves [alter ego, nos]
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line 2 : ego thinks egottnos loves [alter ego, tnos]
line 3: egoHnos thinks ego#tnos loves [alter ego, tnos)
This latter double movement is allowed in this case but not in (78), according to Rebuschi, 
because the lower subject is coindexed with the higher subject; on analogy again with each 
other, the ATB strict and ATB switch readings for (84b) have their counterparts in the narrow 
scope and wide scope readings of they think they love each other.
For reasons given above in the two-pronoun cases, however, the movement of nos, 
singly or doubly, does not actually derive the readings Rebuschi desires. In fact, both 
readings can be derived without nos-movement, as there are two possibilities available for 
copying the predicate in line 1 of (8 6 ): X-conversion of nos alone, or X-conversion of both 
nos and ego, shown respectively below.
(87) a. X-convert nos: ego thinks ego loves [alter ego, <  S 1, S2 > ]
b. X-convert nos and ego: SI thinks SI loves S2
As before, the predicate after conversion of nos alone will yield the ATB switch reading for 
(84b), and conversion o f both nos and ego will yield the ATB strict. Can the observed third, 
"mixed" reading be derived? The predicate required to derive the mixed reading would have 
to be of the form shown in (8 8 ).
(8 8 ) Xx [jc thinks x  loves S2]
There are two approaches that would result in (8 8 ). The first involves re-abstraction of the 
logical form in (87b), which would directly lead to (8 8 )—this is how it would be done, for 
example, in the theory developed by Dalrymple et al. (1991). The second would be to 
suggest that the "functional spell-out" o f one pronoun is not required when in the scope of the
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other, as defined by Rebuschi in (72), but is rather optionally available. (This "requirement" 
is in fact expendable as it was only needed as part of the attempt to derive "obligatory" switch 
readings—which, as discussed above, failed for other reasons.) This would yield a possible 
logical form for (84a) with the Rebuschi’s "default” variables from (6 8 ), as shown in line 1 of 
(89). Conversion of tu—which would have to take place, as it is a free variable—would yield 
line 2 , which is an alphabetic variant of (8 8 ).
(89) line 1: Xego Xtu [ego thinks ego loves tu\
line 2: Xego [ego thinks ego loves S2]
Whichever approach is taken, the observed "mixed” reading can be thus derived.
Interestingly, the "mixed" reading that is not observed for (84b) is not derivable, as this 
would only be possible through conversion of ego but not tu. This would leave tu as a. free 
variable, and the unobserved reading would thus not be derivable. The welcome result is that 
the three readings available for (84b)—and only those three—are explained under a "functional 
spell-out" analysis, assuming no nar-movement.
With the three pronouns in different order, however, as in (90), the result is not as 
welcome. As discussed in chapter 3, (90b) has only ATB strict and ATB switch readings; no 
"mixed” readings are observed.
(90) a. Speaker 1: l t think you2  love met
b. Speaker 2: I2  do, too
"Functional spell-out” will result in a logical form for (90a) as shown in line 1 below. As 
before, conversion of nos only prior to copying will result in the ATB strict interpretation for 
(90b), while conversion of both nos and ego will result in the ATB switch.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
194
(91) line 1 : ego thinks [alter ego, nos] loves ego
line 2: X-convert nos: ego thinks [alter ego, <  S 1, S2 >  ] loves ego
line 3: X-convert nos and ego: SI thinks S2 loves SI
The problem is that the same kind of additional predicate yielding the observed "mixed" 
interpretation in (84b) will also yield the non-observed "mixed" reading for (90b) I think I 
love me.
(92) Xego [ego thinks s2 loves ego]
Deriving too many readings in "many-pronoun" sentences is in fact a common problem for 
predication-based theories of ellipsis, as noted in Fiengo and May 1994 (see chapter 4).
How does a "functional spell-out" analysis handle extended discourse cases, as 
discussed in chapter 3? Rebuschi did not consider any examples of this sort in his analysis. 
Recall the facts of the cases shown in (93-94): where the (b) sentences have the switch 
interpretation. (93c) has an apparent strict reading with respect to (93b), but (94c) does not.
The (93c) reading was analyzed as the "Dahl strict" under the oriented dependency analysis.
(93) a. Speaker 1: I love you
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I love you, too
c. Speaker 1: You do? =  You do love me?
(94) a. Speaker 1: I love you
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I love you, too
c. Speaker I: Sam does, too Sam loves me, too
"Functional spell-out" would unproblematically derive the (93c) reading—again, assuming no 
nos-movement. Since the switch occurs in the (b) response, nos must be converted in the
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logical forms for (93a) and (93b), shown respectively below.
(95) a. S 1 Xego, ego loves [alter ego < S 1, S2>  ] => SI loves S2
b. S2 Xego, ego loves [alter ego < S 1 , S 2 > ] => S2 loves SI
To derive (93c), ego must be converted from (95b) in order to not be a free variable in the 
next predication, yielding the logical form in (96). This correctly yields the strict 
interpretation of (93c) relative to (93b).
(96) S2 Xtu, tu loves SI =* S2 loves S 1
But conversion o f ego could also take place in (94), and the same process would incorrectly 
derive the unobserved reading for (94c):
(97) Sam Ax, x  loves [SI] =» Sam loves SI
There seems to be no way, on an approach such as Rebuschi’s, to block the strict reading in
(94c) while deriving it in (93b).
To summarize this evaluation of Rebuschi’s technical analysis, it is clear first of all 
that the hypothesis that movement of some element is involved in deriving switch 
interpretations is untenable. The initial movement hypothesis was based in Rebuschi’s 
intuition that the switch cases paralleled the distribution of each other, which is not the case.
No reasonable answer is given to the fundamental question of why syntactic movement of a 
non-quantificational element can (or should) occur. Furthermore, movement causes technical 
problems in the analysis, including the question of the interpretation of the complex, adjoined 
subject, as well as the problem of free variables. The movement analysis does not achieve the 
separation of "obligatory" cases o f switch from "optional" ones, as Rebuschi desired, nor 
does it prevent switch derivations in places where it never occurs, such as the Jack sentences.
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If the movement hypothesis is eliminated from the analysis, as seems warranted, what 
remains is the "functional spell-out” post SS, pre-LF of one o f the pronouns in the scope of 
the other. As discussed earlier, the spell-out need not be required, but could be provided as a 
grammatical option, and achieve the same results. I have shown that switch readings, as well 
as strict readings, are indeed derivable using "functional spell-outs” pre-LF, assuming no nos- 
movement. Unfortunately, switch readings as well as strict readings are derivable on this 
approach in any sentence containing both pronouns, where one o f them is the subject. No 
explanation is available for the lack of a switch reading in sentences containing another 
referential noun phrase such as Jack. Neither is there an explanation for the lack of a switch 
reading in the "same-speaker problem." Furthermore, switch readings are not derivable at all 
in cases where the initial pronoun is within the subject, under Rebuschi’s assumptions 
concerning abstraction. While the approach derives three—and only three—readings in three 
noun phrase cases, which is correct for examples where the first two noun phrases are 
numerically covalued, it is incorrect for examples where the first two noun phrases are not. 
Finally, "functional spell-out” fails to separate cases where the Dahl-strict occurs from cases 
where it does not.
4.23 Can a "functional spell-out" account be saved?
What would be needed in addition to "functional spell-outs" to make a working 
analysis of switch, and how would such a theory compare to the orientation-dependency 
analysis developed in the previous chapter? I will attempt to lay out the basic positions.
In a working theory, "functional spell-outs" would be taking the place of orientation, 
but without the advantage of dependency theory. In such an account, it would have to be 
stipulated that a "spell-out” of one pronoun can only occur if preceded by the alternate 
pronoun. No comparable stipulation is needed on an orientation analysis, as this follows from
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dependency theory: a noun phrase cannot be "dependent" unless an "independent" noun 
phrase is available. Assuming a predicate-based semantics, the "functional spell-out" account 
cannot prevent the legitimate alphabetic variant from incorrectly deriving the switch in the 
"same-speaker problem," which is fairly easily solved as not being an i-copy in the 
dependency account. Furthermore, in a "functional spell-out” analysis, it seems impossible to 
account for the "Dahl" strict readings without being highly stipulative, which comes for free 
assuming dependency theory.
Some of the problems that the "functional spell-out" theory has could be avoided if 
certain assumptions of Rebuschi’s predicate-based semantics were abandoned. To derive 
cases of switch in which the first pronoun is within the subject, for example, something along 
the lines of "unification" theory o f Dalrymple et al. (1991) would have to be assumed, in 
which abstract relations over embedded positions can be formed. The explanation of switch 
in these cases is unproblematic in the orientation analysis, as dependency is a linear notion.
As Rebuschi himself suggests in his rejection of the approach, however, adopting 
"unification" assumptions to account for switch would have to involve major adjustments not 
only in "unification" theory itself but also in how interpretations are derived in Rebuschi’s 
theory—in particular, how the variables ego, tu, and nos would have to be interpreted, among 
other issues.
Necessary in any theory is an account of why switch occurs sentence-wide or not at 
all. In the oriented dependency analysis, this was argued to follow from licensing conditions 
at one level or another in logical form. The "functional spell-out” theory cannot account for 
this phenomenon without additional baggage. In addition, any analysis of switch must be 
consistent with the fact that the availability of switch varies at the level of idiolect of speakers 
within the same language, and in the best of all worlds a theory o f switch should account for 
this variation. The extent to which switch varies across language should also be accounted for
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in a general theory of switch—although data for this enterprise might be hard to gather.
Finally, any theory requires an account of the pragmatic conditions concerning the varying 
availability o f switch in similar or identical syntactic configurations.
On my view, the "functional spell-out” approach does not have much theoretical 
appeal. A functional re-write of certain elements in certain environments has to be motivated, 
since at other times no such re-write will occur. Thus such a theory must posit a theoretical 
difference between pronouns that are rewritten and those that are not. While it can be 
imagined that a working functional account may one day be technically clever enough to 
derive the cases of switch, it does not seem possible either to relate an account such as 
Rebuschi’s to other existing theoretical phenomena or to embed such an account in a larger 
theory o f indexicals. Assuming that there is syntactic orientation, on the other hand, and 
allowing the existing machinery of dependency theory to do the rest, is simpler and more 
theoretically elegant. On the analysis developed here, all indexical expressions are 
syntactically oriented—not just the ones that lead to switch interpretations. Built within a 
proposed new model o f indexicals, the dependency processes that explain the switch 
phenomenon are found operating elsewhere in the grammar.
4.3 The theory of indexicals, given "switch"
Over these last two chapters, a thorough account of the switch phenomenon has been 
achieved. I have shown that if syntactic orientation exists, the switch phenomenon can be 
subsumed under dependency theory. For a dependency analysis to have the correct results in 
predicting switch in the configurations where it does occur, as well as in ruling out switch 
where it cannot, it has been shown that the new dependency must be licensed at a different 
derivational line than the numeric level. Thus the analysis of switch has provided support for 
the hypothesis that orientation is a syntactic property operating at a pre-numeric derivational
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level of logical form. Both the orientation level, and the numeric level, have been shown to 
be required to explain the full range of observations surrounding the switch phenomenon.
The proposed new model of formal context developed earlier thus has additional 
empirical support. In chapter 2, I argued that a two-tiered formal context through which 
numeric indices may be functionally derived through orientation in the syntax was a highly 
explanatory model, providing a unified account for sentences containing indexicals and non- 
indexicals alike, and allowing a natural explanation of context shift. Now we have seen that 
the explanation of "switch" reference has also followed naturally in the new model, assuming 
that dependencies may be licensed at the derivational level of orientation.
As yet, however, the operation of the new model has not been tested much beyond the 
singular indexical pronouns, with the exception of the unexpected switch readings in indirect 
discourse, and of plural pronouns in the cases o f context bifurcation. In the next and final 
chapter, I will ask whether the new model can be extended to other indexical expressions.
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Chapter 5: A new theory of indexical expressions
5.0 The derivation of plural indexical pronouns
To this point, most of the examples that have been exploited to establish and illustrate 
the workings of the new model have contained singular first and second person pronouns. A 
few examples containing plural pronouns have been considered briefly in chapter 4, in the 
discussion of bifurcated contexts. When the procedure for the derivation of plural expressions 
is examined in more detail, however, it becomes clear that the cases already considered are in 
all likelihood exceptional, in that the explanation for the bifurcated context examples involves 
special assumptions concerning the context structure itself. I will claim in this section that 
more usually, plurals are interpreted without altering the standard actual context, which is also 
used for singular expressions.
Let's return to the.Holiday example, repeated below as (1). As remarked earlier, I 
assume, following Fiengo and May, that the numeric value of a plural expression is a "fused" 
index, indicated by 0 ,  as introduced by Link (1983).
(1) a. Laura: Oh Susan and Nick, love you2 © 3 0
b. Susan: Darling, we do, too =  ...we2 ®3 a [love y o u ^ ], too
It was mentioned in the previous chapter that for the switch reading to be derivable for (lb ), 
it must be the case that the w function return a fused index. That is to say, at the orientation 
level of structure, the plural pronoun would be marked only with orientation, from which the 
fused index may be derived. Therefore the structure of the formal context for (lb), for 
example, would have to be as illustrated in (2), in which co(*-) =  2 0 3 .  The derivation of 
(lb) at logical form would then proceed as shown in (3) (ignoring index types, which are 
irrelevant to the point being made here). At line 1 of this derivation, there is only
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orientation.
-
1 2 3 . . .
\© l
Laura
A
line 1: We_
\© /
Susan
A
love you_], too
\© /
Nick
A
line 2 : We2 © 3  [love yout], too
However, there is another method of deriving the fused numeric values for plural 
expressions in the model—which I will argue is the more usual—that does not involve an 
alteration of the context structure. Instead, at the orientation level of logical form the index 
o f a plural indexical expression is analyzed to be a fusion o f orientation with one or more 
numeric values. Such an account can assume an unaltered context, in which only one 
sequence position at a time is oriented, with the c j  function returning a single value as 
opposed to a fused value. Under this alternative analysis for plural indexical expressions, the 
derivation of a sentence such as we think you should visit proceeds as shown in (5), assuming 
the context illustrated by (4).
—►
1 2 3 . . .
© © ©
IX\ IY \ IZ\
A A A
(5) line 1: We_ e 3  think you_ should visit
line 2 : We2 © 3  think yoU[ should visit
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Note that unlike in (3), there cannot be an oriented dependency at line 1 of (5), because at 
that derivational level, there is a numeric value that would be unaccounted for . 1 So a context 
structure such as (2 ) must be possible, since without it the switch reading for cases like the 
Holiday example would be underivable on this alternative account. The question then 
becomes whether there is reason to believe that both kinds of derivations can occur for a 
plural indexical.
Support for the idea that the derivation of indexical plurals not only can, but more 
usually does, proceed against unaltered contexts such as (5) comes from everyday sentences 
like (6 ).
(6 ) Since we went to my family’s on Thanksgiving, w e’ll go to his family’s for Christmas
Assuming again the unaltered context (5), through the fusion o f orientation with numeric 
value at the level of orientation, the derivation of the numeric values for (6 ) proceeds 
unproblematically, as shown in (7).
1 There is also good reason to believe that, in general, a dependent occurrence of an 
index cannot be licensed by a independent occurrence within a ftised index. There is a sloppy 
interpretation in (ia), for example, that is not available for (ib).
(i) a. Susan5  and Jack6  believe hinig to be crazy, and Alicey and Tedg do, too 
b. They5 Q6  believe hin^ to be crazy, and THEY7 © 8  do, too
The problem with this is that it is the intuition of some that there is a "disjointness effect” in
(ib), so for these people the reading of the first clause in which the individual indicated by 
him is a member of the group indicated by they is unavailable (cf. Lasnik 1981). However, 
everyone agrees that (ii), in which a noun phrase is bound from within a fused index, is 
ungrammatical.
(ii) * They5 © 6  believe himself6  to be crazy
From the other direction, it can be shown that a plural noun phrase bearing a fused index may
be coindexed with, but not bound by, "split antecedents"—for discussion, see chapter 1 in 
Fiengo and May 1994.
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(7) line 1: Since we_ @ 3  went to my_ family’s on Thanksgiving, we’ll_ @ 3  go to his3
family’s for Christmas
line 2: Since w e^ -j went to my2  family’s on Thanksgiving, we’Il2 © 3  go to his3  
family’s for Christmas
However, if the context for (6) were instead the altered (2), in which the output of the cj 
function were a fusion index, (6 ) could only be derived through the assumption of the context 
shifting at the two points indicated by || in line 2 of (8 ). The derivation of the first [we] 
would be unproblematic in context (2), as co(«-) = 2© 3. However, to derive the numeric 
value for the following [my], the context would have to shift to (5). Then the context would 
have to shift back again to (2 ) to derive the numeric value for the following [we] .
(8 ) line I: Since we_ went to my_ family’s on Thanksgiving, we’ll_ go to his3  family’s
for Christmas
line 2: Since we2 ® 3  went to || my2  family’s on Thanksgiving, || we’ll2 ® 3  go to his3  
family’s for Christmas
If the numeric values for all plurals were derived by the method proposed for the Holiday 
example, there would in general need to be a context shift every time the speaker switched 
from singular to plural or from plural to singular. This seems counterintuitive—why should 
the context shift at these || junctures? Unlike in the "dreamscape'' and counterfactual 
sentences analyzed in chapter 2 , where it seems reasonable to conjecture that a new formal 
context is shifted to which reflects the dream world or hypothetical situation, there does not 
seem to be any justification for context shift just because a speaker chooses to refer both to 
himself individually and to a group of which he is a member. I therefore conclude that in the 
usual case, the appropriate derivation is one that proceeds as in (7), against an unaltered 
formal context, and that no shifting takes place.
However, the Holiday example shows that there are contexts that have an altered
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structure like (2 ), in which the oj function returns not a single value but a fusion of values. 
Switch readings for sentences including plurals are only derivable under this analysis 
assuming such an altered context. Therefore, a first person plural expression, for example, 
will be derivationally ambiguous between (9) and (10), depending on the formal context.
(9) line 1: [ we ]^.
line 2 : [ we ] 2 © 3
( 1 0 ) line 1 : [ we L_ © 3
line 2 : [ we ] 2 © 3
I have claimed that (10) is the more usual derivation in that it can occur without assuming an 
altered context, or shifting contexts such as in (8 ). But how w/zusual is (9)? I would suggest 
that a special context structure in which indexical plurals can be derived as in (9) can only 
occur under bifurcation circumstances, as discussed in the previous chapter. Recall that it 
was proposed there that it is only in circumstances where a binary opposition can be 
established that the context can acquire the special status such that third person expressions 
may be syntactically oriented. I would now propose that it is not just oriented third person 
expressions that are exceptional, but also oriented indexical plurals. That is to say, an 
establishment o f a binary opposition is necessary for the context to be altered such that oj 
returns a fusion o f values instead o f a single value.
Evidence that in non-bifurcated circumstances plural indexical expressions bear a 
fusion of orientation and value, and not orientation alone, comes from the lack o f switch 
readings for sentences that, like (6 ), contain a mixture of singular and plural indexical 
expressions. For example, in (1 lb), (12b) or (13b)—where the first person plural is taken to 
indicate the inclusive group comprised of speakers 1 and 2 —only the strict reading is
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available; there is no switch. Note that along with noun phrases containing first and second 
person singular pronouns, a first person plural expression occurs medially in ( 1 1 ) and ( 1 2 ), 
and finally in (13). All other conditions of switch having been met, if that indexical plural 
could be marked with only orientation, we would expect a dependency to be licensable and 
the switch reading to occur in these replies. But if it is assumed instead, as proposed above, 
that an indexical plural can be only oriented only in cases o f  context bifurcation, then this will 
not be the case for (11-13), as there is no individual or group in these circumstances in binary
opposition to the group comprised of speakers 1 and 2. Thus on this account the noun
phrases [we] or [our] must be marked <-©n, and not at the orientation level, and an 
oriented dependency will not be possible, explaining the lack o f switch.
(11) a. Speaker 1: I’d love it if we ran into your ex at the party
b. Speaker 2: I would, too ^  I’d love it if we ran into your ex at
the party, too
(12) a. Speaker 1: I think our children will grow up to hate you
b. Speaker 2: I do, too ^  I think our children will grow up to
hate you, too
(13) a. Speaker 1 : I think you should give our relationship another chance
b. Speaker 2: I do, too ^  I think you should give our
relationship another chance, too
In light of what I have called the "usual" derivation o f plural indexicals, it is now 
clear that switch between plural indexicals under the we/you all bifurcation is as exceptional 
as the us/them bifurcation, in which switch occurs between first and third person. That is to 
say, it is as unusual for an indexical plural to be marked only with orientation as it is for a 
third person expression. These cases of switch occur through altered formal contexts, and the
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formal context is alterable due to a circumstance of binary opposition of groups. Ln the 
Holiday example, Laura is friends with Susan and Nick not as individuals but as a couple. In 
the case of the military leaders exchanging threats, it is the two nationalities in binary 
opposition. In the codified structure o f the bridge game, there is an opposition between the 
two sets of partners. Thus the altered formal context of the bridge game, from the 
perspective of—say—East, as illustrated in (14), is available not only for we/you all cases, but 
also for cases of us/them. The former is as highly marked as the latter.
- —>
E W N S
V©/ \© / \© / \© /
East West North South
A A A A
Assuming that in the usual method of derivation the fused index of indexical plural 
expressions are partly oriented and partly not allows the numeric level to be derived 
unproblematically at logical form without assuming unmotivated shifting contexts. In 
addition, it also allows a natural way to describe the pronominal systems across languages, in 
which functionally different indexical expressions bear different specific combinations of 
syntactic orientation and numeric values. For example, in a language that has a plural 
indexical that is both "dual" and "inclusive," to use traditional descriptive terms, an 
expression containing that form would bear the fusion index «-©-► at the orientation level of 
logical form. Combinations o f the two syntactic orientations that have been hypothesized 
here, along with variables for numeric value and orientation or numeric value, are sufficient 
to account for the different pronominal possibilities that are—to my knowledge—attested. 
Shown below are the functional indexing at the orientation level for expressions that comprise, 
according to Ingram’s (1978) typology, the four most common pronominal systems across
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languages. Listed in order of their frequency, these four systems together account for 71% 
of the languages in Ingram’s sample. (The remaining 17 systems are generally one o f these 
with one or more gaps.)
a. "Six-personsystem" * > l singular plural
first person *- «-©x*
second person - -*©n*
third person n nffin*
b. "Eleven-person system" * > l singular dual plural
first person (exclusive) *— <-ffin «-ffin*
first and second (inclusive) < ■©-> - ff i-6
second person —* -*ffin -*ffin*
third person n nffin nffin*
c. "Seven-personsystem" * >  1 singular plural
first person (exclusive) *- «-©n*
first and second (inclusive) <-©-►© n*
second person -ffin *
third person a nffin*
d. "Nine-person system" * >  1 singular dual plural
first person «— <-ffix -ffix *
second person -*ffin -*ffin*
third person n nffin nffin*
(where n =  numeric value; x =  orientation or numeric value)
The indexing patterns indicated in the grids in (15) match intuitions concerning 
their respective expressions. Assuming the minimal formal context, for the expressions that 
are solely comprised of orientations at this level—first and second person singular, and 
inclusive dual—only knowledge of language is needed for their interpretation. For the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 0 8
expressions that are oriented only in part—the remaining first and second person duals and 
plurals—knowledge of language alone will only partly determine their interpretation. For the 
third person expressions that are oriented not at all, other knowledge beyond that o f language 
must be assumed.
5.1 Other indexical expressions
The majority of this analysis has centered on the indexical pronouns, and it is through 
the syntactic behavior of these pronominal expressions that the new model has been 
constructed and motivated. However, this account would not be complete were it not to 
examine whether the proposed model can be extended to include indexical expressions beyond 
the pronominal system.
I have claimed that there are two syntactic orientations, informally described as 
"inward" and "outward." Expressions containing first person pronouns are syntactically 
marked with the former, second person with the latter, and third person expressions are not 
oriented. Support for the model set up in this way has appeared throughout this analysis.
When other expressions in the "indexical" family are considered, however, we find in English 
a difference between these expressions and the pronouns: where there is a three-way 
contrast—first, second, third—in the pronominal system, there is instead a two-way contrast 
among non-person expressions. For places and things in the proximity of the speaker,
English has here and this corresponding to the first person, but contrasting with here and this 
there are no expressions for places and things in the proximity of the hearer. Rather, in 
contrast to here and this, English has there and that, which intuitively correspond not to 
second person but to third person. This is evident in the traditional way of talking about 
these words; while the pronouns are usually described in terms of "speaker" versus "hearer," 
the here/there and this/that contrasts are usually described instead as "proximal" versus
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"distal," and the distal there and that are generally classed as "demonstrative" and not 
indexical. This way of talking may lead to confusion: it is important to realize that it is not a 
matter of one kind o f binary contrast versus another, but a ternary versus a binary contrast.
In terms of a model that assumes syntactic orientation, these observations lead to the 
hypothesis for the non-pronominal indexicals that only the proximal member of each pair is 
syntactically oriented, while the distal member of each pair has no orientation, as illustrated 
below.
(16) * - - *  no
orientation orientation orientation
people I you he/she
places here there
things this that
Note that under this proposal, occurrences of here and this will be syntactically 
marked with the same orientation as occurrences of I. On the face of it, this will cause a 
technical difficulty in the operation o f the co function: will u(<-) return an index that evaluates 
to a person, place or thing? One obvious way to avoid this difficulty would be to propose, 
alternatively, that the two orientations that I have called "inward" and "outward” are reserved 
for the pronouns, and that there are other orientations for the proximal indexicals, for 
example "downward" and "cater-comered," as illustrated in (17).
(17) [ I ]*- [ you ]-+ [ here ] I [ this \ /
Indeed, something similar to (17) is assumed by Larson and Segal (1995) in their alphabetic 
indexing proposal. As discussed in chapter 2, Larson and Segal hypothesize that first person 
pronouns have index a and second person pronouns b. In addition, other indexical 
expressions are assigned other, different alphabetic indices in their system: here. for
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example, is indexed c, and now is indexed d. Under Kaplan’s assumptions, as well, each of 
the indexicals has it own "character" function unrelated to the others—it is only through 
stipulation that the "agent of the context" is located at the place determined by the character 
of here. However, not only do multiple orientations as in (17) lack the intuitive appeal of 
(16), but in the derivation of specific cases it turns out that explanatory' problems would result 
if such an alternative were to be assumed. 1 will adopt the schema in (16), deferring until the 
next section the discussion of these cases and the solution to the technical difficulty with the w 
function.
Support for this proposal for the non-pronominal indexicals will be found through the 
examination of the syntactic behavior o f the pairs here and there, and this and that, in relation 
to the indexical pronouns, which will comprise the next two sections. In particular, syntactic 
orientation for the non-pronominal indexicals is supported by observations of "cross- 
indexical” dependencies. Once examples containing these other expressions are considered, it 
becomes clear that the formal context structure proposed in chapter 2 must be adjusted, 
leading to a stronger, more explanatory model. In addition, the status of the time indexicals 
now and then in the model will be discussed. To complete the discussion of "other" 
indexicals, I will ask whether the hypothesized two syntactic orientations are sufficient.
Finally, I will return to the question of what makes a "demonstrative" a demonstrative.
5.11 Here and there
Evidence that there is syntactic orientation for expressions containing the locative 
adverbial here, but not for there, comes from observations that here can vary with the 
indexical pronouns. That is, under verb phrase ellipsis, sentences containing here can have 
"sloppy," as well as "strict" readings. Such sloppy readings can be readily explained under 
an analysis that hypothesizes that oriented dependencies are possible "cross-indexically"—that
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is, by assuming in this case that the locative indexical and the indexical pronoun are in a 
dependency relation.
To illustrate, imagine a telephone conversation between two friends, one in New York 
and the other in Los Angeles, that includes one of the exchanges in (18) or (19). To make
each of the sloppy and strict readings as pragmatically likely as the other, assume that both
speakers are well acquainted with both places. Subscripts indicating the cities have been used 
to indicate the relevant interpretations for the replies. listed in sloppy, strict order.
(18) a. Speaker 1: I love it hereNY
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I love it hereLA, too
=  I love it thereby- too
(19) a. Speaker 1: Don’t you love it thereLA
b. Speaker 2: Don’t you? ?£ Don’t you love it thereNY ?
=  Don’t you love it hereLA ?
For here in (18), both sloppy and strict readings are quite good, but for there in (19), only 
the strict reading is available—under a dependency analysis, exactly as would be predicted on 
the assumption that here has syntactic orientation but there does not. Note that the sloppy 
reading does not occur if a non-indexical coreferent expression is substituted for here in (18); 
if speaker 1 had said I  love it in New York, speaker 2 ’s reply could only have the strict 
interpretation.
Comparing (18) to (20), note that the sloppy reading for here becomes unavailable in 
a sentence that does not contain an earlier indexical expression, which lends support to a 
dependency analysis.
(20) a. Speaker 1: Jack loves it herej^y
b. Speaker 2: Ted does, too ^  Ted loves it hereLA, too
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The lack of the sloppy reading in (20) shows that the presence of /  is crucial to the sloppy 
reconstruction of here in (18), which therefore cannot be analyzed as being explainable under 
some notion other than dependency, such as word-identity.
How will the dependency analysis o f (18) proceed? First, it must be the case that the 
oriented occurrence of [here] can be dependent, licensed by the oriented independent [/]. 
Assuming the orientation schema in (16), the licensing would be as shown below.
(21) a. Speaker I: 1 ^  love it h e re^
b. Speaker 2: 1 ^  [love it here^J, too
The structures in (21) represent the pre-numeric, oriented level of structure, at which the 
dependency is licensed. In deriving the numeric values, however, the technical difficulty 
discussed above comes to the forefront: how does the function evaluate on the different 
expression types? Although they are co-oriented, it is clear that /  and here are not coreferent: 
in (21a), for example, the pronoun evaluates to speaker 1 and the locative to New York.
There are two possible solutions to this difficulty. The first would propose that /  and here, 
though co-oriented, are not numerically covalued, from which it would follow that they need 
not be coreferent. The second solution assumes that I  and here are both co-oriented and 
numerically covalued, but that nonetheless they are not coreferent. Although the former may 
seem more intuitive, it will be the latter solution that is workable. To see why, let’s run 
through both possibilities.
Under the first suggestion, co-oriented expressions would not necessarily be covalued. 
This could be, if it were supposed that oo takes not one argument, as previously assumed, but 
two arguments, a>(o,c) where o = orientation and c =  subcontext. The idea would be that 
the conceptual division of individuals from locations and from objects—which is after all 
reflected in the lexical categories of the language—is also reflected in the structure of the
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formal context. On this idea, the context would have a defined subpart dedicated to 
"individuals," another to "locations," yet another to "objects,” and so forth. Thus the a> 
function would be relativized to a subsection of the context: for example, a)(«-,/) would be 
the value of «- in the "individuals" section of the formal context, while u («-,0  would be
evaluated in the "locations" section. For the derivation of the numeric level of (21), this
would lead to the representations in (22). The modified context for (22a) would be as shown 
in (23). Note that ) =  1, and oj(«-,f) =  51, thus /  and here, though co-oriented, would 
be contra-valued.
(22) a. Speaker 1: rj"a  love it here‘s
b. Speaker 2: I^g [love it here^g], too
- < —
I 2 . . . 51 52
©
/S l\
A
©
/S2\
A
New
York
Los
Angeles
However, assuming such a context structure would lead to a problem for the dependency 
analysis, as the dependencies in (22a) and (22b) are not i-copies, under the analysis developed 
in chapter 3. Recall that according to the i-copy condition, dependencies may differ by no 
more than a singleton indexical value. Although the encoded dependencies have identical 
orientation patterns, their value sets differ: (1,51) versus (2,52). Thus the altered context 
structure as depicted in (23) must be rejected. Note too that if multiple orientations for the 
other indexicals were assumed, as suggested in (17), that the same i-copy problem would 
result, giving added support to the rejection of (17) on intuitive grounds.
On the other hand, if  the second solution is adopted, identity of dependencies holds 
without further assumptions. Under this proposal, the a> function has a single argument.
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orientation, that returns a numeric value, as originally proposed. The relativization to 
subsections of the context does occur, but not at logical form in the derivation from 
orientation to numeric value, but rather in the second, semantic stage of interpretation. In 
fact, it makes more sense to suppose that such conceptual categories as "individuals" or 
"locations" are available at the semantic stage, and not at the earlier, syntactic stage. Thus 
the a function has two arguments: o(n,c) where n = numeric value and c =  subcontext. On 
this solution, /  and here are not only co-oriented, they are also numerically covalued, as in 
(24). They will not, however, be coreferent—as can be seen from the formal context for 
(24a) shown in (25). The i-copy condition for dependencies as defined in chapter 3 remains 
intact: while the value sets o f the encoded dependencies in (24a) and (24b) differ, it is only 
by a singleton value (1) versus (2), which is by the condition allowed. Note that under these 
assumptions, numeric covaluation will only entail coreference under a constant subcontext c.
(24) a. Speaker 1: love it h e re ^
b. Speaker 2: [love it here^g], too
—►
1 2
©
/S l\
A
New
York . . .
©
fS2\
A
Los
Angeles . . .
The sloppy reading for here is thus derived through dependency on co-oriented I.
Are there also cross-indexical "switch" readings? This analysis predicts that they will occur, 
and the prediction appears to be borne out. Consider, for example, (26). To construct a 
suitably "intimate" situation, imagine that speakers 1 and 2 are lovers, who live in separate 
places, in a telephone conversation late at night. The switch interpretation is quite strong for 
(26b). (Note that the strict interpretation would be quite odd.)
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(26) a. Speaker 1: Why don’t you take a cab over here?
b. Speaker 2: Why don’t you? =  Why don’t you take a cab over here?
As would be anticipated under a dependency analysis for (26) that parallels the analysis for 
switch between indexical pronouns, there is no switch in (27), that contains a proper name 
instead of the locative indexical, nor in (28), parallel to the Jack puzzle, nor in (29), in which 
there is no earlier oriented expression to depend on. Rather these only have strict readings, 
even though for (27b), the interpretation is as odd as for (26b).
(27) a. Speaker 1: Why don’t you take a cab to Mulberry Street?
b. Speaker 2: Why don’t you? ^  Why don’t you take a cab to Mott
Street?
(28) a. Speaker 1: Why don’t you tell Jack to take a cab over here?
b. Speaker 2: Why don’t you? Why don’t you tell Jack to take a cab
over here?
(29) a. Speaker 1: Why doesn’t Jack take a cab over here?
b. Speaker 2: Why doesn’t Ted? ^  Why doesn’t Ted take a cab over
here?
The representations at logical form to derive the switch in (26) are as shown in (30), 
assuming an altered formal context along the lines of (25). The encoded dependencies in 
(30a) and (30b) are both of the orientation pattern < -* ,« -> , and have identical value sets 
(1,2), thus the i-copy condition holds.
(30) a. Speaker 1: Why don’t y o u ^  take a cab over h e re ^  ?
b. Speaker 2: Why don’t you fa take a cab over hereT^ ?
As with the sloppy here, if the modified formal context were instead assumed to be as
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depicted in (23), the i-copy condition would fail for the switched here, as the value sets would 
differ: (2,51) versus (1,52).
Unexpectedly, once these "intimate" circumstances of lovers-on-the-telephone-late-at- 
night are contrived, sloppy and strict interpretations of there become available, where there is 
taken to indicate the location of the hearer. For example, in the back-to-back exchanges in 
(31), suddenly a switch interpretation is available for (31b) and a sloppy interpretation is 
available for (3 Id). These examples suggest that contrary to initial assumptions, there can in 
fact be syntactically oriented.
(31) a. Speaker 1: Maybe I should take a cab over there
b. Speaker 2: Maybe I should =  Maybe I should take a cab over there
c. Speaker 1: No, you should stay there
d. Speaker 2: You should, too =  You should stay there, too
I would argue, however, that while there has syntactic orientation in (31), allowing the switch
and sloppy readings to be derived along the same lines as for here, that this is a highly 
marked option, similar to the exceptional us/them cases discussed in chapter 3, in which it 
was found that a third person expression could have orientation. The contrived situation of 
the lovers for (31) is, like the bridge game, simply another bifurcation circumstance—in this 
case not for groups of people, but for locations. For the purposes of these two lovers in this 
conversation, there are only two relevant locations, her place and his place, and here and 
there can divide and exhaust the context in this regard. I conclude that (31) is not counter­
evidence for the "no orientation" status of there proposed in (16), but rather an exception that 
parallels the exception found earlier in the pronominal system: in bifurcated contexts, 
orientation can appear on there as it can on third person pronouns. That this is the correct 
way of thinking about (31) is further supported by efforts to construct other circumstances in
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which sloppy or switch readings for there are available—such efforts are generally fruitless, as 
the reader may verify. For example, the status of the exchange in (31c-d), which in the 
contrived circumstances has a sloppy reading, deteriorates sharply to the status of (19) when 
these circumstances are removed.
The final evidence that the locative indexical here is syntactically oriented comes from 
cases that parallel the "many pronoun" examples discussed in chapter 3. Consider another 
exchange between the friends in different cities, shown in (32), that contains a mixture of 
indexicals, the two singular indexical pronouns followed by the locative here. An across-the- 
board strict reading is available for (32b). But if there is a dependency in the structure, it 
appears that here must be included therein, for if I  and you switch in the reply, here must also 
switch and cannot be interpreted strictly. This reading is certainly not pragmatically odd, for 
example in the case where speaker 1 does not actually live in New York but is staying in a 
hotel there. This lack of a "mixed” reading is what would be predicted under the assumption 
that here is oriented; as discussed in chapter 3 for the "many pronoun" cases, only across-the- 
board interpretations are available for oriented dependencies, due to the requirement that all 
dependencies be licensed at the same level of structure.
(32) a. Speaker 1: 11 wish you2 lived hereNY
b. Speaker 2: I2 do, too =  I2 wish I2 lived thereNY (ATE strict)
=  I2 wish yoU[ lived hereLA (ATE switch) 
l2 wish yout lived thereNY ("mixed")
The parallels between sentences containing here to those containing only indexical 
pronouns are striking. These cases are readily explained in the model I have proposed, 
assuming that here, like the indexical pronouns, is syntactically oriented. By assuming that 
oriented dependencies can be licensed among any expressions that are syntactically oriented, 
and not just among expressions containing the pronouns, no further explanation is required to
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account for the pattern of strict, sloppy and switch interpretations observed for the locatives 
here and there.
5.12 This and that
Not surprisingly, the pair this and that (and their plural counterparts) are in many 
ways similar to here and there. As was the case with here, sloppy and switch interpretations 
of this in sentences containing an earlier indexical do occur. Examples of sloppy or switch 
for that are harder to come by than for there, however, perhaps due to the conceptual 
difficultly of context bifurcation under a this/that binary opposition. Let's try to construct a 
scenario in which this might be the case. Imagine that speakers 1 and 2 are dining out. 
Speaker 1 has ordered spaghetti with clam sauce, and speaker 2 has ordered spaghetti and 
meat balls. Now, it might well be the case that for the purposes of these speakers in 
conversation concerning their dinner, these two dishes are the only relevant things, just as for 
the lovers, her place and his place were the only relevant locations.
Given this situation, consider (33) and (34). The two different spaghetti dishes I have 
indicated with the subscripts cs and m b, respectively. With this following an earlier /, both 
the sloppy and the strict readings are available fo r the reply in (33b). In (34b), however, with
that following an earlier you, only the strict reading is available—although the unavailable
sloppy is marginally possible.
(33) a. Speaker 1: I think thiscs looks delicious
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I think thisMB looks delicious, too
=  I think thatc s  looks delicious, too
(34) a. Speaker 1: Do you like the way thatMB looks?
b. Speaker 2: Do you? ^  Do you like the way thatcs looks?
=  Do you like the way thisMB looks?
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In terms of switch interpretations, one is available in (35b) for this following an 
earlier you , but there is no switch for that in (36b), which can only have the strict, joke 
interpretation that speaker 2 wants to keep the meat balls all to himself.
(35) a. Speaker 1: Would you like some of thiscs ?
b. Speaker 2: Would you? =  Would you like some of thisMB ?
(36) a. Speaker 1: I sure would like some o f thatMB
b. Speaker 2: I would, too I sure would like some of thatc s , too
The pattern o f readings observed for this and that is duplicated for their plural 
counterparts these and those. Imagine that instead of spaghetti, our diners had ordered 
countable food, such as sushi, speaker 1 having tuna (T) and speaker 2 having mackerel (M). 
Parallel to (33) and (34), the sloppy reading is available for these in (37b) but not for those in 
(38b).
(37) a. Speaker 1: I think these^- look delicious
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I think thoseT look delicious, too
=  I think theseM look delicious, too
(38) a. Speaker 1: Do you like the way thoseM look?
b. Speaker 2: Do you? Do you like the way those^- look?
=  Do you like the way theseM look?
Similarly, substituting plural expressions in (35) and (36) leads to the same readings as for the 
singular this and that: switch is available for these but not for those.
Finally, consider a "many indexical" example containing a final this, such as (39). 
Imagine for (39) that speakers 1 and 2 are holding the gifts that they are about to exchange.
The observed readings for the reply parallel those that were observed for here, as well as for
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the many pronoun examples: ATB strict and switch are both possible, but the "mixed" 
reading is out of the question.
(39) a. Speaker 1: 1, hope you2  like this , present
b. Speaker 2: I2 do, too =  I2 hope I2 like that, present (ATB strict)
=  I2 hope you , like this-, present (ATB switch)
I2 hope you, like that, present ("mixed")
These observations of this and that, as well as their plural counterparts, lend further support 
for the schema proposed in (16), that this but not that is syntactically oriented. Unlike the 
case for there, which under exceptional bifurcation circumstances apparently can bear 
syntactic orientation, that seems to be exempt from this possibility, perhaps because this/that 
bifurcations are conceptually difficult. In other respects, the this/that pair is the same as 
here/there. We will return to that and there in the discussion of demonstratives below.
5.13 Now and then
It seems reasonable to hypothesize that like here and this, now is syntactically 
oriented, and that like there and that, now's contrastive partner then has no orientation. In so 
doing, the time adverbials would be assimilated to the schema proposed in (16). Although 
such assimilation is attractive for its own sake, direct evidence for syntactic orientation of now 
is scarce. The reason for this is illustrated by (40). Although the reply in (40b) might look 
at first glance like a "sloppy” reading, it is also the reading that would be derived "strictly," 
since the time indicated by now  is the same for both speakers.
(40) a. Speaker 1: I have to go now
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I have to go now, too
No one would disagree that now is indexed to the circumstances of utterance.
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However, it differs from the other indexical expressions that have been examined in that it is 
indexed to the dimension of time, rather than spatially. The appeal of the schema in (16), in 
which /, here and this all share the same syntactic orientation, rests on the intuition that all of 
these are in the same spatial proximity relativized to the speaker. But since the time picked 
out by now in ordinary conversation is not any different for the speaker than it is for the 
hearer, arguments that now shares the same orientation as second person are as likely as first 
person. Furthermore, when the "speaker" and "hearer” are separated in time, as is the case 
with written communication or recording devices, in some cases now  is interpreted with the 
former and other cases with the latter. Fillmore (1997) distinguishes these different times as 
"encoding time" versus "decoding time." The occurrence o f now  in I  wish you were with me 
right now, written in a love letter, would be interpreted as indicating the "encoding time," 
while in the same letter the occurrence o f now  in Close your eyes right now and think o f  me 
would be interpreted as indicating the "decoding time." But to conclude from this that now 
may be syntactically ambiguous between one orientation or the other would be mistaken. In 
line with the discussion of the answering machine example in chapter 2, the second of these 
different "times" is actually a case of indexical transplanting. There is no syntactic 
ambiguity: now  has a single orientation that in non-shifted contexts evaluates to the 
"encoding time." However, the context may be shifted to the future in a letter or recording, 
and now will evaluate in the shifted context in the normal way. The question is, what is the 
single orientation that now has—is it one o f the two orientations already hypothesized, or 
perhaps a third, different orientation?
If there were "sloppy” readings of now  varying with /, similar to those observed for 
here and this, this would constitute evidence that the orientation of now is the same as for I. 
Such cases are quite difficult to construct, because to test whether now can vary with I, it has 
to be the case that the two speakers exist at different times, but the test for sloppy readings
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involves verb phrase elision, which generally occurs in immediate conversation. There are 
science fiction scenarios in which all o f  the above conditions are met, but let’s first try to 
construct a real life case. Suppose that a young woman, having just received a letter from her 
sweetheart far away, reads (41a). Clasping the letter to her bosom, she sobs to the wind. Oh 
darling—I do, too! The intuition is that now in the letter reader’s "reply" can go sloppy as 
well as strict.
(41) a. Letter writer: I wish you were with me right now 
b. Letter reader: Oh, darling—I do, too!
As mentioned above, now in (4 la) picks out the "encoding time” of when the letter was 
written. The dilemma for the sloppy interpretation of the "reply" in this example, however, 
is that it is not clear that the letter reader has not instead "transplanted” the written sentence, 
interpreting it according to the "decoding time” in which she is reading. That is, has she not 
in clasping the letter to her bosom and replying to the wind, imagined that her lover was 
somehow standing before her? Talcing this argument to its conclusion, both possible readings 
of (41b) can be analyzed as strict with respect to the different context assumptions for (41a).
Perhaps some clarity can be found in a science fiction scenario, constructed to be 
parallel to the situation, discussed with here and there, of two friends speaking on the 
telephone who are in New York and Los Angeles, respectively. Imagine that time travel has 
become common, and that there is an across-time telephone device that allows people to 
converse who have traveled to, or have chosen to live in, different times. Imagine that the 
exchange (42) occurs between two avid time travelers using this device: speaker 1, having 
traveled two hundred years into the past, is conversing with speaker 2, who has traveled two
hundred years into the future. The question is whether there are both the "sloppy" and
"strict" readings of now in the reply.
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(42) a. Speaker 1: I love it nowl797
b. Speaker 2: I do, too =  I love it now2 1 9 7
=  I love it then1797
Given the time-travel story, both readings are indeed available for (42b)—if anything, the 
sloppy reading is stronger than the strict. In the same circumstances, a "switch" reading of 
(43b) with now  opposed to you  is less strong but nonetheless available. This suggests that 
now and /  do indeed share the same orientation.
(43) a. Speaker 1: You would love it now1797
b. Speaker 2: You would, too ? =  You would love it now2197
Unfortunately, parallel examples containing then are just confusing. Although time 
travel may have to actually come to pass before we can determine for sure that now  shares the 
same syntactic orientation as /, this, and here, this preliminary evidence seems promising. 
Moreover, there would seem to be no contradiction if now and then are assimilated within the 
schema proposed in (16), which, as mentioned at the outset of this section, is attractive for its 
own sake. The picture that emerges is uniform across the different expression types, in which 
the two hypothesized orientations account for all the basic contrasts made in the language.
5.14 Are two syntactic orientations sufficient?
At the beginning of this chapter, I claimed that the hypothesized pair o f syntactic 
orientations, informally described as "inward" and "outward," provide a sufficient and natural 
account o f different pronominal systems across languages, as described by Ingram. And 
throughout this discussion of non-pronominal indexical expressions in English, there has been 
no reason to hypothesize additional orientations. In fact, there is evidence from examples 
involving here/there and this/that, as well as with now, that hypothesizing additional
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orientations would lead to the wrong predictions. Are two orientations enough? In English, 
the answer is apparently yes.
A brief glance at languages other than English indicates that as with the pronominal 
system, the contrasts made for the non-pronominal indexicais do differ across languages. For 
example, where English has the two-way distinction here and there, Anderson and Keenan 
(1985) report that Palauan has a three-way contrast that parallels the first-second-third 
distinction in the pronominal system: qr tia, §r til^cha, and %r se for "here" (near speaker), 
"there” (near hearer), and "there" (distant). The two orientations seem sufficient to account 
for Palauan locatives, with *-, and no orientation accounting for the ternary locative 
distinction in the same way as for the pronouns. It is possible that more orientations might 
well be necessary, however, for indexical contrasts that go beyond a ternary distinction. For 
example, there is a seven-way locative distinction in Malagasy, also reported by Anderson and 
Keenan, as mentioned in chapter 1: the forms ety, eto, eo, etsy, eny, eroa, and ery lie along 
the dimension closer-to-the-speaker to further-away-ffom-the-speaker.
At this point, the cross-language data are too incomplete to decide the matter; the 
question whether more orientations are in fact required must be left to future research.
5.2 Demonstrative expressions
Given the new model o f formal context that has been developed in this dissertation on 
the evidence of indexical expressions, we are now in a position to better identify the class of 
expressions that are used "demonstratively." Recall from chapter 1 that it was necessary to 
reject the identification of a demonstrative with its accompanying demonstration, 
paradigmatically thought of as a pointing gesture. To briefly review, it was established that 
demonstratives do not necessarily occur with demonstrations, that demonstrations do occur 
without demonstratives, and that even a demonstration that does occur along with a
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demonstrative does not necessarily indicate the object or individual that is being referred to by 
the linguistic expression. What, then, is a demonstrative use? A demonstrative use is one in 
which an ”underspecified" expression is felicitous through the situational prominence of the 
intended referent—prominence that may in many cases be achieved through demonstration.
On the analysis that has been offered in this dissertation, what makes the expressions 
that are used demonstratively a class is that they have both o f the following properties: first, 
they are not syntactically oriented, and second, they contrast with expressions that are exactly 
like them except for syntactic orientation.
Let’s review the expressions that are used demonstratively in English. Among the 
personal pronouns, there are the third person he, she, or they, and among non-pronominals, 
the distal there, that, and those. Note that all of these fulfill both of the above conditions: 
except in special bifurcation contexts, none has syntactic orientation, and all contrast with 
oriented expressions: he or she contrasts with /  and you; they contrasts with we; there 
contrasts with here; that contrasts with this; those contrasts with these. An additional curious 
fact about English follows from the above conditions, for which I know of no explanation in 
any other theory of indexicals or demonstratives, and that is the fact that the third person 
pronoun it in English does not have a demonstrative use.2 Note that although it is not 
syntactically oriented, it fails the second condition above, in that it does not contrast with 
another expression that is exactly like it but is oriented, thus it cannot be used 
demonstratively.
In the usual, non-bifurcational circumstances, these non-oriented, contrastive 
expressions constitute the class o f expressions that can be used demonstratively. The 
demonstrative expressions are in complementary distribution with indexical expressions.
2 The adviser to this dissertation attributes this observation to James Higginbotham.
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differing from them only in terms of orientation. Note that because they have no orientation, 
the numeric value o f expressions that contain demonstratives will not be syntactically 
derivable at logical form. Grammatically speaking, they are seriously "underspecified."
Unlike their indexical counterparts that contain the "internal pointing" o f syntactic orientation, 
the deficient demonstrative expressions require external assistance.
As discussed in chapter 1, the purpose of the physical act of pointing is to draw 
attention to something, and this is all that pointing does. Pointing can and does co-occur with 
both indexical expressions and demonstrative expressions. In the case o f indexical 
expressions, pointing has a variety of effects—but it would be mistaken to conclude that when 
pointing occurs along with an indexical that the indexical has gained a "demonstrative" use.
On the contrary, the evidence is that indexical expressions do not have demonstrative uses. 
When a speaker says I  while pointing to himself, the linguistic expression he has chosen 
unambiguously refers to himself. In addition, he has drawn attention to himself by pointing— 
in most circumstances, superfluously, in that referring to an object entails drawing attention to 
it. The purpose of the pointing in such a case seems similar to additional stress in English—it 
may be for extra emphasis, or for contrastive purposes "I (and not someone else)," or perhaps 
because the speaker believes that the addressee is hard of hearing.
There might be different reasons why a pointing gesture would accompany the 
indexical you, such as in the case where a speaker says I ’ll take you and you, pointing at Jack 
and Teddy, respectively. But this is not a case of you being used "demonstratively." The 
effect of the pointing is to make clear who is being addressed with each utterance of you. 
Through its orientation, each occurrence of you unambiguously refers to the addressee in the 
context—the pointing simply helps makes clear the context in each case. Note that if while 
looking into your eyes I say I  think you 're guilty, taking care to point with my index finger at 
the orange cat along with the occurrence of you in my utterance, that I have accused you and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 2 7
not the cat, because I am addressing you and not the cat—although my pointing may have 
drawn attention to the cat. Recall as well the discussion in chapter 2, in which it was argued 
that the so-called demonstrative use o f  here, involving a pointing gesture to a map, is actually 
a case of the gesture effecting a context shift. In none of the cases o f a pointing gesture 
accompanying an indexical is the gesture used to bring the intended referent to prominence, in 
order that the expression will unambiguously refer, as is the case with demonstratives. Thus 
in normal circumstances, indexical expressions are in complementary distribution with 
demonstratives, which contrast with indexical expressions in that they are non-oriented.
Thus in the theory developed here, the syntactically oriented indexical expressions 
are never used demonstratively. However, demonstrative expressions can in special cases 
behave "indexically," due to circumstances in which at least some of them can have syntactic 
orientation. These are the bifurcation situations, where an indexical expression and one o f the 
usually non-oriented expressions split and exhaust the context. As has been shown, under 
such exceptional circumstances, an occurrence of they can be oriented under bifurcations of 
us/them; and there can be oriented where only two locations are assumed. Ready examples 
are not available for the third person singular pronoun he or she, or for that, perhaps because, 
as mentioned earlier, context bifurcations delimited by these singular terms are conceptually 
difficult.
S.3 Concluding remarks
I began this analysis with arguments in support of the "uniformity thesis," the idea 
that all expressions—indexical and non-indexical alike—are syntactically individuated in the 
same way at logical form. I have claimed that indexical expressions are syntactically 
oriented, and proposed a two-tiered model o f the formal context, in which the numeric values 
of indexical expressions are functionally derived in the syntax, through the mechanism of
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orientation. In the new model, observations o f the syntactic behavior of the indexical 
expressions are readily explained, and in addition, the model provides a natural way of 
accounting for indexical "transplantation" through context shift.
Direct evidence for the existence o f syntactic orientation has come from observations 
o f the interaction between dependency theory and indexical expressions, first revealed through 
observations of "switch" interpretations among the indexical pronouns. The assumption that 
dependencies may be licensed among the syntactic orientations at the syntactic level of 
orientation has led to an explanatory account of when such readings can occur. The further 
availability of "sloppy" and "switch" readings for certain o f the non-pronominal indexicals in 
sentences containing an earlier indexical pronoun lends credence to the extension of this 
theory to all indexicals expressions. The schema in (16)—along with the assimilation o f the 
time indexicals—shows how the two hypothesized syntactic orientations are realized on the 
different indexical expressions in English, assuming non-bifurcational circumstances. First 
person pronominal expressions share the same syntactic orientation as the proximal indexicals 
here, this, and now; second person expressions have the alternate orientation; third person 
expressions, and the distal there, that and then have no orientation. In bifurcational contexts, 
these latter expressions can be exceptionally oriented the same as second person pronouns.
Through examination of the larger range of indexical expressions, the proposal for the 
formal context has been developed beyond the original model in chapter 2, its final modified 
form repeated below.
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In the formal context, the orientation function will return a numeric value, derived at the 
syntactic level of logical form. The second function within the formal context, the semantic 
function that operates from index to individual, has two arguments: the numeric value and 
the subcontext. Thus more than one indexical expression may share the same syntactic 
orientation.
Importantly, the overall analysis offered here is consistent with, and allows a natural 
description of, what is known concerning the acquisition o f indexicals, discussed in chapter 1, 
which before closing I would like to review. Recall that according to Clark (1978) a 
demonstrative based on that or there is often among a child's first ten words, and always in 
the first fifty. This is not surprising, given that like names, that and there have no syntactic 
orientation, and thus are structurally less complex than indexical expressions: mastery o f  the 
functional operation of orientation is not necessary to their effective use. When pronouns 
appear, first person forms arrive first, but for most children, the contrast between first and 
second person takes a while to figure out. Given the proposed model, there is a natural way 
to describe what is going on during this time for the language learner. To master these 
pronouns, the child needs to have straight not only the binary distinction of orientation 
associated with the correct forms, but also full command of the additional tier in the formal 
context.
After the first and second person contrast is mastered, there follows the other "deictic 
contrasts," first here/there, and then this/that. In terms of syntactic orientation, these 
contrasts are between orientation and no orientation, unlike the three-way distinction for the 
pronouns, so it is not very surprising that they come later than I/you—although it is not clear 
why here/there should precede this/that. Despite the fact that that and/or there is found being 
used demonstratively among the child’s first fifty words, Tanz (1980) noted that in terms of 
the pairs in which these contrast, the proximal member is learned first—which is to say, used
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
230
consistently for a location or object that is near the speaker. Again, given the model I have 
proposed here, this is not so surprising: the proximal here and this are syntactically oriented, 
while their distal partners are not. Consistent evidence of "inward" syntactic orientation for 
here and this is thus predicted to appear in the child’s input and so in their production, where 
there remains inconsistency for the nonoriented there and that.
As a percentage of expression types, the English language contains a very small 
number of "pure indexicals." The importance o f indexicality to human language, however, 
cannot be underestimated. To paraphrase what Bar-Hillel argued more than forty years ago, 
an account o f language that does not include indexical expressions is not an account of human 
language. It is my hope that this dissertation has contributed towards the goal of achieving an 
explanatory account of this aspect of our knowledge o f language.
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